

## Moral and Amoral Liberal Democracies: How Targeted Chaos Can Affect the Democratic Process?

By

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**Abstract** – Liberal democracies are usually morality based, but sometimes they can be amoral. When they are morality based, they are normal liberal democracies. When they are amorality based they are extreme liberal democracies.

Morality and practical morality based world views or political platforms have been the competing forces usually fighting against each other to gain power and to reflect their views on policy under majority rule based normal liberal democracies, including in the USA. And one thing that these competing political groups claim to have in common is to have the best interest of the majority in mind or at heart. In other words, their moral high ground is to seek the best interest of the majority, and a true majority view support gives them the electoral win. This is because under normal democratic outcomes the majority view always wins the democratic contest. Hence, morality and practicality form the corner stone of opposition parties under normal liberal democracies under majority rule based systems.

As we all know the world of extreme liberal democratic outcomes came in 2016, a shift from normal democratic outcomes to extreme democratic outcomes in the UK (BREXIT/LeaveEU) and in the USA (USEXIT/Trumpism). This represents a shift from morality based democracies or choices to amorality based democracies or choices. As extreme democratic outcomes have the best interest of the minority in mind, the shift meant a move away from moral and practical majority rule friendly values in favor of amoral values to closely reflect the best interest of the minority. This is because under extreme liberal democracies the minority view somehow wins the democratic contest. Hence, amorality forms the corner stone of party behavior under extreme liberal democracies,

It is known that chaos, especially manufactured chaos or misinformation played a key role in the coming BREXIT and USEXIT in 2016 and continues to play a key role right now, yet not much is written to my knowledge about how that could happen, about where and how manufactured chaos can be targeted to induce specific complacency conditions or participation behavior that are necessary to induce specific ways of affecting the voting process creating in this manner political room for anti-majority rule democratic outcomes; and understand that way what happened in 2016 that shifted liberal democracy models from normal to extreme.

Among the goals of this paper is to use qualitative comparative means to state the structure of true democracy in a way that allows us to represent a) how chaos, specially manufactured chaos, can actually be targeted specifically to influence, and to even shift normal democratic outcomes; and b) to use the same framework to highlight that with limited or no chaos we should always expect a normal democratic outcome.

**Keywords:** Majority rule, complacency, partial complacency, full complacency, democratic outcomes, normal democratic outcomes, extreme democratic outcomes, true majority complacency, true minority complacency, full participation assumption, full voting assumption, complacency assumption, chaos, manufactured chaos, targeted chaos, BREXIT, USEXIT.

### Introduction

#### a) The liberal democracy morality line

Liberal democracies are usually morality based, but sometimes they can be amoral. When they are morality based, they are normal liberal democracies. When they are amorality based they are extreme liberal democracies. Hence it can be said that there are morally based policies and amorally based policies. For example immigration policy in Canada is morally based to show compassion and tolerance as the case of Syrian refugees showed(BBC 2015) while in the USA the same policy is based on amoral grounds to show cruelty and intolerance and disincentive as the case of the Muslim ban(Shear and Cooper, 2017) and the zero tolerance policy(Allen 2018) indicated. Therefore, it can be said that morality goes from 0 to 1 as indicated in the inverse line in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1 The liberal democracy morality line

Figure 1 above tells us that at point 0 we have full amorality (AM) and that at point 1 we have full morality (MO).

**b) Morality based liberal democracies**

It can be said that normal liberal democracies (NLD) are morality based democracies, whether based on pure morality or practical morality. Their main characteristics are inclusion, openness, respect for the rule of law, equality, stability, integration, union, harmony, the truth, trust, clarity, scientific facts, and the will of the majority for the common good is the heart of normal democratic outcomes. Sen(1999) pointed out the plurality of virtues that make democracy a universal value such as i) political participation and freedom in human life; ii) political incentives to keep government responsible and accountable; and iii) the formation of democratic needs, rights and duties, virtues consistent with the characteristics of democracy listed above.

Under these normal conditions the majority rule based voting system (V) one person one vote leads to normal democratic outcomes (NDO). There is a normal democratic outcome (NDO) when the true majority view wins the democratic contest (Muñoz 2017a). Therefore, the level of morality under which normal liberal democracies (NLD) and normal democratic outcomes (NDO) operate is high; and hence, they are located at the far right of the morality line as indicated in Figure 2 below:




Figure 2 Types of democracies and types of democratic outcomes within the democracy morality line.

Point (i) in Figure 2 above tells us that normal liberal democracies (NLD) work under high moral grounds. Morality and practical morality based world views or platforms have been the competing forces usually fighting against each other to gain power and to reflect their views on policy under majority rule based normal liberal democracies (NLD), including the USA (Muñoz 2015), but what both groups claim to have in common is to have the best interest of the majority in mind. In other words, the moral high ground of competing groups is to seek the best interest of the majority, and a true majority view support gives them the electoral win. This is because under normal democratic outcomes (NDO) conditions the majority view always wins the democratic contest,

which is the expectation (Muñoz 2018).

Hence, morality and practicality form the corner stone of opposition parties under normal liberal democracies (NLD) under majority rule based systems, and this is consistent with the democratic history of the USA pre-Trump where democrats championed morality and the pre-Trump GOP championed practicality when winning or losing power (Muñoz 2015), a situation consistent with the position of normal democratic outcomes (NDO) at the right of the liberal democracy morality line above. Here actual corruption or direct lying or political spinning tend to fall apart when confronted with the truth as the rule of law is respected. Normal liberal democratic (NLD) forces work under the law as the law is seen as a strength. It has been pointed out that normal democracies in western countries can deal with lies intended to deceive when facing the truth (TG 2017) as the truth can cure them.

