

**Sustainability thoughts 132: How can a general majority rule based liberal democracy model can be stated step by step and how can it be linked to normal democratic outcome and extreme democratic outcome existing and persisting dynamics?**

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**Abstract:** It can be said that the world of normal democratic outcomes that existed before 2016 Brexit/Brexism and USEXIT/Trumpism was flipped outside down as well as traditional democratic thinking. A world where the majority view rules under the constant watch of an independent judiciary was changed by a world where the view of the minority rules in constant fight with the independent judiciary with the goal of seeking loyalty to party/individual, instead of loyalty to the country/democracy. Even though Brexit came 2016 and persisted to today and Trumpism came in 2016 and faded it in 2020 there is no clear understanding of how they come to exist and why they persist or fail to persist as this knowledge falls outside traditional democratic and political thinking. Hence there is the need of new ideas on how the majority rule based liberal democracy model can be framed so that it can help us to understand how all possible democratic outcomes consistent with it can come to exist and persist at all costs, so we can capture the dynamics of normal and extreme democratic forces as they compete to outdo each other to exist and persist, one with the best interest of the majority in mind and the other with the best interest of the minority at heart. This understanding can give us real clues about what needs to be done right now to protect and improved the democracies in which we live in to keep them away from authoritarianism forces. Among the goals of this paper is to point out how a general majority rule based liberal democracy model can be stated step by step and how it can be linked to normal democratic outcome and extreme democratic outcome dynamics in terms of how they come to exist and persist.

**Keywords:** Normal democratic outcome, extreme democratic outcome, liberal democracy, normal liberal democracy, extreme liberal democracy, Brexism, Trumpism, no complacency, full true majority complacency, targeted chaos, effective targeted chaos, ineffective targeted chaos, true democracy, authoritarianism, temporary authoritarianism, permanent authoritarianism.

### Introduction

It can be said that the world of normal democratic outcomes that existed before 2016 Brexit/Brexism and USEXIT/Trumpism was flipped outside down as well as traditional democratic thinking. It has been pointed out that in the USA normal democratic outcomes have been alternating power going from moral liberalism to practical liberalism as a way to advance the common good(Muñoz 2015), but that trend changed in 2016 when BREXIT won in the UK to leave the European Union(BBC 2016) and when Trump won the election against Hillary Clinton(Rawlinson 2016; TG 2016), turning a normal liberal democracy outside down(Muñoz 2017a) as a shift from a normal democratic outcome structure to an extreme democratic outcome structure takes place(Muñoz 2017b) when it happened. A world where the majority view rules under the constant watch of an independent judiciary was changed by a world where the view of the minority rules in constant fight with the independent judiciary with the goal of seeking loyalty to party/individual, instead of loyalty to the country/democracy. The seeking of loyalty has been central soon after the Trumpism area started in 2016(loyalty to party/individual) to use it to implement policy or to expect legal or political protection as the case of the 2020 impeachment acquittal shows (Herb 2020). On the other hand, the seeking of retribution for those not willing to play along with the loyalty to requirement becomes central too. For example: a) the firing of James Comey(Shear and Apuzzo 2017) or of the firing of his first attorney general Jeff Sessions (Miller 2018) for not going against the law; and b) the frontal attacks on the media outlets and journalists for reporting the facts calling them enemies of the people(Wemple 2020) or labelling their coverage as fake news or as dishonest news(Diamond 2016).

Even though Brexit came in 2016(Wintour 2016) and persisted to today ending with a trade deal with the EU(CBC 2020) while Trumpism came in 2016 too(Hohmann 2016; Byers 2016 ) and failed to persist in 2020(Collinson 2020) there is no clear understanding of how they come to exist and why they persist or fail to persist as this knowledge falls outside traditional democratic and political thinking. The following has been pointed out recently: i) that extreme democratic outcomes should be expected to come to exist when there is full true majority complacency affecting democratic or election process(Muñoz 2018); ii) that extreme democratic outcome like Trumpism should be expected to operate outside moral boundaries(Muñoz 2019a) to achieved its goal; iii) that extreme democratic outcomes come to exist and flourish under chaos, and if it is able to use chaos as effective targeted chaos, it will persist in power(Muñoz 2019a); and iv) that when in power the extreme democratic outcome will be in constant war against independent normal democratic values, institutions, and science(Muñoz 2019b) with the goal of transforming them into non-independent democratic values, institutions and science in order to meet authoritarianism goals, yet those aspects of extreme democratic outcomes are either not known or they are not understood right now in the political arena in the USA and outside the USA alike.

Hence there is the need of new ideas on how the majority rule based liberal democracy model can be framed so that it can help us to understand how all possible democratic outcomes consistent with it can come to exist and persist at all costs, so we can capture the dynamics of normal and extreme democratic forces as they compete to outdo each other to exist and persist, one with the best interest of the majority in mind and the other with the best interest of the minority at heart. This understanding can give us real clues about what needs to be done right now to protect and improved the democracies in which we live in to keep them away from authoritarianism forces. Among the goals of this paper is to point out how a general majority rule based liberal democracy model can be stated step by step and how it can be linked to normal democratic outcome and extreme democratic outcome dynamics in terms of how they come to exist and persist.

