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Sustainability thoughts 133: Stating the expected step by step road from majority rule based liberal democracies to permanent authoritarianism: The case of the 2016-2020 rise and fall of Trumpism

By

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Abstract

It can be said that the coming of exism movements like Trumpism in 2016 pose a serious threat to the survival of majority rule based liberal democracies as they have an autocratic nature, but this threat is still not yet well understood because the working of exism movements fall outside traditional democracy theory thinking as exism outcomes require abnormal electoral conditions to come to exist first; and then they needs abnormal legal conditions to persist at all cost after they come to exist, which again these are aspects still not yet well understood even by politicians as the case of Trumpism shows. For example, seeing authoritarian behavior after an extreme democratic outcome like Trumpism comes to exist as consequential behavior means those individuals who think so cannot see yet that after temporary authoritarian behavior comes permanent authoritarianism behavior if the opportunity comes to corrupt the independent legal system, and hence, they cannot yet see the real threat to democracy. Therefore, the liberal democracy in which they are living in can disappear without them even noticing what is really going on in the background until it is too late to go back to the normal liberal democracy world that existed at the beginning. This means that for permanent authoritarianism to come to exist then the exism movement must use the time it has in power since it comes to exist, and better indeed, if it is re-elected, to corrupt the independent legal conditions under which it came to exist so that it can later persist in power even if it loses re-elections. For example, Trumpism first comes to exist under an independent rule of law system; and therefore, to persist at all cost we should expect it to focus its attention on corrupting that independent rule of law system in order to win re-elections at all cost in the future as if it loses an election under the independent rule of

law if cannot persist. An attempt to persist after the election loss has been validated by independent courts is anti-constitutional and anti-democratic, yet not understanding the structure of Trumpism or ignoring its risk to democracy may allow some people to think that defending democracy is anti-constitutional or think that the goal of equality is antidemocratic.

The discussion above raises the need to advance new ideas on how extreme democratic outcome theory and normal democratic outcome theory fit within the general majority rule based liberal democracy theory in order to see from outside the box what is going on during exism movements like Trumpism, which makes the following questions relevant: How can a general re-election model be framed based on specific complacency conditions and legal loyalty conditions under which specific democratic outcomes come to exist and persist at all cost? How are majority rule based liberal democracies expected to work when different normal democratic outcome compete for re-election? How are majority rule based liberal democracies expected to work when a normal democratic outcome seeking re-election competes with an extreme democratic outcome? How are majority rule based liberal democracies expected to work when an extreme democratic outcome seeking re-election competes with a normal democratic outcome? How are majority rule based liberal democracies expected to work after death when an extreme democratic outcome seeking re-election competes with another extreme democratic outcome? How can this majority rule based democratic theory be used to state the expected step by step road from majority rule based liberal democracies to permanent authoritarianism? How can this understanding be linked to the 2016-2020 rise and fall of Trumpism? The goal of this paper is to provide answers to all the questions listed above.

Key words

Normal democratic outcome, extreme democratic outcome, liberal democracy, normal liberal democracy, extreme liberal democracy, Brexitism, Trumpism, no complacency, full true majority complacency, targeted chaos, effective targeted chaos, ineffective targeted chaos, true democracy, authoritarianism, temporary authoritarianism, permanent authoritarianism, populism, normal populism, populism with a mask

Introduction

a) The general majority rule based liberal democracy model

It can be said that majority rule based liberal democracies requires specific conditions for specific democratic outcomes(DOi) to come to exist; and they required specific conditions under which those specific democratic outcomes(DOi) can persist at all cost when facing re-elections. Those conditions were recently shared(Muñoz 2021) as highlighted in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1 Linking the democratic outcome (DOi) with the consistent type of rule of law(CRLi) that needs to persist at all costs and majority rule(MLDi)

Figure 1 above can help us to highlight the following things about the general majority rule based liberal democracy model: i) The voting system(V) brings together the true majority view(T) and the true minority view(M), and depending of their voting strength they lead to a specific democratic outcome(DOi); ii) that under specific complacency conditions C_i the majority rule based liberal democracy model MLDi leads to an specific democratic outcome DOi, bringing it into existence as indicated by the arrow between MLDi and DOi; and iii) that specific democratic outcomes DOi need specific and consistent rule of law systems CRLi in place in order for them to persist re-elections at all cost.

b) Restating the general majority rule based liberal democracy model

The general majority rule based liberal democracy model(MLDi) summarized in Figure 1 above can be stated analytically as follows:

CRLi

1) MLDi ----->DOi

C = Ci

The expression 1 above tells us that under consistent rule of law conditions CRLi and consistent complacency environment $C = C_i$ the democratic outcome DOi product of the majority rule based liberal democracy model MLDi will come to exist and then persist in power at all cost. The complacency condition C_i determines the specific nature of the democratic outcome DOi that comes to exist; and the consistent rule of law system CRLi helps it to persist at all cost. As indicated below, the nature of the democracy outcome DOi can be either a specific normal democratic outcome(NDOi) if it reflects the best interest of the true majority/democratic movement or an extreme democratic outcome(EDO) if it reflects the best interest of the true minority/anti-democratic movement.

c) The general normal democratic outcome model

If we make the majority rule based liberal democracy model $MLDi$ in expression 1) above be a normal liberal democracy model $NLDi$ that works under normal populism as it reflects the true majority view as there is no complacency(NC) under stability, then we can make $MLDi = NLDi$, $CRLi = IRL$, $Ci = NC$, and restate expression 1 above in terms of a normal liberal democracy $NLDi$ as follows:

IRL

2) $NLDi$ -----→ $NDOi$

$C = NC$

The expression 2 above tells us that under independent rule of law conditions IRL and consistent no complacency environment $C = NC$ the normal democratic outcome $NDOi$ product of the majority rule based normal liberal democracy model $NLDi$ will come to exist and then persist in power at all cost. The no complacency condition NC determines that a normal democratic outcome $NDOi$ comes to exist as the majority view wins; and the consistent independent rule of law system IRL helps it to persist at all cost. The normal democratic outcome $NDOi$ reflects the best interest of the true majority/democratic movement. The nature of normal democratic outcome under no complacency conditions has been highlighted in detail recently(Muñoz 2017a).

d) The general permanent extreme democratic outcome model

If we make the majority rule based liberal democracy model $MLDi$ in expression 1) above be an extreme liberal democracy model $ELDi$ that works under populism with a mask as it reflects the true minority view as there is full true majority complacency(FTC) under effective targeted chaos, then we can make $MLDi = ELDi$, $CRLi = NIRL$, $Ci = FTC$, and restate expression 1 above in terms of an extreme liberal democracy $NLDi$ as done below:

NIRL

3) $ELDi$ -----→ $EDOi$

$C = FTC$

The expression 3 above indicates that under non-independent rule of law conditions $NIRL$ and a consistent full true majority complacency environment $C = FTC$ the extreme democratic outcome $EDOi$ product of the majority rule based extreme liberal democracy model $ELDi$ will come to exist and then persist in power at all cost. The full true majority complacency condition FTC determines that an extreme democratic outcome $EDOi$ comes to exist as the minority view wins; and the consistent non-independent rule of law system $NIRL$ helps it to persist at all cost. The extreme democratic outcome $EDOi$ reflects the best interest of the true minority/anti-democratic movement. The nature of extreme democratic outcomes as the opposite of normal democratic outcomes has been pointed out in detail recently(Muñoz 2017b).

e) The central role of the type of legal loyalty system present when re-elections are held in determining who keeps power if there are re-election complaints

Re-elections take place under the legal environment under which the group in power operates as this environment determines who will keep power in the end in the re-election process regardless of election complaints or disagreements. For example, if re-elections take place under an independent rule of law system like in expression 2 above, whether competition is between two possible normal democratic outcomes(NDO1 and NDO2) or competition between a normal democratic outcome(NDO1) and an extreme democratic outcome(EDO1), then the independent rule of law system validates the winner and the loser. Hence, here if you lose an election, no matter what type of democratic outcome you are, you cannot persist and you lose the election. If on the other hand, re-elections take place under a non-independent rule of law system such as in expression 3 above, whether competition is between two possible extreme democratic outcomes(EDO1 and EDO2) or competition between an extreme democratic outcome(EDO2) and a normal democratic outcome(NDO2), then the non-independent rule of law system validates the winner and the loser. Therefore, here the loser of an election can persist or maintain power with the support of the non-independent rule of law system as this system can declare the extreme democratic outcome the winner regardless of the election loss . Hence, the following needs to be highlighted: i) the legal loyalty conditions in expression 2) above, the independent rule of law system(IRL) govern the competition between normal democratic outcomes and other normal democratic outcomes or other extreme democratic outcomes when they go into re-election; and ii) the legal loyalty conditions in expression 3 above, the non-independent rule of law system(NIRL), govern the competition between extreme democratic outcomes and other extreme democratic outcomes or other normal democratic outcomes when they go into re-elections. Normal democratic outcomes reflect legal and political loyalty to country/democracy as they advance the majority good under stability and no complacency(Muñoz 2018) shifting from morality based views to practicality based party views through time(Muñoz 2015); and extreme democratic outcomes reflect legal and political loyalty to movement/anti-democracy as they advance the minority good under chaos and full true majority complacency(Muñoz 2019a).

f) The need to understand the nature and implications of the coming of extreme democratic outcomes on the survival of normal liberal democracies once they come to exist