### c) Amorality based liberal democracies

It can be said that extreme liberal democracies (ELD) are amorality based democracies. Their main characteristics are exclusion, closeness, lack of respect for the rule of law, inequality, instability, separation, division, chaos, fake truth, fake trust, confusion, fake facts, and the will of the minority for the good of the minority is the heart of extreme democratic outcomes. If a normal liberal democracy is taken for granted on purpose or not, and true majority voting complacency takes hold, then extreme democratic outcomes can take place, and shift the democratic system from morality to amorality. It has been pointed out that Obama believes that democratic complacency can lead to extreme, immoral world views that work against majority rule based democracy (Green 2017), a view consistent with the expected behavior of extreme democratic outcomes.

Under these abnormal voting complacency conditions the majority rule based voting system (V) can lead to an extreme democratic outcome (EDO). Therefore, the level of morality under which extreme liberal democracies (ELD) and extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) operate is low; and hence, they are located at the far left of the morality line as indicated in Figure 2 above. Point (ii) in Figure 2 above tells us that extreme liberal democracies (ELD) work under low moral grounds.

As we all know the world of extreme liberal democratic outcomes (EDO) came in 2016, a shift from normal democratic outcomes (NDO) to extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) in the UK with BREXIT (BBC 2016) and in the USA with USEXIT/Trumpism (Rawlinson 2016). This represents a shift from morality based democracies or choices to amorality based democracies or choices. As extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) have the best interest of the minority in mind, the shift meant a move away from moral and practical majority rule friendly values in favor of amoral values to closely reflect the best interest of the minority.

This is because under extreme liberal democracies (ELD) conditions the minority view somehow wins the democratic contest, which is the expectation (Muñoz 2018). It has been pointed out that extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) take place only in democratic contests or in situations where the voting system (V) is under full true majority view complacency or full true majority voting collapse as only then the minority view can win (Muñoz 2017b). Notice that amorality makes it easy to make offensive remarks against specific groups such as poor countries (Barron 2018) or implement divisive policies such as on immigration (Allen 2018; Rizzo 2018) or to label factual arguments as fake (Naylor 2018) to excite and advance the best interest of the minority view.

Hence, amorality forms the corner stone of party behavior under extreme liberal democracies (ELD), reason why extreme liberal democracies (ELD) are placed to the left in the liberal morality line above. Here actual corruption or direct lying or political spinning tend not to fall apart when confronted with the truth as the rule of law is not respected. And this makes sense since extreme liberal democratic (ELD) forces work if needed outside the law as the law is seen as a constraint. It has been pointed out that normal democracies in western countries can not deal with lies intended to be lies to intimidate when facing the truth (TG 2017) as the truth cannot cure them. If caught, you deny it; and if confronted, you double down or bring up a new lie, that is the expectation that makes EDOs real. Leonhardt and Thompson (2017) have documented for example a list of lies under Trumpism.

### d) The expected moral tendency of inverse opposite liberal democracy models

It is important to point out here based on the discussion above that the normal liberal democracy model (NLD) and the extreme liberal democracy model (ELD); and therefore, normal democratic outcomes (NDO) and extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) are fully inverse opposite models. And therefore, if the expected moral tendency of normal liberal democracies (NLD) is towards full morality (MO), then the expected moral tendency

of extreme liberal democracies (ELD) is towards full amorality (AM), a situation depicted in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 The moral tendency of democratic outcomes

Figure 3 above helps us see that the expected moral tendency of normal democratic outcomes (NDO) is to the right from point (i) to point 1; and therefore, it tends towards full morality (MO). The expected moral tendency of extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) on the other hand is to the left in Figure 3 from point (ii) to point 0; and hence, it tends towards full amorality (AM). For example when dealing with concepts such as inclusion, free markets, global action, multilateral coordination, multiculturalism, and minority protection normal liberal democracies(NLD) count on moral tools whether it is trade or general development while to undermine the usefulness of these concepts extreme liberal democracies(ELD) use amoral grounds.

Notice that in the USA Obamacare was based on the grounds of social inclusion(Kohn 2015), a moral concern, while separating children from parents at the border under President Trump seems to be justified on the grounds of the right to exclude(Rizzo 2018), an amoral argument. The Paris Agreement ( UN 2015) represent joint environmental responsibility for countries under normal liberal democracy (NLD), but for extreme liberal democracies (ELD) it represents the curse of majority rule based organizations and agreements as it works better for them to be on their own under chaos so the fact that President Trump exited the Paris Agreement(Hunt 2017) is an action consistent with what is expected from an extreme democratic outcomes (EDO).

**e) The morality gap and chaos gap separating inverse opposite liberal democracy models**

It can be said that the space between the fully inverse opposite liberal models in Figure 3 above, the space between point (ii) and point (i) is a morality gap(MG) and chaos gap(KG), a situation summarized in Figure 4 below:





Figure 4 The morality gap(MG) and the chaos gap(KG)

One way of looking at the implications of Figure 4 above is that a) there is a chaos gap (KG) separating extreme democratic outcomes (EDO) from normal democratic outcomes (NDO); and b) there is a morality gap (MG) separating extreme liberal democracies (ELD) from normal liberal democracies (NLD). The wider the moral gap (MG) and the chaos gap (KG) are the more at risk the stability of normal liberal democracies is as the unexpected 2016 BREXIT (Jackson 2016) and unexpected 2016 USEXIT (Byers 2016) showed. People can take as truth what

is not true or take as not true what is true when under information chaos, coming from straight lies to conspiracy theories presented convincingly as truth. Both BREXIT(BT 2016) and USEXIT(Horton 2016) took place in 2016 under information chaos and conspiracy theories.