### The goals of this paper

- a) To show how a general majority rule based liberal democracy model can be stated step by step; b) To link this general model to the structure of normal democratic outcomes and the structure of extreme democratic outcomes given complacency conditions and consistent legal loyalty conditions; c) To compare the specific structure of normal democratic outcomes with that of extreme democratic outcomes to highlight inconsistencies; d) To show that a perfect shift from normal democratic outcomes to extreme democratic outcome leads to permanent authoritarianism; and e) To highlight that a perfect shift from extreme democratic outcomes to normal democratic outcomes means a total collapse of authoritarianism.

### Methodology

- i) The terminology used in this article is shared; ii) Operational concepts, chaos expectations, operational models and complacency expectations are given; iii) The structure of the voting system in liberal democracies is stated; iv) that voting system is linked with democratic outcomes in liberal democracies; v) Democratic outcomes(DO<sub>i</sub>) are linked to type of democracy(LDi) giving voting behavior(C<sub>i</sub>) in those liberal democracies to point out the structure needed to come to exist and/or propagate; vi) Democratic outcomes(DO<sub>i</sub>) are linked with consistent loyalty based rule of law system(CRL<sub>i</sub>) to point out the structure needed to persist all costs; vii) Transforming the general democratic outcome structure(DO<sub>i</sub>)above in terms of majority rule based democratic environment(MLDi); viii) The structure of normal democratic outcome is extracted from the now majority rule based liberal model; ix) The structure of extreme democratic outcome is extracted from the now majority rule based liberal model; x) The inconsistencies and expected dynamics when democratic outcomes in power go to compete in elections are highlighted; and xi) A short summary, implications, food for thoughts, and relevance conclusions are provided.

### Terminology

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V = Voting model	V <sub>i</sub> = Voter “i”
G <sub>1</sub> = Group of voters 1	G <sub>2</sub> = Group of voters 2
T = True majority	M = true minority
D = Democracy	TD = True democracy
A = Group A	B = Group B

K = General chaos	O = Outcome
TK = Targeted chaos	DO = Democratic outcome
TK <sub>A</sub> = Chaos targeted to group A	TK <sub>B</sub> = Chaos targeted to group B
TK <sub>PA</sub> = Partial group A collapse	TK <sub>FA</sub> = Full group A collapse
TK <sub>PB</sub> = Partial group B collapse	TK <sub>FB</sub> = Full group B collapse
T = Dominant/active component	t = Dominated/passive component
M = Dominant/active component	m = Dominated/passive component
C = Complacency	NC = No complacency
TC = True majority complacency	TNC = True majority no complacency
MC = True minority complacency	MNC = True minority no complacency
FTC = Full true majority complacency	PTC = Partial true majority complacency
FMC = Full true minority complacency	PMC = Partial true minority complacency
NDO = Normal democratic outcome	EDO = Extreme democratic outcome
BREXIT = UK June 2016 outcome	USEXIT = USA November 2016 outcome
ND = No democracy exists	CRE = Complacency rule expectations
KC = General chaos led complacency	KC <sub>M</sub> = Chaos targets true minority complacency
KC <sub>PM</sub> = Chaos led partial complacency	KC <sub>FM</sub> = Chaos led minority full complacency
KC <sub>PT</sub> = Chaos led partial complacency	KC <sub>T</sub> = Chaos targets true majority complacency
KC <sub>FT</sub> = Chaos led full complacency	? = Unknown outcome
I = Influence operator	KC <sub>i</sub> = Chaos based complacency type i
ETK = Effective targeted chaos	ITK = Ineffective targeted chaos

## Operational concepts, chaos expectations, operational models and complacency expectations

### A) Operational concepts

- 1) Democracy**, *system that aims at providing equal opportunity to elect, to be represented, and to share in the benefits to all its members;*
- 2) True democracy**, *there is equal opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 3) Partially distorted democracy**, *there is not equal opportunity in at least one democratic aspect;*
- 4) Fully distorted democracy**, *there is inequality of opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 5) Majority rule system**, *the electoral system where the majority rules decides the winner of democratic contexts;*
- 6) Voters**, *each individual in the electoral system acting without complacency and who is committed to make sure his vote or her vote is counted in the determination of the democratic outcome with the goal to maintain or improve his current or future benefits and rights;*
- 7) True majority**, *the actual number of voters who win the democratic context;*
- 8) True minority**, *the actual number of voters who lose the democratic context;*
- 9) Complacency**, *the social discontent or protest or frustration affecting opposing groups with the given democratic or electoral system choices that may lead voters from the true majority and/or the true minority to not vote at all or if they vote they go for a protest vote by either voiding their vote or shifting their vote to other choices in the belief that their party will still win or will still lose anyway without their vote or in the belief that their vote is just one vote anyway and it will not matter in the end result; Hence, complacency based voting is linked to pure dissatisfaction as voting behavior takes place without thinking much about the impact that this action may have in the end on the balance of current and future majority and minority democratic rights;*
- 10) No complacency**, *the absence of social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral system that leads each voter from each group to vote for their preferred democratic choice to ensure his or her vote is counted, therefore no complacency based voting is linked either to ensuring the preservation and enhancing of current democratic rights in one group or linked to seeking the erosion or change of those rights or to slowing the pace of democratic change in the other group;*
- 11) Partial complacency**, *the partial social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is not widespread; some voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*
- 12) Full complacency**, *the general social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is widespread; many voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*
- 13) True majority complacency**, *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*
- 14) True minority complacency**, *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*
- 15) True majority no complacency**, *everybody in the true majority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*