It can be said that the coming of exism movements like Trumpism in 2016 poses a serious threat to the survival of majority rule based liberal democracies as they have an autocratic nature, but this threat is still not yet well understood because the working of exism movements fall outside traditional democracy theory thinking and economic thinking(Muñoz 2019b) as exism outcomes require abnormal electoral conditions to come to exist first; and then they needs abnormal legal conditions to persist at all cost after they come to exist, which again are aspects still not yet well understood even by politicians as the case of Trumpism shows. For example, seeing authoritarian behavior after an extreme democratic outcome like Trumpism comes to exist as consequential behavior means those individuals who think so cannot see yet that after temporary authoritarian behavior comes permanent authoritarianism behavior if the opportunity comes to fully corrupt the independent legal system, but they cannot yet see the real threat to democracy; and hence, the liberal democracy model they are living in can disappear without them even noticing what is really going on in the background until it is too late to go

back to the normal liberal democracy world that existed at the beginning. This means that for permanent authoritarianism to come to exist an exism movement like Trumpism must use the time it has since it comes to exist, and better indeed, if it is re-elected, to corrupt fully the independent legal conditions under which it came to exist so that it can later persist in power even if it loses re-elections. For example, Trumpism first comes to exist under an independent rule of law system; and therefore, to persist at all cost we should expect it to focus its attention on corrupting that independent rule of law system in order to win re-elections at all cost in the future as if it loses an election under the independent rule of law system it cannot persist. An attempt to persist after the election loss has been validated by independent courts is anti-constitutional and anti-democratic, yet not understanding the structure of Trumpism or ignoring its risk to democracy may allow some people to think that defending democracy is anti-constitutional or think that the goal of equality is antidemocratic. Hence, Trumpism came to exist in 2016 under chaos surprising every one locally and internationally(Rawlinson 2016) when Trump won over Clinton(TG 2016), taking authoritarian actions or pressures to undermine independent components of the system like the press(Diamond 2016), the F.B.I(Shear and Apuzzo 2017), states(CBC 2020; Solender 2020) or political bodies(Herb 2020) to remain in power by attacking the 2020 re-election process during the election regardless of court loses(Shamsian and Sheth 2021) and after the election process was over, even to the point of generating full anti-democratic rioting(Wamsley 2021); and anti-democratic political actions in support of the exism movement after the facts(Yourish et al 2021) and invalidate President Biden 2020 win(TG 2020).

The discussion above raises the need to advance new ideas on how extreme democratic outcome theory and normal democratic outcome theory fit within the general majority rule based liberal democracy theory in order to see from outside the box what is going on during exism movements like Trumpism, which makes the following questions relevant: How can a general re-election model be framed based on specific complacency conditions and legal loyalty conditions to point out when specific democratic outcomes are expected to come to exist and persist at all cost? How are majority rule based liberal democracies expected to work when a normal democratic outcome compete for re-election against another normal democratic outcome? How are majority rule based liberal democracies expected to work when a normal democratic outcome seeking re-election competes with an extreme democratic outcome? How are majority rule based liberal democracies expected to work when an extreme democratic outcome seeking re-election competes with a normal democratic outcome? How are majority rule based liberal democracies expected to work when an extreme democratic outcome seeking re-election competes with another extreme democratic outcome? How can this majority rule based liberal democratic theory be used to state the expected step by step road from majority rule based liberal democracies to temporary authoritarianism to permanent authoritarianism? How can this understanding be linked to the 2016-2020 rise and fall of Trumpism?. The goal of this paper is to provide answers to all the questions listed above.

The goals of this paper

1) To highlight a general democratic outcome re-election model that can be used to frame the general dynamics under which specific democratic outcome compete in re-election after they come to exist against other possible democratic outcomes and what to expect in terms of winning and persisting at all costs; 2) To apply that general democratic outcome framework to capture how normal democratic outcomes compete in re-election against other normal democratic outcomes or against extreme democratic outcomes to indicate the conditions under which they win and/or persist at all costs; 3) To apply that general democratic outcome framework to capture how extreme democratic outcomes compete in re-election against normal democratic outcomes or against other extreme democratic outcomes to highlight the conditions under which they win and/or persist at all costs; 5) To use the knowledge above to point out the road from majority rule based liberal democracy to permanent authoritarianism from within in 3 steps, the coming to exist step, the re-election while corrupting the independent rule of law step, and the persistence at all cost step; 6) To stress the democratic outcome re-election structure that lead to the fall of extreme democratic outcomes; and 7) To use the knowledge shared above to highlight the democratic outcome re-election structure that led to 2016 rise of Trumpism and to the 2020 fall of Trumpism.