**f) General chaos and the working of normal liberal democracies**

It can be said that general chaos (K), manufactured or not, can be used to affect the working of the majority rule based voting system (V) by affecting voter complacency or voter participation behavior to create group voting collapses; and therefore, it can affect that way the working of normal liberal democracies (NLD) and the nature of normal democratic outcomes (NDO). We should expect that the characteristics of normal liberal democracies (NLD) will not do well under chaos, specially manufactured chaos presented as truth, a situation highlighted in Figure 5 below:



**Figure 5 Chaos(K) can be used to undermine the working of majority rule based normal liberal democracies and lure them towards amorality or to the left.**


We can say based on Figure 5 above that a) general chaos (K) affects the nature of normal democratic outcomes (NDO) through its impact on voter complacency behavior; and b) when doing this, general chaos pushes the normal liberal democracy (NLD) process to the left creating morality gaps as manufacture chaos and conspiracy theories presented as truth confuses voters in all political camps.

Hence, general chaos, manufactured or not, can affect voter complacency or participation behavior and therefore, it can affect the nature of the democratic outcome (DO) if it leads to group vote collapse. For example, it could lead to a bigger majority is it leads to true minority vote collapse or it could lead to a minority view win if there is a full true majority group vote collapse. This is the reason why extreme liberal democracy need to operate under chaos, to seek chaos, not unity as only under chaos minority view objectives can be reached or maintained, which explains why EDOs like Trumpism must strive to maximize chaos and keep it that way. It has been pointed out that the white house is under chaos since Trump became president and even now, making him a master of disruption(Elliott 2017), and this is normal if you look at it as me from outside the box; and it is abnormal for those looking at the same situation from inside the box.

**g) Targeting chaos to affect and even flip normal democratic outcomes**

We know that chaos, manufactured or not, can be targeted to affect true majority rule based democratic processes; and its final impact depends on how successful the targeting of the true majority vote is in creating true majority voting collapses. If the chaos targeted to induce true majority voting collapse is only partially successful, it only weakens the strength of normal democratic outcomes(NDO) and of normal liberal democracy(NLD). In this case the targeted chaos could only trick some true majority voters to support or act directly or indirectly to support manufactured facts presented as truth inducing that way partial majority voting group collapse, but the majority view still wins the democratic contest. If the chaos targeted to induce true majority voting collapse is fully successful, it shifts a normal democratic outcome(NDO) and a normal liberal democracy(NLD) into an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) and an extreme liberal democracy(ELD) respectively as the minority view wins the democratic contest. In this case the targeted chaos was successful in inducing full true majority voting collapse by tricking so many true majority view voters to direct anger directly or indirectly to support anti-majority rule based

outcomes based on manufactured chaos given as truth, and because of this the minority view wins the democratic contest. This situation is detailed in Figure 6 below:



**Figure 6** Chaos can be targeted(TK) to weaken or to shift normal liberal democracies(NLD)

Let's assume that at point (i) in Figure 6 above we have a strong normal liberal democracy (NLD) and strong normal democratic outcome (NDO). Then if chaos is targeted(TK) as truth to trick the true majority voting block into supporting anti-majority choices, and the action is partially successful, then the normal liberal democracy model(NLD) shifts to the left from point (i) to point (ii). At point (ii) we have a smaller or weaker normal democratic outcome (NDO1) as the true majority block collapsed some, but still a true majority. But if chaos is targeted(TK) as truth to trick the true majority voting block into supporting anti-majority choices, and the action is fully successful, then the normal liberal democracy model(NLD) shifts to the left from point (i) to point (iii). At point (iii) we have an extreme democratic outcome (EDO) as the true majority block collapsed so much that the true minority view wins the voting contest. Proof seems to be coming up indicating that the true majority view was specifically targeted in 2016 both in the UK (UKHC 2018) and in the USA(Price and Leswing 2018) with misinformation to create the conditions needed for extreme democratic outcomes to take place. Muñoz(2018) has pointed out a) that the expectation when there is partial true majority view complacency affecting the voting system is still to have a normal democratic outcome (NDO) as the true majority view still wins the democratic contest; and b) that the expectation when there is full true majority view complacency is to have an extreme democratic outcome (EDO) as the minority view wins the voting contest then.

**h) The need to understand how chaos affects majority rule based voting systems**

As indicated above chaos, especially manufactured chaos or misinformation played a key role in the coming BREXIT and USEXIT in 2016 and continues to play a key role right now, yet not much is written to my knowledge about how that could happen, about where and how manufactured chaos can be targeted to induce specific complacency conditions or participation behavior that are necessary to induce specific ways of affecting the voting process creating in this manner political room for anti-majority rule democratic outcomes; and understand that way what happened in 2016 that shifted liberal democracy models from normal to extreme. The successful targeting of chaos to generate extreme democratic outcome conditions is now being documented in the UK(UKHC 2017) and in the USA(Samuelsohn and Matishak 2018).

Among the goals of this paper is to use qualitative comparative means to state the structure of true democracy in a way that allows us to represent a) how chaos, specially manufactured chaos, can actually be targeted specifically to influence, and to even shift normal democratic outcomes; and b) to use the same framework to highlight that with limited or no chaos we should always expect a normal democratic outcome.