- 16) **True minority no complacency**, *everybody in the true minority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*
- 17) **Normal democratic outcome**, *under no complacency or not protest behavior everybody votes and the true majority wins the democratic contest; governments retain or lose power without big surprises. Inclusion, openness, respect for the rule of law, equality, stability, integration, union, harmony, the truth, trust, clarity, scientific facts, and the will of the majority for the common good are the heart of normal democratic outcomes.*
- 18) **Extreme democratic outcome**, *under full true majority complacency or full true majority protest behavior the true minority wins the democratic context, governments lose or win power under a big surprise as the democratic option that seems impossible to happen wins the day. Exclusion, closeness, lack of respect for the rule of law, inequality, instability, separation, division, chaos, fake truth, fake trust, confusion, fake facts, and the will of the minority for the good of the minority are the heart of extreme democratic outcomes.*
- 19) **Internal complacency**, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by internal group divisions(e.g. divisive choice/ leader selection);*
- 20) **External complacency**, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by external group divisions(e.g. equally disliked competing choices/ leaders);*
- 21) **Full democracy**, *a full inclusion model, a true democracy;*
- 22) **Partial democracy**, *a partial inclusion model, a distorted democracy;*
- 23) **Democratic stability**, *the tendency towards harmony associated with specific democratic outcomes;*
- 24) **Full democratic stability**, *the tendency towards full harmony associated with normal democratic outcomes;*
- 25) **Full democratic instability**, *the tendency towards zero harmony associated with extreme democratic outcomes.*
- 26) **BREXIT**, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the UK withdrawing from the European Union.*
- 27) **BREXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of economic or territorial or state based unions.*
- 28) **USEXIT**, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the USA withdrawing from the international and local order.*
- 29) **USEXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of the international and local order.*
- 30) **EXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements aiming at destroying majority rule based institutions, locally and globally.*
- 31) **Democratic normalism**, *the tendency of normal democratic outcomes to move towards more stable or balance democratic conditions through time as they seek responsible majority rule.*
- 32) **Democratic extremism**, *the tendency of extreme democratic outcomes to move towards the more unstable or unequal democratic conditions as they flourish under irresponsible minority rule.*
- 33) **Effective targeted chaos**, *the chaos that leads to full true majority complacency or achieves specific targets.*
- 34) **Ineffective targeted chaos**, *the chaos that does not lead to full true majority complacency or does not achieve specific targets*
- 35) **Normal liberal democracy**, *the one where the majority view wins the democratic contest.*
- 36) **Extreme liberal democracy**, *the one where the minority view wins the democratic contest.*
- 37) **Effective targeted chaos**, *the one that leads to full true majority complacency.*
- 38) **Ineffective targeted chaos**, *the one that does not lead to full true majority complacency.*

### **B) Chaos expectations**

If we have a population of voters(V) that can be divided into two groups, groups A and group B under the assumption of one person, one vote; and the assumption that everybody votes so that the total number of voters equals the total number of votes, then the voting model can be expressed as follows:

#### **1) $V = AB$**

Formula 1 simply says that the voting system (V) brings together two groups of voters, group A and group B.

If we assume we do not know the size of group A and the size of group B, then the expectation of who will win the voting contest is not clear. In other words, when you do not know the size of the groups involved in the voting contest the expected winner outcome (O) is not clear(?), a situation that can be expressed as follows:

#### **2) $V = AB \rightarrow O = \text{winner A or B} = ?$**

In formula 2 we can see that the expected outcome (O) of who is the winner is not clear(?) as we do not know the size of each group.

Now we can use formula 2 to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the voting model(V) comes from factor I, which systematically affects the voting system; and it therefore may affect the nature of the outcome(O) as indicated below:

#### **3) $I[V] = I[AB] \rightarrow I[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?]$**

Formula 3 shows that the working and the outcome of the voting process(V) is being affected systematically by the operator I.

#### **a) General chaos expectations when we do not know the size of the groups involved**

If we make the influence operator(I) be general chaos(K), then we have  $I = K$  and if we substitute this in

formula 3 we can state the expected influence of general chaos(K) on the winner expectation when we do not know the size of group A and of group B.

**Expectation 1**

When the voting system(V) is under the influence of general chaos(K), we cannot link chaos and winners as we do not know the size of the groups involved and there is no clear targeting, which can be stated as:

**4)  $K[V] = K[AB] \rightarrow K[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?] = ?$**

Notice that if there is no chaos,  $K = I = 1$ , still we would not be able to have a clear expectation of the winner, an expectation consistent with that of formula 2 above.

**b) Targeted chaos expectations under majority rule**

If we assume now the size of group A is greater than that of group B in the voting model(V) so that  $A > B$ , where A is the majority group and B is the minority group, then the majority rule expectation leads to an outcome(O) that is normal democratic outcome(NDO) where the majority group A wins the voting contest, as indicated below:

**5)  $V = AB \rightarrow O = \text{winner A}$**

In formula 5 we can see that the expected outcome(O) is clear, group A is the winner as we do know that  $A > B$ .

Now we can use formula 5 to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the majority rule voting model(V) comes from factor I, which systematically affects the voting system and it therefore may affect the nature of the majority rule based outcome(O) as indicated below:

**6)  $I[V] = I[AB] \rightarrow I[O = \text{winner A}]$**

Formula 6 tells us that the working and the outcome of the majority rule voting process(V) is being affected by the operator I.