Methodology

i) The terminology used in this article is shared; ii) Operational concepts, chaos expectations, operational models and complacency expectations are given; iii) The structure of the general democratic outcome re-election model is highlighted; iv) How the general model applies when normal democratic outcomes go into re-election competing with another normal democratic outcome is stressed; v) How the general model applies when normal democratic outcomes go into re-election competing with an extreme democratic outcome is pointed out; vi) How the general model applies when an extreme democratic outcome go into re-election competing with a normal democratic outcome is provided; vii) How the general model applies when an extreme democratic outcome go into re-election competing with another extreme democratic outcome is shared; viii) The three steps in the road from normal liberal democracy to permanent authoritarianism from within are described; ix) The structure of how extreme democratic outcome fail to persist is indicated; x) The majority rule based democratic re-election structure that led to 2016 rise of Trumpism is pointed out; xi) The majority rule based democratic re-election structure that led to 2020 fall of Trumpism is highlighted; xii) Some food for thoughts and relevant conclusions are listed.

Terminology

V = Voting model

V_i = Voter "i"

G_1 = Group of voters 1

G_2 = Group of voters 2

| | |
|--|---|
| T = True majority | M = true minority |
| D = Democracy | TD = True democracy |
| A = Group A | B = Group B |
| K = General chaos | O = Outcome |
| TK = Targeted chaos | DO = Democratic outcome |
| TK _A = Chaos targeted to group A | TK _B = Chaos targeted to group B |
| TK _{PA} = Partial group A collapse | TK _{FA} = Full group A collapse |
| TK _{PB} = Partial group B collapse | TK _{FB} = Full group B collapse |
| T = Dominant/active component | t = Dominated/passive component |
| M = Dominant/active component | m = Dominated/passive component |
| C = Complacency | NC = No complacency |
| TC = True majority complacency | TNC = True majority no complacency |
| MC = True minority complacency | MNC = True minority no complacency |
| FTC = Full true majority complacency | PTC = Partial true majority complacency |
| FMC = Full true minority complacency | PMC = Partial true minority complacency |
| NDO = Normal democratic outcome | EDO = Extreme democratic outcome |
| BREXIT = UK June 2016 outcome | USEXIT = USA November 2016 outcome |
| ND = No democracy exists | CRE = Complacency rule expectations |
| KC = General chaos led complacency | KC _M = Chaos targets true minority complacency |
| KC _{PM} = Chaos led partial complacency | KC _{FM} = Chaos led minority full complacency |
| KC _{PT} = Chaos led partial complacency | KC _T = Chaos targets true majority complacency |
| KC _{FT} = Chaos led full complacency | ? = Unknown outcome |
| I = Influence operator | KC _i = Chaos based complacency type i |
| ETK = Effective targeted chaos | ITK = Ineffective targeted chaos |
| NETK = Not effective targeted chaos = ITK | |

Operational concepts, chaos expectations, operational models and complacency expectations

A) Operational concepts

- 1) Democracy**, *system that aims at providing equal opportunity to elect, to be represented, and to share in the benefits to all its members;*
- 2) True democracy**, *there is equal opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 3) Partially distorted democracy**, *there is not equal opportunity in at least one democratic aspect;*
- 4) Fully distorted democracy**, *there is inequality of opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*
- 5) Majority rule system**, *the electoral system where the majority rules decides the winner of democratic contexts;*
- 6) Voters**, *each individual in the electoral system acting without complacency and who is committed to make sure his vote or her vote is counted in the determination of the democratic outcome with the goal to maintain or improve his current or future benefits and rights;*
- 7) True majority**, *the actual number of voters who win the democratic context;*
- 8) True minority**, *the actual number of voters who lose the democratic context;*
- 9) Complacency**, *the social discontent or protest or frustration affecting opposing groups with the given democratic or electoral system choices that may lead voters from the true majority and/or the true minority to not vote at all or if they vote they go for a protest vote by either voiding their vote or shifting their vote to other choices in the belief that their party will still win or will still lose anyway without their vote or in the belief that their vote is just one vote anyway and it will not matter in the end result; Hence, complacency based voting is linked to pure dissatisfaction as voting behavior takes place without thinking much about the impact that this action may have in the end on the balance of current and future majority and minority democratic rights;*
- 10) No complacency**, *the absence of social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral system that leads each voter from each group to vote for their preferred democratic choice to ensure his or her vote is counted, therefore no complacency based voting is linked either to ensuring the preservation and enhancing of current democratic rights in one group or linked to seeking the erosion or change of those rights or to slowing the pace of democratic change in the other group;*
- 11) Partial complacency**, *the partial social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is not widespread; some voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*
- 12) Full complacency**, *the general social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is widespread; many voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*

13) True majority complacency, *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*

14) True minority complacency, *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*

15) True majority no complacency, *everybody in the true majority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*

16) True minority no complacency, *everybody in the true minority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*