**Objectives**

- a) To use qualitative comparative means to state a true democracy model; b) To highlight that under no voter complacency conditions or no voting collapse we should always expect from this model a normal democratic outcome out of a voting contest; c) To stress that under general voting chaos, the model can produce either a

normal or extreme democratic outcome; and d) To point out that only when chaos is targeted and successful in inducing full true majority complacency or true majority voting collapse, the model produces an extreme democratic outcome.

### Methodology

First, the structure of a true democracy model is introduced. Second, it is indicated how the true democracy model works under majority rule expectations. Third, the structure of true democracy under majority rule is linked to general chaos based complacency or voting collapse. Fourth, the structure of true democracy under majority rule is linked to chaos targeted to induce true minority complacency, partial and full complacency or voting collapse.

Fifth, the structure of true democracy under majority rule is linked to chaos targeted to induce true majority complacency, partial and full complacency or voting collapse. Sixth, the structure of true democracy under majority rule is stated in terms of having no complacency or no protest behavior affecting the voting protest. Seventh, a short summary, implications and food for thoughts are shared. And finally, relevant conclusions are stressed.

### Terminology

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V = Voting model

$V_i$  = Voter “i”

$G_1$  = Group of voters 1

$G_2$  = Group of voters 2

T = True majority

M = true minority

D = Democracy

TD = True democracy

A = Group A

B = Group B

K = General chaos

O = Outcome

TK = Targeted chaos

DO = Democratic outcome

$TK_A$  = Chaos targeted to group A

$TK_B$  = Chaos targeted to group B

$TK_{PA}$  = Partial group A collapse

$TK_{FA}$  = Full group A collapse

$TK_{PB}$  = Partial group B collapse

$TK_{FB}$  = Full group B collapse

T = Dominant/active component

t = Dominated/passive component

M = Dominant/active component

m = Dominated/passive component

C = Complacency

NC = No complacency

TC = True majority complacency

TNC = True majority no complacency

MC = True minority complacency

MNC = True minority no complacency

FTC = Full true majority complacency

PTC = Partial true majority complacency

FMC = Full true minority complacency

PMC = Partial true minority complacency

NDO = Normal democratic outcome

EDO = Extreme democratic outcome

BREXIT = UK June 2016 outcome	USEXIT = USA November 2016 outcome
ND = No democracy exists	CRE = Complacency rule expectations
KC = General chaos led complacency	KC <sub>M</sub> = Chaos targets true minority complacency
KC <sub>PM</sub> = Chaos led partial complacency	KC <sub>FM</sub> = Chaos led full complacency
KC <sub>PT</sub> = Chaos led partial complacency	KC <sub>T</sub> = Chaos targets true majority complacency
KC <sub>FT</sub> = Chaos led full complacency	? = Unknown outcome
I = Influence operator	KC <sub>i</sub> = Chaos based complacency type i

## Operational concepts, chaos expectations, and operational models

### A) Operational concepts

- 1) **Democracy**, *system that aims at providing equal opportunity to elect, to be represented, and to share in the benefits to all its members;*
- 2) **True democracy**, *there is equal opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 3) **Partially distorted democracy**, *there is not equal opportunity in at least one democratic aspect;*
- 4) **Fully distorted democracy**, *there is inequality of opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 5) **Majority rule system**, *the electoral system where the majority rules decides the winner of democratic contexts;*
- 6) **Voters**, *each individual in the electoral system acting without complacency and who is committed to make sure his vote or her vote is counted in the determination of the democratic outcome with the goal to maintain or improve his current or future benefits and rights;*
- 7) **True majority**, *the actual number of voters who win the democratic context;*
- 8) **True minority**, *the actual number of voters who lose the democratic context;*
- 9) **Complacency**, *the social discontent or protest or frustration affecting opposing groups with the given democratic or electoral system choices that may lead voters from the true majority and/or the true minority to not vote at all or if they vote they go for a protest vote by either voiding their vote or shifting their vote to other choices in the belief that their party will still win or will still lose anyway without their vote or in the belief that their vote is just one vote anyway and it will not matter in the end result; Hence, complacency based voting is linked to pure dissatisfaction as voting behavior takes place without thinking much about the impact that this action may have in the end on the balance of current and future majority and minority democratic rights;*
- 10) **No complacency**, *the absence of social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral system that leads each voter from each group to vote for their preferred democratic choice to ensure his or her vote is counted, therefore no complacency based voting is linked either to ensuring the preservation and enhancing of current democratic rights in one group or linked to seeking the erosion or change of those rights or to slowing the pace of democratic change in the other group;*
- 11) **Partial complacency**, *the partial social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is not widespread; some voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*
- 12) **Full complacency**, *the general social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is widespread; many voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*