If we make the influence operator I be targeted chaos  $TK_i$ , so that  $I = TK_i$ , then the targeted chaos influence operation can be stated as follows:

**7)  $TK_i[V] = TK_i[AB] \rightarrow TK_i[O = \text{winner A}]$**

Notice from expression 7 above that depending of the type of targeted chaos( $TK_i$ ), the nature of the majority rule winner may change, and it raises the possibility that under a specific type of successful targeting the outcome can be flipped and be won by group B, a situation consistent with the ideas shared in the introduction that a specific type of targeted chaos may lead to flipping the majority rule based democratic outcome.

**i) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the minority group vote( $TK_B$ )**

**Expectation 2**

When majority rule voting system(V) is under minority group targeted chaos( $TK_B$ ); therefore,  $I = TK_i = TK_B$ , then the majority group A still wins the voting contest, and with a bigger majority as this chaos leads to minority vote collapse, partial or full, which flips minority votes toward the majority view camp:

**8)  $TK_B[V] = TK_B[AB] \rightarrow TK_B[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still the winner}$**

Notice that chaos targeted to the minority group  $TK_B$  does not affect group A.

**Expectation 3**

When minority group targeted chaos leads to partial minority collapse( $TK_{PB}$ ) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{PB}$ , then the majority group A still wins, with a slightly bigger majority,

**9)  $TK_{PB}[V] = TK_{PB}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{PB}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still wins, bigger margin}$**

**Expectation 4**

When minority group targeted chaos leads to full minority collapse( $TK_{FB}$ ) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{FB}$ , the majority group A still wins, with the biggest majority,

**10)  $TK_{FB}[V] = TK_{FB}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{FB}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still wins, biggest margin}$**

Notice that expectations 2, 3 and 4 above tell us that when the majority rule voting system(V) is under any type of minority group targeted chaos, the majority group is still expected to win the voting contest.

**ii) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the majority group vote( $TK_A$ )**

**Expectation 5**

When the majority rule voting system (V) is under majority group targeted chaos (TK<sub>A</sub>), so that  $I = TK_i = TK_A$  we cannot have a clear expectation(?) of the voting outcome(O) or of who the winner is expected to be without knowing the type of true majority targeting and therefore, the type of majority group collapse it generates, partially majority group collapse(TK<sub>PA</sub>) or full majority group collapse(TK<sub>FA</sub>), as indicated below:

11)  $TK_A[V] = TK_A[AB] \rightarrow TK_A[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{winner A or B} = ?$

Notice that chaos targeted to the majority group TK<sub>A</sub> does not affect group B.

**Expectation 6**

When majority group targeted chaos(TK<sub>A</sub>) leads to partial majority collapse(TK<sub>PA</sub>) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{PA}$ , then the majority group A still wins the voting contest as still  $A > B$ , with a smaller majority, as stated below:

12)  $TK_{PA}[V] = TK_{PA}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{PA}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A wins, smaller majority}$

**Expectation 7**

When majority group targeted chaos(TK<sub>A</sub>) leads to full majority collapse(TK<sub>FA</sub>) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{FA}$ , the minority group B wins the voting contest as now  $B > A$ , since the majority group A votes has fully collapsed as shown below:

13)  $TK_{FA}[V] = TK_{FA}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{FA}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{B wins}$

This is the only instance when an expected normal democratic outcome A can be flipped to an extreme democratic outcome B

***C) Operational models***

**a) The general voting model**

If we have a one person, one vote system, then we can express the population of voters(V<sub>p</sub>) as follows:

14)  $V_p = V_1 + V_2 + V_3 + \dots + V_{100} + V_{101} + \dots + V_n$

Model V<sub>p</sub> in expression 14) above gathers all voters from voter V<sub>1</sub> to voter V<sub>n</sub>, which can also be stated as indicated below:

15)  $V_p = \sum_{i=1}^n V_i$

Therefore, formula 15) above indicates the summation of all voters.

**b) The general voting model by groupings**

We can also express the population of voters in formula 14) and 15) in two main groups or views, group G<sub>1</sub> and group G<sub>2</sub> as shown below:

16)  $G_1 = V_1 + V_2 + \dots + V_{100} = \sum_{j=1}^r V_j$  and  $G_2 = V_{101} + \dots + V_n = \sum_{k=1}^s V_k$ , where  $r + s = n$

Therefore, the voting model by groups can now be indicated as follows:

17)  $V_p = G_1 + G_2$

In the model V<sub>p</sub> in expression 17) above we can see that the views of both groups G<sub>1</sub> and G<sub>2</sub> matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

**c) The general voting model in terms of true minority and true majority**

If we assume that group G<sub>2</sub> > G<sub>1</sub>, then G<sub>2</sub> is the true majority (T) and G<sub>1</sub> is the true minority (M) so that G<sub>1</sub> = M and G<sub>2</sub> = T; and therefore, the following is true:

18)  $V_p = M + T$

In the model V<sub>p</sub> in expression 18) above we can see that the views of both groups M and T matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

**d) The fully inclusive general voting model**

The voting model(V) that brings together the competing views of groups of participants is the ideal voting model as it is fully inclusive as indicated below:

19)  $V = G_2.G_1 = T.M$

Model V in expression 19) above tells us that the views of G<sub>2</sub> and G<sub>1</sub> and the views of the true majority T and the true minority M are present in the model at the same time; and therefore it is fully inclusive.

**e) Effective and ineffective targeted chaos**

20)  $ETK = TKFTC$

Expression 20 simply tells us that chaos that leads to full true majority complacency  $TKFTC$  is effective chaos  $ETK$ , which leads to an extreme democratic outcome win or to a normal democratic outcome loss.