17) Normal democratic outcome, *under no complacency or not protest behavior everybody votes and the true majority wins the democratic contest; governments retain or lose power without big surprises. Inclusion, openness, respect for the rule of law, equality, stability, integration, union, harmony, the truth, trust, clarity, scientific facts, and the will of the majority for the common good are the heart of normal democratic outcomes.*

18) Extreme democratic outcome, *under full true majority complacency or full true majority protest behavior the true minority wins the democratic context, governments lose or win power under a big surprise as the democratic option that seems impossible to happen wins the day. Exclusion, closeness, lack of respect for the rule of law, inequality, instability, separation, division, chaos, fake truth, fake trust, confusion, fake facts, and the will of the minority for the good of the minority are the heart of extreme democratic outcomes.*

19) Internal complacency, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by internal group divisions(e.g. divisive choice/leader selection);*

20) External complacency, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by external group divisions(e.g. equally disliked competing choices/leaders);*

21) Full democracy, *a full inclusion model, a true democracy;*

22) Partial democracy, *a partial inclusion model, a distorted democracy;*

23) Democratic stability, *the tendency towards harmony associated with specific democratic outcomes;*

24) Full democratic stability, *the tendency towards full harmony associated with normal democratic outcomes;*

25) Full democratic instability, *the tendency towards zero harmony associated with extreme democratic outcomes.*

26) BREXIT, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the UK withdrawing from the European Union.*

27) BREXISM, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of economic or territorial or state based unions.*

28) USEXIT, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the USA withdrawing from the international and local order.*

29) USEXISM, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of the international and local order.*

30) EXISM, *the extreme democratic movements aiming at destroying majority rule based institutions, locally and globally.*

31) Democratic normalism, *the tendency of normal democratic outcomes to move towards more stable or balance democratic conditions through time as they seek responsible majority rule.*

32) Democratic extremism, *the tendency of extreme democratic outcomes to move towards the more unstable or unequal democratic conditions as they flourish under irresponsible minority rule.*

33) Effective targeted chaos, *the chaos that leads to full true majority complacency or achieves specific targets.*

34) Ineffective targeted chaos, *the chaos that does not lead to full true majority complacency or does not achieve specific targets*

35) Normal liberal democracy, *the one where the majority view wins the democratic contest.*

36) Extreme liberal democracy, *the one where the minority view wins the democratic contest.*

37) Effective targeted chaos, *the one that leads to full true majority complacency.*

38) Ineffective targeted chaos, *the one that does not lead to full true majority complacency.*

39) Normal populism, *when the majority view wins the democratic contest, the common good is the target.*

40) Populism with a mask, *when the minority view wins the democratic contest, the private good is the target.*

B) Chaos expectations

If we have a population of voters(V) that can be divided into two groups, groups A and group B under the assumption of one person, one vote; and the assumption that everybody votes so that the total number of voters equals the total number of votes, then the voting model can be expressed as follows:

$$1) V = AB$$

Formula 1 simply says that the voting system(V) brings together two groups of voters, group A and group B.

If we assume we do not know the size of group A and the size of group B, then the expectation of who will win the voting contest is not clear. In other words, when you do not

know the size of the groups involved in the voting contest the expected winner outcome(O) is not clear(?), a situation that can be expressed as follows:

$$2) V = AB \text{-----} \rightarrow O = \text{winner A or B} = ?$$

In formula 2) above, we can see that the expected outcome(O) of who is the winner is not clear(?) as we do not know the size of each group.

Now we can use formula 2) to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the voting model(V) comes from factor I, which systematically affects the voting system; and it therefore may affect the nature of the outcome(O) as indicated below:

$$3) I[V] = I[AB] \text{-----} \rightarrow I[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?]$$

Formula 3 shows that the working and the outcome of the voting process(V) is being affected systematically by the operator I.

a) General chaos expectations when we do not know the size of the groups involved

If we make the influence operator(I) be general chaos(K), then we have $I = K$ and if we substitute this in formula 3 we can state the expected influence of general chaos(K) on the winner expectation when we do not know the size of group A and of group B.

Expectation 1

When the voting system(V) is under the influence of general chaos(K), we cannot link chaos and winners, as we do not know the size of the groups involved and there is no clear targeting, which can be stated as:

$$4) K[V] = K[AB] \text{-----} \rightarrow K[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?] = ?$$

Notice that if there is no chaos, $K = I = 1$, still we would not be able to have a clear expectation of the winner, an expectation consistent with that of formula 2 above.

b) Targeted chaos expectations under majority rule

If we assume now the size of group A is greater than that of group B in the voting model(V) so that $A > B$, where A is the majority group and B is the minority group, then the majority rule expectation leads to an outcome(O) that is normal democratic outcome(NDO) where the majority group A wins the voting contest, as indicated below:

$$5) V = AB \text{-----} \rightarrow O = \text{winner A}$$

In formula 5 we can see that the expected outcome(O) is clear, group A is the winner as we do know that $A > B$.