- 13) **True majority complacency**, *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*
- 14) **True minority complacency**, *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*
- 15) **True majority no complacency**, *everybody in the true majority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*
- 16) **True minority no complacency**, *everybody in the true minority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*
- 17) **Normal democratic outcome**, *under no complacency or not protest behavior everybody votes and the true majority wins the democratic contest; governments retain or lose power without big surprises. Inclusion, openness, respect for the rule of law, equality, stability, integration, union, harmony, the truth, trust, clarity, scientific facts, and the will of the majority for the common good are the heart of normal democratic outcomes.*
- 18) **Extreme democratic outcome**, *under full true majority complacency or full true majority protest behavior the true minority wins the democratic context, governments lose or win power under a big surprise as the democratic option that seems impossible to happen wins the day. Exclusion, closeness, lack of respect for the rule of law, inequality, instability, separation, division, chaos, fake truth, fake trust, confusion, fake facts, and the will of the minority for the good of the minority are the heart of extreme democratic outcomes.*
- 19) **Internal complacency**, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by internal group divisions(e.g. divisive choice/ leader selection);*
- 20) **External complacency**, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by external group divisions(e.g. equally disliked competing choices/ leaders);*
- 21) **Full democracy**, *a full inclusion model, a true democracy;*
- 22) **Partial democracy**, *a partial inclusion model, a distorted democracy;*
- 23) **Democratic stability**, *the tendency towards harmony associated with specific democratic outcomes;*
- 24) **Full democratic stability**, *the tendency towards full harmony associated with normal democratic outcomes;*
- 25) **Full democratic instability**, *the tendency towards zero harmony associated with extreme democratic outcomes.*
- 26) **BREXIT**, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the UK withdrawing from the European Union.*
- 27) **BREXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of economic or territorial or state based unions.*
- 28) **USEXIT**, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the USA withdrawing from the international and local order.*
- 29) **USEXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of the international and local order.*
- 30) **EXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements aiming at destroying majority rule based institutions, locally and globally.*
- 31) **Democratic normalism**, *the tendency of normal democratic outcomes to move towards more stable or balance democratic conditions through time as they seek responsible majority rule.*
- 32) **Democratic extremism**, *the tendency of extreme democratic outcomes to move towards the more unstable or unequal democratic conditions as they flourish under irresponsible minority rule.*

***B) Chaos expectations***

If we have a population of voters(V) that can be divided into two groups, groups A and group B under the assumption of one person, one vote and the assumption that everybody votes so that the total number of voters equals the total number of votes, then the voting model can be expressed as follows:

**1)  $V = AB$**

Formula 1 simply says that the voting system(V) brings together two groups of voters, group A and group B.

If we assume we do not know the size of group A and the size of group B, then the expectation of who will win the voting contest is not clear. In other words, when you do not know the size of the groups involved in the voting contest the expected winner outcome(O) is not clear(?), a situation that can be expressed as follows:

**2)  $V = AB \rightarrow O = \text{winner A or B} = ?$**

In formula 2 we can see that the expected outcome(O) of who is the winner is not clear(?) as we do not know the size of each group.

Now we can use formula 2 to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the voting model(V) comes from factor I, which systematically affects the voting system; and it therefore may affect the nature of the outcome(O) as indicated below:

**3)  $I[V] = I[AB] \rightarrow I[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?]$**

Formula 3 shows that the working and the outcome of the voting process(V) is being affected systematically by the operator I.

**a) General chaos expectations when we do not know the size of the groups involved**

If we make the influence operator(I) be general chaos(K), then we have  $I = K$  and if we substitute this in formula 3 we can state the expected influence of general chaos(K) on the winner expectation when we do not know the size of group A and of group B.

**Expectation 1**

When the voting system(V) is under the influence of general chaos(K), we can not link chaos and winners as we do not know the size of the groups involved and there is no clear targeting, which can be stated as:

**4)  $K[V] = K[AB] \rightarrow K[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?] = ?$**

Notice that if there is no chaos,  $K = I = 1$ , still we would not be able to have a clear expectation of the winner, an expectation consistent with that of formula 2 above.

**b) Targeted chaos expectations under majority rule**

If we assume now the size of group A is greater than that of group B in the voting model(V) so that  $A > B$ , where A is the majority group and B is the minority group, then the majority rule expectation leads to an outcome(O) that is normal democratic outcome(NDO) where the majority group A wins the voting contest, as indicated below:

**5)  $V = AB \rightarrow O = \text{winner A}$**

In formula 5 we can see that the expected outcome(O) is clear, group A is the winner as we do know that  $A > B$ .

Now we can use formula 5 to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the majority rule voting model(V) comes from factor I, which systematically affects the voting system and it therefore may affect the nature of the majority rule based outcome(O) as indicated below:

**6)  $I[V] = I[AB] \rightarrow I[O = \text{winner A}]$**

Formula 6 tells us that the working and the outcome of the majority rule voting process(V) is being affected by the operator I.

If we make the influence operator I be targeted chaos  $TK_i$ , so that  $I = TK_i$ , then the targeted chaos influence operation can be stated as follows:

7)  $TK_i[V] = TK_i[AB] \rightarrow TK_i[O = \text{winner A}]$

Notice from expression 7 above that depending of the type of targeted chaos( $TK_i$ ), the nature of the majority rule winner may change, and it raises the possibility that under a specific type of successful targeting the outcome can be flipped and be won by group B, a situation consistent with the ideas shared in the introduction that a specific type of targeted chaos may lead to flipping the majority rule based democratic outcome.

**i) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the minority group vote( $TK_B$ )**

**Expectation 2**

When majority rule voting system(V) is under minority group targeted chaos( $TK_B$ ); therefore,  $I = TK_i = TK_B$ , then the majority group A still wins the voting contest, and with a bigger majority as this chaos leads to minority vote collapse, partial or full, which flips minority votes toward the majority view camp:

8)  $TK_B[V] = TK_B[AB] \rightarrow TK_B[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still the winner}$

Notice that chaos targeted to the minority group  $TK_B$  does not affect group A.