21)  $ITK = N[TKFTC]$

Expression 21 says that chaos that does not lead to full true majority complacency  $N[TKFTC]$  is ineffective chaos  $ITK$ , which leads to an extreme democratic outcome loss or to a normal democratic outcome win.

**f) Complacency expectations and expected democratic outcomes**

If  $NC$  = no complacency

$FTC$  = Full true majority complacency

$FMC$  = Full true minority complacency  $PTC$  = Partial true majority complacency

$PMC$  = Partial true minority complacency  $D = V = T.M$  = democratic contest

*Then the following expectations hold true:*

22)  $NC[D] = NC[V] = NC[T.M] \text{-----} \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$

Expression 22 says that under no complacency( $NC$ ) we should expect the voting system( $V$ ) to produce a normal democratic outcome( $NDO$ ).

23)  $FTC[D] = FTC[V] = FTC[T].M \text{-----} \rightarrow M \text{ wins at } T < M = EDO$

Expression 23 says that under full true majority complacency ( $FTC$ ) we should expect the voting system( $V$ ) to produce an extreme democratic outcome( $EDO$ ).

24)  $FMC[D] = FMC[V] = T.FMC[M] \text{----} \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$

Expression 24 says that under full true minority complacency ( $FMC$ ) we should expect the voting system( $V$ ) to produce a normal democratic outcome( $NDO$ ).

25)  $PTC[D] = PTC[V] = PTC[T].M \text{-----} \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$

Expression 25 says that under partial true majority complacency ( $PTC$ ) we should expect the voting system( $V$ ) to produce a normal democratic outcome( $NDO$ ).

26)  $PTM[D] = PTM[V] = T.PTM[M] \text{-----} \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$

Expression 26 says that under partial true minority complacency ( $PMC$ ) we should expect the voting system( $V$ ) to produce a normal democratic outcome( $NDO$ ).

**The voting system in liberal democracies**

Consistent with the operational models, the general voting system ( $V$ ) in terms of two competing groups  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  can be expressed graphically as done in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1 The voting system( $V$ ) in liberal democracies

Figure 1 above simply says that groups  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  participate in the fully inclusive voting contest  $V$ .

**Linking the voting system with democratic outcomes in liberal democracies**

The competition between group  $G_1$  and group  $G_2$  will ensure that the fully inclusive voting system( $V$ ) produces a democratic outcome( $DO$ ), but we do not know which type of outcome it will be as we do not know the voting strength(?) of group  $G_1$  and group  $G_2$ , a situation summarized in Figure 2 below:




Figure 2 Linking the voting system(V) to the type of democratic outcome (DO)

Figure 2 above indicates that we do not know if the winner of the democratic outcome (DO) is G<sub>1</sub> or group G<sub>2</sub>.

**Linking democratic outcomes (DO<sub>i</sub>) to type of democracy (LD<sub>i</sub>) giving voting behavior (C<sub>i</sub>) in liberal democracies to point out the structure needed to come to exist and/or propagate**

According to complacency expectations, a liberal democracy LD<sub>i</sub> will lead to a democratic outcome DO<sub>i</sub> if under complacency type C<sub>i</sub>, a situation detailed in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 Linking the democratic outcome(DO<sub>i</sub>) to the type of liberal democracy(LD<sub>i</sub>) and the type of voting complacency(C<sub>i</sub>) that it needs to come to exist

Figure 3 above indicates that for the democratic outcome DO<sub>i</sub> to exist the voting environment in liberal democracy LD<sub>i</sub> must be under complacency type C<sub>i</sub>. In other words, for the democratic outcome DO<sub>i</sub> to come to exist, the voting contest (V) in liberal democracy LD<sub>i</sub> must be under complacency type C<sub>i</sub>.

**Linking democratic outcomes (DO<sub>i</sub>) with consistent loyalty based rule of law system (CRL<sub>i</sub>) to point out the structure needed to persist all costs**

In order to persist, a democratic outcome DO<sub>i</sub> needs to have a consistent legal loyalty system CRL<sub>i</sub> that ensures its persistence at all costs, in case the win or the loss is legally challenged by competitors or by themselves, a situation indicated in Figure 4 below:






Figure 4 Linking the democratic outcome (DOi) with the consistent type of rule of law(CRLi) that needs to persist at all costs

Figure 4 above indicates that for the democratic outcome DOi to persist the voting environment in liberal democracy LDi must be under a consistent rule of law system CRLi in order to persist at all costs. In other words, for the democratic outcome DOi to persist in election or re-election, the voting contest (V) in liberal democracy LDi must be under the specific consistent legal rule CRLi.

Therefore, Figure 4 above provides the general democratic model structure needed to capture the conditions under which specific democratic outcomes come to exist and persist at all cost given that inclusive voting system. In other words, Figure 4 above summarizes the conjunctural conditions needed for democratic outcome DOi to come to exist and persist at all costs.