Now we can use formula 5 to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the majority rule voting model(V) comes from factor I, which systematically affects the voting system and it therefore may affect the nature of the majority rule based outcome(O) as indicated below:

$$6) I[V] = I[AB] \text{-----} \rightarrow I[O = \text{winner A}]$$

Formula 6 tells us that the working and the outcome of the majority rule voting process(V) is being affected by the operator I.

If we make the influence operator I be targeted chaos TK_i , so that $I = TK_i$, then the targeted chaos influence operation can be stated as follows:

$$7) TK_i[V] = TK_i[AB] \text{-----} \rightarrow TK_i[O = \text{winner A}]$$

Notice from expression 7 above that depending of the type of targeted chaos(TK_i), the nature of the majority rule winner may change, and it raises the possibility that under a specific type of successful targeting the outcome can be flipped and be won by group B, a situation consistent with the ideas shared in the introduction that a specific type of targeted chaos may lead to flipping the majority rule based democratic outcome.

i) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the minority group vote(TK_B)

Expectation 2

When majority rule voting system(V) is under minority group targeted chaos(TK_B); therefore, $I = TK_i = TK_B$, then the majority group A still wins the voting contest, and with a bigger majority as this chaos leads to minority vote collapse, partial or full, which flips minority votes toward the majority view camp:

$$8) TK_B[V] = TK_B[AB] \text{-----} \rightarrow TK_B[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still the winner}$$

Notice that chaos targeted to the minority group TK_B does not affect group A.

Expectation 3

When minority group targeted chaos leads to partial minority collapse(TK_{PB}) so that $I = TK_i = TK_{PB}$, then the majority group A still wins, with a slightly bigger majority,

$$9) TK_{PB}[V] = TK_{PB}[AB] \text{-----} \rightarrow TK_{PB}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still wins, bigger margin}$$

Expectation 4

When minority group targeted chaos leads to full minority collapse(TK_{FB}) so that $I = TK_i = TK_{FB}$, the majority group A still wins, with the biggest majority,

10) $TK_{FB}[V] = TK_{FB}[AB]$ -----→ $TK_{FB}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still wins, biggest margin}$

Notice that expectations 2, 3 and 4 above tell us that when the majority rule voting system(V) is under any type of minority group targeted chaos, the majority group is still expected to win the voting contest.

ii) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the majority group vote(TK_A)

Expectation 5

When the majority rule voting system(V) is under majority group targeted chaos(TK_A), so that $I = TK_i = TK_A$ we cannot have a clear expectation(?) of the voting outcome(O) or of who the winner is expected to be without knowing the type of true majority targeting and therefore, the type of majority group collapse it generates, partially majority group collapse(TK_{PA}) or full majority group collapse(TK_{FA}), as indicated below:

11) $TK_A[V] = TK_A[AB]$ -----→ $TK_A[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{winner A or B} = ?$

Notice that chaos targeted to the majority group TK_A does not affect group B.

Expectation 6

When majority group targeted chaos(TK_A) leads to partial majority collapse(TK_{PA}) so that $I = TK_i = TK_{PA}$, then the majority group A still wins the voting contest as still $A > B$, with a smaller majority, as stated below:

12) $TK_{PA}[V] = TK_{PA}[AB]$ -----→ $TK_{PA}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A wins, smaller majority}$

Expectation 7

When majority group targeted chaos(TK_A) leads to full majority collapse(TK_{FA}) so that $I = TK_i = TK_{FA}$, the minority group B wins the voting contest as now $B > A$, since the majority group A votes has fully collapsed as shown below:

13) $TK_{FA}[V] = TK_{FA}[AB]$ -----→ $TK_{FA}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{B wins}$

This is the only instance when an expected normal democratic outcome A can be flipped to an extreme democratic outcome B

C) Operational models

a) The general voting model

If we have a one person, one vote system, then we can express the population of voters(V_p) as follows:

$$14) V_p = V_1 + V_2 + V_3 + \dots + V_{100} + V_{101} + \dots + V_n$$

Model V_p in expression 14) above gathers all voters from voter V_1 to voter V_n , which can also be stated as indicated below:

$$15) V_p = \sum_{i=1}^n V_i$$

Therefore, formula 15) above indicates the summation of all voters.

b) The general voting model by groupings

We can also express the population of voters in formula 14) and 15) in two main groups or views, group G_1 and group G_2 as shown below:

$$16) G_1 = \sum_{j=1}^r V_j \text{ and } G_2 = \sum_{k=1}^s V_k, \text{ where } r + s = n$$