**Expectation 3**

When minority group targeted chaos leads to partial minority collapse( $TK_{PB}$ ) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{PB}$ , then the majority group A still wins, with a slightly bigger majority,

9)  $TK_{PB}[V] = TK_{PB}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{PB}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still wins, bigger margin}$

**Expectation 4**

When minority group targeted chaos leads to full minority collapse( $TK_{FB}$ ) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{FB}$ , the majority group A still wins, with the biggest majority,

10)  $TK_{FB}[V] = TK_{FB}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{FB}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still wins, biggest margin}$

Notice that expectations 2, 3 and 4 above tell us that when the majority rule voting system(V) is under any type of minority group targeted chaos, the majority group is still expected to win the voting contest.

**ii) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the majority group vote( $TK_A$ )**

**Expectation 5**

When the majority rule voting system(V) is under majority group targeted chaos( $TK_A$ ), so that  $I = TK_i = TK_A$  we cannot have a clear expectation(?) of the voting outcome(O) or of who the winner is expected to be without knowing the type of true majority targeting and therefore, the type of majority group collapse it generates, partially majority group collapse( $TK_{PA}$ ) or full majority group collapse( $TK_{FA}$ ), as indicated below:

11)  $TK_A[V] = TK_A[AB] \rightarrow TK_A[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{winner A or B} = ?$

Notice that chaos targeted to the majority group  $TK_A$  does not affect group B.

**Expectation 6**

When majority group targeted chaos(TK<sub>A</sub>) leads to partial majority collapse(TK<sub>PA</sub>) so that I = TK<sub>i</sub> = TK<sub>PA</sub>, then the majority group A still wins the voting contest as still A > B, with a smaller majority, as stated below:

$$12) TK_{PA}[V] = TK_{PA}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{PA}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A wins, smaller majority}$$

**Expectation 7**

When majority group targeted chaos(TK<sub>A</sub>) leads to full majority collapse(TK<sub>FA</sub>) so that I = TK<sub>i</sub> = TK<sub>FA</sub>, the minority group B wins the voting contest as now B > A, since the majority group A votes has fully collapsed as shown below:

$$13) TK_{FA}[V] = TK_{FA}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{FA}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{B wins}$$

This is the only instance when an expected normal democratic outcome A can be flipped to an extreme democratic outcome B

***C) Operational models***

**a) The general voting model**

If we have a one person, one vote system, then we can express the population of voters(V<sub>p</sub>) as follows:

$$14) V_p = V_1 + V_2 + V_3 + \dots + V_{100} + V_{101} + \dots + V_n$$

Model V<sub>p</sub> in expression 14) above gathers all voters from voter V<sub>1</sub> to voter V<sub>n</sub>, which can also be stated as indicated below:

$$15) V_p = \sum_{i=1}^n V_i$$

Therefore, formula 15) above indicates the summation of all voters.

**b) The general voting model by groupings**

We can also express the population of voters in formula 14) and 15) in two main groups or views, group G<sub>1</sub> and group G<sub>2</sub> as shown below:

$$16) G_1 = V_1 + V_2 + \dots + V_{100} = \sum_{j=1}^r V_j \text{ and } G_2 = V_{101} + \dots + V_n = \sum_{k=1}^s V_k, \text{ where } r + s = n$$

Therefore, the voting model by groups can now be indicated as follows:

$$17) V_p = G_1 + G_2$$

In the model V<sub>p</sub> in expression 17) above we can see that the views of both groups G<sub>1</sub> and G<sub>2</sub> matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

**c) The general voting model in terms of true minority and true majority**

If we assume that group G<sub>2</sub> > G<sub>1</sub>, then G<sub>2</sub> is the true majority (I) and G<sub>1</sub> is the true minority (M) so that

$G_1 = M$  and  $G_2 = T$ ; and therefore, the following is true:

18)  $V_p = M + T$

In the model  $V_p$  in expression 18) above we can see that the views of both groups  $M$  and  $T$  matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

**d) The fully inclusive general voting model**

The voting model( $V$ ) that brings together the competing views of groups of participants is the ideal voting model as it is fully inclusive as indicated below:

19)  $V = G_2.G_1 = T.M$

Model  $V$  in expression 19) above tells us that the views of  $G_2$  and  $G_1$  and the views of the true majority  $T$  and the true minority  $M$  are present in the model at the same time; and therefore it is fully inclusive.

**The structure of true democracy**

As indicated in the introduction true democracy( $TD$ ) is the democratic system that is supported by a fully inclusive voting process( $V$ ), and therefore, the following holds true if we make  $TD = V$  in expression 20) above:

20)  $TD = V = G_2.G_1 = T.M$

Expression 20) above simply says that true democracy( $TD$ ) is a system based on a fully inclusive voting system( $V$ ) that brings together the views of competing groups or views in order to determine the ruler of that democracy.

**The structure of true democracy under majority rule**

Under the majority rule model's expectations of one person, one vote, where everyone eligible to vote votes for his preferred choice, either the true majority view( $T$ ) or the true minority( $M$ ); and where  $T > M$ , the following holds true:

21)  $TD = V = G_2.G_1 = T.M \text{ -----} \rightarrow T \text{ wins the voting contest as } T > M = NDO$

Expression 21) above is telling us that the true democracy model( $TD$ ) under majority rule produces always a normal democratic outcome( $NDO$ ) as the majority view( $T$ ) wins the democratic contest.

Notice that expression 21 summarizes the structure of normal democratic outcomes, of normal liberal democracies, and therefore the structure of morality based democratic models.