**Transforming the general democratic outcome structure (DOi) above in terms of majority rule based democratic environment(MLDi)**

Consistent with the operational models above, if we make group  $G_1 > G_2$ , then  $G_1$  is the true majority (T) and  $G_2$  is the true minority (M) so that  $T = G_1$  and  $M = G_2$  so that  $T + M =$  total numbers of votes as everybody participates. If we substitute this information in Figure 4 above we transform the structure of the general liberal democracy model (LDi) into a majority rule based liberal democracy structure (MLDi) as indicated in Figure 5 below:




Figure 5 Linking the democratic outcome (DOi) with the consistent type of rule of law(CRLi) that needs to persist at all costs and majority rule(MLDi)

Figure 5 above shows the structure of the general majority rule based liberal democracy model(MLDi) where given the voting complacency environment of type  $C = C_i$ , the majority rule model type MLDi leads to a democratic outcome type DOi, which requires a consistent rule of law environment type CRLi to persist at all costs. In other words, for the democratic outcome type DOi under majority rule to come to exist and to come to persist at all cost it needs a complacency environment type  $C = C_i$  and a consistent rule of law environment type CRLi.

Therefore, Figure 5 above provides the majority rule based democratic model structure needed to capture the conditions under which specific democratic outcomes come to exist and persist at all cost given that inclusive majority rule based voting system. In other words, Figure 5 above summarizes the conjunctural conditions needed for democratic outcome DOi to come to exist and persist at all costs,

Extracting the structure of normal democratic outcome from the majority rule based model in Figure 5 above

Consistent with the operational models and expectations shared in this paper above, if we make the complacency condition in Figure 5 above be that there is no complacency( $C = C_i = C_{NC}$ ) affecting the majority rule based liberal democratic model( $MLDi = MLD_{NC}$ ), then the liberal democracy model under no complacency( $MLD_{NC}$ ) becomes a normal liberal democracy model( $MLD_{NC} = NLD$ ) that leads to a normal democratic outcome( $DO_i = DO_{NC} = NDO$ ) as  $T > M$  under no complacency(NC), a situation that came be stated analytically as follows:

**$NLD = MLD_{NC} \xrightarrow{\text{NC}} DO_{NC} = NDO$  since then "T" wins given  $T > M$  when  $V = T.M$**   
 **$C = C_i = NC$**

Since normal liberal democracies(NLD) flourish under an independent rule of law environment(IRL), then the consistent rule of law environment(CRLi) they need to persist at all cost under no complacency(NC) is one based on the independent rule of law so that  $CRL_i = CRL_{NC} = IRL$

The normal liberal democracy structure(NLD) indicating how it come to exist and how it depends of the independent rule of law(IRL) to persist at all cost can be appreciated graphically as indicated in Figure 6 below:



**Figure 6** The majority rule based normal liberal democracy structure(NLD) under which normal democratic outcomes(NDO)come to exist and the consisten independent legal structure IRL under which they persist at all costs when there is no complacency(NC)

Figure 6 above simply tells us that under no complacency (NC) normal liberal democracies (NLD) produce normal democratic outcomes (NDO), which are supported by an independent rule of law system(IRL) that puts loyalty to normal liberal democracy outcomes/country first.

Hence, Figure 6 above provides the conjunctural conditions of a true democracy that are needed to come to exist and persist as the majority view rules, putting loyalty, political and legal loyalty, to democracy/country first when in conflict between democracy/country and party/individual arises. In other words, in a normal liberal democracy as its fullest full loyalty here is to democracy/country so all efforts should be placed here to ensuring permanent no complacency.

Extracting the structure of extreme democratic outcome from the majority rule based model in Figure 5 above

Consistent with the operational models and expectations shared in this paper above, if we make the complacency condition in Figure 5 above be that there is full true majority complacency( $C = C_i = C_{FTC}$ ) affecting the majority rule based liberal democratic model( $MLDi = MLD_{FTC}$ ), then the liberal democracy model under full true majority complacency( $MLD_{FTC}$ ) becomes an extreme liberal democracy model( $MLD_{FTC} = ELD$ ) that leads to an extreme

democratic outcome( $DO_i = DO_{FTC} = EDO$ ) as now  $T < M$  under full true majority complacency( $FTC$ ), a situation that can be stated analytically as indicated below:

$$ELD = MLD_{FTC} \xrightarrow{\text{FTC}} DO_{FTC} = EDO \text{ since then "M" wins since } T < M \text{ when } V = T.M$$

$$C = C_i = FTC$$

Since extreme liberal democracies( $ELD$ ) flourish under a non-independent rule of law environment( $NIRL$ ), then the consistent rule of law environment( $CRL_i$ ) they need to persist at all cost under full true majority complacency( $FTC$ ) is one based on the non-independent rule of law so that  $CRL_i = CRL_{FTC} = NIRL$

The extreme liberal democracy structure( $ELD$ ) indicating how it come to exist and how it depends of the non-independent rule of law( $NIRL$ ) to persist at all cost can be appreciated graphically as indicated in Figure 7 below:



Figure 7 The majority rule based extreme liberal democratic structure( $ELD$ ) under which extreme democratic outcomes( $EDO$ ) come to exist and the consistent legal non-independent legal structure  $NIRL$  under which they persist at all costs when there is full true majority complacency( $FTC$ )

Figure 7 above simply tells us that under full true majority complacency( $FTC$ ) extreme liberal democracies( $ELD$ ) produce extreme democratic outcomes( $EDO$ ), which are supported by a non-independent rule of law system( $NIRL$ ) that puts loyalty to extreme liberal democracy outcomes/party or loyalty to the anti-democratic movement first.

Therefore, Figure 7 above provides the conditions of an extreme democracy to exist and persist as the minority view rules, putting loyalty, political and legal loyalty, to party/individual first when in conflict between party/individual and democracy/country arises. In other words, in full extreme liberal democracies, full loyalty here is to party/individual/antidemocratic movement so all efforts will be placed here on ensuring permanent true majority complacency.