Therefore, the voting model by groups can now be indicated as follows:

$$17) V_p = G_1 + G_2$$

In the model V_p in expression 17) above we can see that the views of both groups G_1 and G_2 matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

c) The general voting model in terms of true minority and true majority

If we assume that group $G_2 > G_1$, then G_2 is the true majority (T) and G_1 is the true minority (M) so that $G_1 = M$ and $G_2 = T$; and therefore, the following is true:

$$18) V_p = M + T$$

In the model V_p in expression 18) above we can see that the views of both groups M and T matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

d) The fully inclusive general voting model

The voting model(V) that brings together the competing views of groups of participants is the ideal voting model as it is fully inclusive as indicated below:

$$19) V = G_2.G_1 = T.M$$

Model V in expression 19) above tells us that the views of G_2 and G_1 and the views of the true majority T and the true minority M are present in the model at the same time; and therefore it is fully inclusive.

e) Effective and ineffective targeted chaos

$$20) \text{ETK} = \text{TK}_{\text{FTC}}$$

Expression 20 simply tells us that chaos that leads to full true majority complacency TK_{FTC} is effective chaos ETK, which leads to an extreme democratic outcome win or to a normal democratic outcome loss.

$$21) \text{ITK} = \text{N}[\text{TK}_{\text{FTC}}]$$

Expression 21 says that chaos that does not lead to full true majority complacency $\text{N}[\text{TK}_{\text{FTC}}]$ is ineffective chaos ITK, which leads to an extreme democratic outcome loss or to a normal democratic outcome win.

f) Complacency expectations and expected democratic outcomes

If NC = no complacency

FTC = Full true majority complacency

FMC = Full true minority complacency PTC = Partial true majority complacency

PMC = Partial true minority complacency D = V = T.M = democratic contest

Then the following expectations hold true:

$$22) \text{NC}[\text{D}] = \text{NC}[\text{V}] = \text{NC}[\text{T.M}] \text{-----} \rightarrow \text{T wins as } \text{T} > \text{M} = \text{NDO}$$

Expression 22 says that under no complacency (NC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce a normal democratic outcome (NDO).

$$23) \text{FTC}[\text{D}] = \text{FTC}[\text{V}] = \text{FTC}[\text{T.M}] \text{-----} \rightarrow \text{M wins at } \text{T} < \text{M} = \text{EDO}$$

Expression 23 says that under full true majority complacency (FTC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce an extreme democratic outcome (EDO).

$$24) \text{FMC}[\text{D}] = \text{FMC}[\text{V}] = \text{T.FMC}[\text{M}] \text{----} \rightarrow \text{T wins as } \text{T} > \text{M} = \text{NDO}$$

Expression 24 says that under full true minority complacency (FMC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce a normal democratic outcome (NDO).

$$25) \text{PTC}[\text{D}] = \text{PTC}[\text{V}] = \text{PTC}[\text{T.M}] \text{-----} \rightarrow \text{T wins as } \text{T} > \text{M} = \text{NDO}$$

Expression 25 says that under partial true majority complacency (PTC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce a normal democratic outcome (NDO).

$$26) \text{PTM}[\text{D}] = \text{PTM}[\text{V}] = \text{T.PTM}[\text{M}] \text{----} \rightarrow \text{T wins as } \text{T} > \text{M} = \text{NDO}$$

Expression 26 says that under partial true minority complacency (PMC) we should expect the voting system (V) to produce a normal democratic outcome (NDO).

The general democratic outcome re-election model

As indicated in the introduction, when the democratic outcome DO_i in expression 1 goes into re-election against another democratic outcome DO_j in an attempt to keep power, then the complacency condition $C = C_i$ present during the election determines who wins the election; and the legal condition CRL_i validates who wins the election in case of electoral complaints by losers, a situation summarized in Figure 2 below:




Figure 2 General re-election model and expected winners and losers under majority rule based liberal democracies

Figure 2 above simply says that given the consistent complacency conditions $C = C_i$ present affecting the electoral process any democratic outcome DO_i or DO_j can win the election process as indicated by the arrows between DO_i and DO_j ; and the consistent rule of law system CRL_i will validate who persists in the election if there are complaints, DO_i or DO_j .

The working of re-elections when normal democratic outcomes compete with another normal democratic outcome for power

As mentioned in the introduction, when a normal democratic outcome NDO_i in expression 2 goes into re-election against another normal democratic outcome NDO_j in an attempt to keep power the independent rule of law system IRL governs the election. The complacency condition present at the time of the re-election $C = NC$ determines who wins the election; and the independent legal system IRL validates who persists in the election in case of electoral complaints by the loser of the election, a situation indicated in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 Re-election model when a normal democratic outcome NDOi goes into re-election against another normal democratic outcome NDOj in order to keep power

Figure 3 above tells us that given the consistent no complacency condition $C = NC$ any normal democratic outcome NDOi or NDOj can win the election process or voting contest; and the consistent independent rule of law system IRL will validate who persists in the election if there are election complaints. Hence, if $V_i > V_j$ under no complacency (NC), then the normal democratic outcome NDOi wins and persists in re-election if NDOj were to complain, but if $V_i < V_j$, then under no complacency (NC) the democratic outcome NDOj wins and persists in the election if NDOi were to complain. Figure 3 above summarizes the way in which normal liberal democracies work, alternating power between different groups through time and through a peaceful transfer of power each time as legal loyalty here is to country/democracy.