**The structure of true democracy under majority rule and general chaos based complacency**

When true democracy( $TD$ ) is affected by general chaos based complacency( $KC$ ), then we do know what type of democratic outcome( $DO$ ) to expect as we cannot link chaos with specific group voting collapses as we do not know who is being targeted, which is consistent with expectation 1 of chaos expectations above, and this can be indicated as follows:

22)  $KC[TD] = KC[V] = KC[G_2.G_1] = KC[T.M] \text{ -----} \rightarrow DO = ?$

Expression 22) above let us see that general chaos based complacency( $KC$ ) systematically affect the true democracy system( $TD$ ) determining the democratic outcome( $DO$ ), but we do not yet know the type of democratic outcome( $DO = ?$ ) to expect as we do not know the type of chaos based complacency( $KC = ?$ ) or the type of chaos based protest behavior affecting the expected democratic outcome or his nature..

Notice that if there is no general chaos based protest behavior  $KC = 1$ , then we have democratic outcome( $DO$ ) from model  $V$  that is a normal democratic outcome( $NDO$ ) as under majority rule based democratic systems the true majority  $T$  wins. Notice too that general chaos based complacency( $KC$ ) can be seen as a point through which the nature of a democratic outcome can be affected or changed like for example as if we targeted manufactured chaos and/or natural chaos to create true majority( $T$ ) or true minority( $M$ ) voting collapses.

**The structure of true democracy under majority rule and chaos targeted to induce true minority complacency(KC<sub>M</sub>)**

If chaos is targeted to induce true minority voting collapses(KC<sub>M</sub>), then the true majority T should be expected to win the democratic contest, which is consistent with the minority group targeted chaos in expectation 2 of chaos expectations above, the majority group wins, which applied to the true democracy model(TD) leads to:

**23)  $KC_M[TD] = KC_M[V] = KC_M[G_2.G_1] = KC_M[T.M] \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$**

Expression 23 above says we should expect a normal democratic outcome(NDO) when the true majority rule voting system is under true minority targeted chaos(KC<sub>M</sub>). Notice that the chaos targeted to the true minority group(M) does not affect the true majority group(T).

**i) The case of partial true minority complacency(KC<sub>PM</sub>)**

If chaos is targeted to induce true minority voting collapses and produces a partial true minority voting collapse(KC<sub>PM</sub>), then the true majority(T) should be expected to win the democratic contest, with a bigger majority, which is consistent with the minority group targeted chaos in expectation 3 of chaos expectations above, the majority group wins with a bigger majority, and this applied to the true democracy model(TD) leads to:

**24)  $KC_{PM}[TD] = KC_{PM}[V] = KC_{PM}[G_2.G_1] = KC_{PM}[T.M] \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$**

Expression 24 above indicates that we should expect a slightly stronger normal democratic outcome(NDO) when the true majority rule voting system is under partial true minority targeted chaos and collapse(KC<sub>PM</sub>).

**ii) The case of full true minority complacency(KC<sub>FM</sub>)**

If chaos is targeted to induce true minority voting collapses and produces a full true minority voting collapse(KC<sub>FM</sub>), then the true majority(T) should be expected to win the democratic contest, with the biggest majority, which is consistent with the minority group targeted chaos in expectation 4 of chaos expectations above, the majority group wins with the biggest majority, and when this is applied to the true democracy model(TD) leads to:

**25)  $KC_{FM}[TD] = KC_{FM}[V] = KC_{FM}[G_2.G_1] = KC_{FM}[T.M] \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$**

Expression 25 above tells us that we should expect the strongest normal democratic outcome(NDO) from this voting contest when the true majority rule voting system is under full true minority targeted chaos and collapse(KC<sub>FM</sub>).

**The structure of true democracy under majority rule and chaos targeted to induce true majority complacency(KC<sub>T</sub>)**

If chaos is targeted to induce true majority voting collapses(KC<sub>T</sub>), then we do not have a clear expectation of the winner of the voting contest as we do not know if this targeted chaos has produced either partial true majority voting collapse(KC<sub>PT</sub>) and therefore a normal democratic outcome(NDO) or a full true majority voting collapse(KC<sub>FT</sub>) and there is an extreme democratic outcome(EDO), which is consistent with the majority group targeted chaos in expectation 5 of chaos expectations above, we do not have yet a clear outcome expectation the type of true majority vote collapse at play, which when applied to the true democracy model(TD) leads to:

**26)  $KC_T[TD] = KC_T[V] = KC_T[G_2.G_1] = KC_T[T.M] \rightarrow DO = ? = NDO \text{ or } EDO$**

Expression 26) above let us see that chaos targeted to induced true majority complacency or voting collapse(KC<sub>T</sub>) systematically affect the true democracy system(TD) determining the democratic outcome(DO), but we do not yet know the type of democratic outcome(DO = ? = NDO or EDO) we can expect as we do not know the type of true majority targeted chaos based complacency(KC<sub>T</sub> = ?) at play.

**i) The case of partial true majority complacency(KC<sub>PT</sub>)**

When the system is under true majority group targeted chaos(KC<sub>T</sub>) and it leads to a partial true majority group voting collapse(KC<sub>PT</sub>), then we should expect to see a normal democratic outcome(NDO) with a weaker majority win, a situation consistent with the partial majority group targeted chaos in expectation 6 of chaos expectations above, the majority group still wins the voting contest, which applied to the true democracy model leads to:

**27)  $KC_{PT}[TD] = KC_{PT}[V] = KC_{PT}[G_2.G_1] = KC_{PT}[T.M] \rightarrow T$  wins, still  $T > M = NDO$**

Expression 27 above tells us that there is a normal democratic outcome(NDO) still when the true democracy model(TD) is under partial true majority voting complacency or collapse( $KC_{PT}$ ) as still  $T > M$ .