### Highlighting the inconsistencies and expected dynamics when democratic outcomes in power go to compete in elections

The inconsistencies between the structure of normal democratic outcomes( $NDO$ ) and the structure of extreme democratic outcomes( $EDO$ ), and the expected dynamics during elections when in power; and hence when competing against the other either normal democratic outcome or other extreme democratic outcome can be appreciated when placed in the same plane as done in Figure 8 below:




Figure 8 Inconsistencies between the world of normal democratic outcomes( $NDO$ ) and the world of extreme democratic outcomes( $EDO$ )

We can appreciate in Figure 8 above that normal liberal democracies ( $NLD$ ) are inconsistent with extreme democratic outcomes ( $EDO$ ) and that normal democratic outcomes( $NDO$ ) are inconsistent with a non-

independent rule of law systems(NIRL) as indicated by the downward leaning broken arrows between those components. On the other hand, we can see that extreme liberal democracies(ELD) are inconsistent with normal democratic outcomes(NDO) and that extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) are inconsistent with an independent rule of law system(IRL) as shown by the upward leaning broken arrows between those components.

**We can use Figure 8 above to see that when there is no complacency behavior (NC) and there is an independent rule of law system we have a full working normal liberal democracy (NLD) ; and that when there is full true majority complacency(FTC) and a non-independent rule of law system(NIRL) we have a full extreme liberal democracy system or permanent authoritarianism.**

We can also use Figure 8 above to extract the dynamics that come about when elections are held and a specific type of liberal democracy is in power and their persistence when they win or lose elections if wins or losses are challenge in court:

**a) Competition between different normal democratic outcome forces when a normal democratic outcome is in power**

The case when there is a normal liberal democracy (NLDi) in power and there are elections and the groups competing represent different views on how a normal democratic outcomes (NDOi) should govern and advance the common good such as for example what it used to be in the USA when the democratic party was in competition with the traditional republican party until just before Trumpism came along in 2016 as indicated in the introduction:

**If a normal democratic outcome leaning group NDO1 competes with another would be normal democratic outcome leaning group NDO2, then the winning competitor persist , whether the loser concedes or not it lost the election as an independent court(IRL) will validate the win even when the loser brings a challenge to court as fact-less complaints do not work in independent courts since losing is not illegal.**

The situation above is consistent with power changing hands between the Democratic Party and the traditional Republican Party on and on just before Trumpism came along in 2016.

**b) Competition between normal democratic outcome and extreme democratic outcome forces when a normal democratic outcome is in power**

The case when there is a normal liberal democracy (NLD) in power and there are elections and the groups competing are a normal democratic outcome leaning group(NDOi) such as for example the Democratic Party in the USA and an extreme democratic outcome leaning group(EDOi) like Trumpism in 2016:

**If a normal democratic outcome NDOi competes with an extreme democratic outcome (EDOi) like Trumpism, then the winning competitor persist , whether the loser concedes or not it lost the election as an independent court(IRL) will validate the win even when the loser, be it the NDOi or the NDOi, brings a challenge to court as fact less complaints do not work in independent courts. For example, if the normal democratic outcome challenges the loss because full targeted chaos was used by the extreme democratic outcome to achieve full true majority complacency, the court will validate the EDOi win as that action using targeted chaos is not illegal yet. If the extreme democratic outcome EDOi challenges the loss based on fake allegations of fraud, the court will validate the NDOi win.**

The situation above reflects what happened in 2016 when Hillary Clinton lost the election to Donald Trump as even it Trump win would have been challenged in court the win would have been validated by independent courts if challenged, but Clinton conceded losing the election as expected.

**c) Competition between extreme democratic outcome and normal democratic outcome forces when the extreme democratic outcome is in power**

The case when there is an extreme liberal democracy(ELD) in power and there are elections and the groups competing are the ruling extreme democratic outcome(EDOi) and a normal democratic outcomes leaning

group(NDO<sub>i</sub>) challenging power, then we have a fight between the true majority view/the common good view and the true minority view/the individual good view, but since the extreme democratic outcome(EDO<sub>i</sub>) has the structure of permanent authoritarianism and it is in power, then the extreme democratic outcome persists, whether it wins or loses the election.

**If a normal democratic outcome leaning group NDO<sub>i</sub> competes with an extreme democratic outcome leaning group EDO<sub>i</sub> under full authoritarianism, then the winning competitor will be the extreme democratic outcome, whether it wins or loses the election as if it loses the election and the winning normal democratic outcome NDO<sub>i</sub> brings a factual legal challenge to a non-independent legal court, the court will side with the extreme democratic outcome as it has full legal loyalty to the extreme out regardless of the facts.**

The situation above is consistent with what happens when authoritarian regimes want to give the appearance of allowing normal democratic participation to portrait legitimacy to the world fully knowing that regardless of opposition they will persist.

**d) Competition between competing extreme democratic outcome forces when an extreme democratic outcome is in power**

The case when there is an extreme liberal democracy(ELD<sub>i</sub>) in power and there are elections and the groups competing are two different groups with extreme liberal democracy leaning tendencies EDO<sub>1</sub> in power and EDO<sub>2</sub> seeking power, then the extreme democratic outcome that has the full loyalty of the non-independent legal system(NIRL) will persist, but if the loyalty of the non-independent legal system is divided, the system will go into permanent chaos until there is a winner or the authoritarianism system collapses.