**ii) The case of full true majority complacency( $KC_{FT}$ )**

When the system is under true majority group targeted chaos( $KC_T$ ) and it leads to full true majority group voting collapse( $KC_{FT}$ ), then we should expect to see an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) where the minority view B wins the democratic contest, a situation consistent with the partial majority group targeted chaos in expectation 7 of chaos expectations above, where the minority group wins the voting contest, which applied to the true democracy model(TD) leads to:

**28)  $KC_{FT}[TD] = KC_{FT}[V] = KC_{FT}[G_2.G_1] = KC_{FT}[T.M] \rightarrow M$  wins, now  $M > T = EDO$**

Expression 28 above simply that there is an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) when the true democracy model(TD) is under full true majority voting complacency or collapse( $KC_{FT}$ ) as now  $M < T$ .

Notice that expression 28 summarizes the structure of extreme democratic outcomes, of extreme liberal democracies, and therefore the structure of amorality based democratic models.

**The structure of true democracy under majority rule and no complacency(NC)**

There is no voting complacency(NC) in a one person one vote true democratic systems when all the true majority voters(T) vote for the true majority candidate; and all the true minority voters(M) vote for their true minority candidate so that  $M + T =$  total number of votes and where  $T > M$ , and under those conditions the true majority(T) wins the democratic contest. If we make the influence operator  $I = NC$ , then we can state the influence operation under no complacency as below:

**29)  $NC[TD] = NC[V] = NC[G_2.G_1] = NC[T.M] \rightarrow T$  wins = NDO as  $T > M = NDO$**

Expression 29 above says that under no complacency(NC) we always expect to see a normal democratic outcome(NDO) where the view of the true majority(T) wins the democratic contest.

Notice that since there is no protest behavior here as all voters vote for their preferred candidate; then under no complacency(NC) there is no chaos of any type  $KC = 1$  and therefore the following is true:

**30)  $NC = KC = 1 =$  No protest behavior**

See that if we substitute the information in expression 30 above in expression 22 and in expression 29 we will reach expression 21, the structure of an expected normal democratic outcome(NDO) under majority rule liberal democracies, where the majority view T wins:

**31)  $TD = V = G_2.G_1 = T.M \rightarrow T$  wins = NDO as  $T > M$**

Expression 31 clearly above lets us see that when the true democracy model(TD) under majority rule leads to a normal democratic outcome when there is no complacency (NC) or protest behavior; and therefore, there is no chaos of any time( $KC_i = 1$ ).

**Summary:**

The structure of the true democracy model introduced here stated in terms of true minority and true majority groups allows us to show the point of entry general chaos and targeted chaos can have, in order to influence even in specific ways the expected democratic outcome under majority rule based democratic systems. In other words, the true democratic framework shared above can be use to point out among other things how targeted chaos can affect the outcome of a democratic process under majority rule. Notice that a flip from a normal democratic outcome to an extreme democratic outcome when it takes place means that the normal liberal democracy model has now shifted to an extreme liberal democracy model.

**Implications**

Chaos can be used by internal and external forces intentionally to induce specific groups voting collapses to benefit the interest of a particular group competing for power even to the point of flipping normal democratic outcome expectations associated with majority rule based democracies, where the true majority view is expected to win the democratic process. For example, if chaos can successfully be targeted to trick true majority voters into supporting a minority view, and this leads to a full true majority complacency and a full true majority voting

collapse, then we can have an extreme democratic outcome where the view of the minority view unexpectedly wins the democratic contest.

### Food for thoughts

a) Under majority rule, can extreme democratic outcomes take place in the absence of chaos?. I think no, what do you think?; b) Should we expect extreme liberal democracies to respect the view of or the values of the majority?. I think no, what do you think; c) Should democratic political parties and candidates be required by law to campaign on science based facts, not on conspiracy theories? I think yes, what do you think?; d) Is targeted chaos now the biggest threat to the stability of normal liberal democracies in the information age? I think yes, what do you think?; and e) Should a separate apolitical independent legal and binding framework such as a bill of voter's rights be created to ensure the equal and fair participation of each voter at all levels of governing electoral system from local to federal and to deal legally with voting issues including the voter's right to factual information from campaigns and candidates?. I think yes, what do you think?

### Specific conclusions

First, it was indicated that if the majority rule based true democracy model is under no protest behavior, the voting contest will produce a normal democratic outcome(NDO), an outcome that places the interest of the majority first. Second, it was stressed that when the majority rule based true democracy mode is under general chaos, the winner of the outcome cannot be linked clearly to it. Third, it was highlighted that when chaos is targeted to produce true minority complacency and result in true minority vote collapse, full or partial, we still expect to have a normal democratic outcome. And finally it was shown that when chaos is targeted to produce full true majority complacency; and this leads to a full true majority vote collapse, then we should expect to see an extreme democratic outcome(EDO), an outcome that places the best interest of the true minority first.

### General conclusions

First, it was pointed out that chaos can be targeted to affect the majority rule based model under which the stability of normal democracies sustainability rests, a model that guarantees that the democratic view of the majority prevails in the democratic process. Second, it was shown that if chaos can be successfully targeted to affect the behavior of the true majority and if it leads to a full true majority voting collapse, then it produces an extreme democratic outcome where the minority view wins the democratic contest. And finally it was indicated that a shift from a normal democratic outcome to an extreme democratic outcome can be seen as a shift from a morality bound model to an amorality bound one.

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