**If two extreme liberal democracy leaning groups compete in elections, EDO<sub>1</sub> in power and EDO<sub>2</sub> challenging, the one who has the full loyalty of the non-independent legal system will prevail, but under divided non-independent legal loyalty, chaos or system collapse will fallow.**

The situation above reflects what happens when different competing authoritarianism factions appear during the working of authoritarianism.

**e) The case when extreme democratic outcome forces do not want elections**


When an extreme liberal democracy outcome (ELD<sub>i</sub>) is in power and it does not want or allow elections and it has the full legal loyalty of the non-independent legal system this leads to ongoing authoritarianism.

**If an extreme liberal democracy outcome (EDO<sub>i</sub>) in power does not allow elections it becomes an authoritarian system for life.**

The situation above reflects what happens when authoritarianism regimes do not allow elections to challenge their hold on power.

**f) The case of why Joe Biden won the 2020 USA election and Trumpism fell**

The situation of Biden or normal democratic outcome win cannot be explained by the structure in Figure 8 above as it took place at the stage where Trumpism had not yet corrupted the independent rule of law system(IRL) in the USA inside which it came to exist and transform it into a non-independent rule of law system(NIRL); and hence, under these conditions if Trumpism loses an election it cannot persist as it has to challenge the loss in independent courts, which is what happened in 2020 when Trumpism lost to Biden and legal challenges in independent courts failed as they were based on fake claims of fraud; and we know that independent courts require facts and proof in order to win. The structure under which Trumpism fails to persist is shown in Figure 9 below:



**Figure 9** The structure of temporary authoritarianism  
When an extreme democratic outcome(EDO)  
does not have non-independent legal support and  
it loses the election it can not persist.

Figure 9 above tells us that the extreme liberal democracy model (ELD) and extreme democratic outcome (EDO) do not have non-independent legal support (NIRL) so it cannot persist if it loses an election as if it challenges the election loss in an independent courts as indicated by the upward moving broken blue arrow between EDO and IRL it will lose the challenge based on fake claims. This situation above explains what happened in 2020 when Trump lost legal challenge after legal challenge in different levels of independent courts in the USA in an attempt to persist, but failed to persist, an expectation consistent with the structure in Figure 9 above.

Notice that the bottom part of Figure 8 above reflects permanent authoritarianism and the bottom part in Figure 9 above reflects temporary authoritarianism as one has a non-independent legal system and the other has an independent legal body, respectively.

### Summary:

Normal democratic outcomes come to exist always under no complacency and they ensure their persistence through an independent rule of law system. Extreme democratic outcomes come to exist always under full true majority complacency and they ensure their persistence through having a non-independent rule of law. If a normal democratic outcome is in power and there are elections, the independent court system will validate the winner, regardless of who wins. If an extreme democratic outcome is in power, the non-independent legal system will ensure it persists, whether it wins or loses the election. But when an extreme democratic outcome is not supported by a non-independent legal system, then it must win the election to persist as if it loses the election under an independent legal law system it will lose any legal challenge aimed at reversing the loss and the winner will be validated.

### Implications:

- i) True democracy to exist and persist requires political loyalty and legal loyalty at the same time under no complacency;
- ii) Extreme democracy to exist and persists needs political loyalty and legal loyalty at the same time;
- iii) Without political and legal loyalty democracies should be expected to go the way of permanent authoritarianism;
- and iv) Without political and legal loyalty authoritarian regimes cannot persist if they lose an election.

### Food for thoughts

- 1) Can permanent authoritarianism take hold in liberal democracies if there is an independent rule of law system? I think no, what do you think?
- ii) Can normal democratic outcomes still take place even if there is true majority complacency? I think yes, what do you think?;
- and iii) Should a priority goal at all levels of government be to ensure the existence of no complacency during elections by making sure that all voters eligible to vote actually vote free of targeted chaos, regardless of their voting choice? I think yes, what do you think?

## Conclusions

i) Based on the operational models and expectations, a general liberal democracy model was developed step by step to show the necessary and sufficient conditions for specific democracy models to come to exist and then persist at all cost during legal challenges during elections or re-elections; ii) It was shown how the general liberal democracy model can be transformed into a general majority rule based liberal democracy model to link it to a general normal liberal democracy model and to a general extreme democracy model in order to highlight what conditions they need to come to exist and to persist at all costs; iii) It was indicated how the inconsistencies between normal liberal democracy and extreme liberal democracy can be highlighted and used to stress what to expect when elections take place and winners and losers challenge democratic outcomes under independent or non-independent rule of law; iv) It was indicated that authoritarianism under independent rule of law is temporary and that under non-independent rule of law is permanent and that under no elections allow, authoritarianism is for life. And finally v) the structure of temporary authoritarianism was shared to point why Trumpism failed to persist in 2020 and normal democracy won in November 2020 US election with the victory of Biden over Trump.

Over all, i) it was shown how a general majority rule based liberal democracy model can be stated step by step; ii) it was pointed out in detail how such a model can be linked to normal democratic outcome and extreme democratic outcome dynamics and expectations when they compete in elections among competitors within the same democratic model or in between different democratic models; and iii) it was highlighted that when authoritarianism does not allow elections it goes into authoritarianism for life and when authoritarianism does not have a non-independent legal system to support it, it will not persist if it loses an election under an independent legal system, as it was the case of the fall of Trumpism and the win of Biden/a normal democratic outcome in the 2020 US election.

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