The working of re-elections when normal democratic outcomes compete with extreme democratic outcomes for power

As mentioned in the introduction, when a normal democratic outcome NDOi in expression 2 goes into re-election against an extreme democratic outcome (EDOj) in an attempt to keep power, then the independent rule of law system IRL governs the election. The complacency condition present at that moment of the election be it no full true majority complacency ($[N[FTC] = N[ETK]]$) or of full true majority complacency ($[FTC = ETK]$) determines who wins the election; and the legal condition IRL validates who persists in the election in the case of electoral complaints made by the loser of the election, a situation shown in Figure 4 below:




Figure 4 Re-election model when a normal democratic outcome NDOi goes into re-election against an extreme democratic outcome EDOj to keep power

Figure 4 above indicates that under the independent rule of law system IRL, either democratic outcome, normal NDOi or extreme EDOj can win the election; and the consistent independent rule of law system IRL will validate who persist in that election. Hence, if there is no full true majority complacency $N(FTC) = N(ETK)$, then $V_i > V_j$ so that the normal democratic outcome NDOi wins and persist in re-election if EDOj were to complain, but if there is full true majority complacency $FTC = ETK$, then $V_i < V_j$ and the extreme democratic outcome EDOj wins and persist in the election if NDOi were to complain. Figure 4 above summarizes the way extreme liberal democracies come to exist, and alternate power with normal democratic outcomes NDOi, but there may not be a peaceful transfer of power when the extreme democratic outcome fails to win the re-election under an independent rule of law system IRL as loyalty of the extreme democratic outcome is to movement, not to country/democracy.

The working of re-elections when an extreme democratic outcome competes with a normal democratic outcome for power

As mentioned in the introduction, when an extreme democratic outcome EDOi in expression 3 goes into re-election against a normal democratic outcome(NDOj) in an attempt to keep power, then the non-independent rule of law system NIRL governs the election. The complacency condition present at that moment of the election be it no full true majority complacency($N[FTC] = N[ETK]$) or of full true majority complacency($[FTC = ETK]$) determines who wins the election, but the non-independent legal system NIRL validates who persists in the election in case of electoral complaints by the loser, a situation shown in Figure 5 below:




Figure 5 Re-election model when an extreme democratic outcome EDOi goes into re-election against an normal democratic outcome NDOj in order to keep power

Figure 5 above shows that under the non-independent rule of law system NIRL, both the normal democratic outcome NDOj and the extreme democratic outcome EDOj can win the election, but under the non-independent rule of law system NIRL only the extreme democratic outcome EDOi can persist as loyalty is to the extreme democratic outcome, not to democracy. In other words, under full true majority complacency $FTC = ETK$, the extreme democratic outcome wins honestly as $V_i > V_j$ as shown in the lower part of the figure by the continuous black arrow from NDOj to EDOi. But under no full true majority complacency $N(FTC) = N(ETK)$, then the normal democratic outcome NDOj wins, but its win is invalidated by the non-independent rule of law system NIRL as indicated by the broken arrow from EDOi to NDOj, and the extreme democratic outcome persists and remain in power despite $V_i < V_j$. Figure 5 above summarizes the way extreme liberal democracies work under permanent authoritarianism, which comes after they come to exist when they are in a period of temporary authoritarianism, and permanent authoritarianism means the end of democracy as there is not a peaceful way to go back to the world of normal liberal democracies under a corrupt legal system as wins by the extreme democratic outcome are validated and wins by the normal democratic outcome are invalidated to keep the extreme democratic outcome in power as legal loyalty in an extreme liberal democracy is to movement, not to country/democracy.

The working of re-elections when extreme democratic outcomes compete with another extreme democratic outcome for power

As mentioned in the introduction, when an extreme democratic outcome EDOi in expression 3 goes into re-election against another extreme democratic outcome EDOj in an attempt to keep power the non-independent rule of law system NIRL governs the election. The complacency condition present at the time of the re-election $C = FTC = ETK$ determines who

wins the election, and the strength of the non-independent legal system NIRL supporting each competitor determines who persists in the re-election , a situation highlighted in Figure 6 below:




Figure 6 Re-election model when an extreme democratic outcome EDOi competes against another extreme democratic outcome EDOj for power.

Figure 6 above tells us that given the consistent full true majority complacency condition $C = FTC = ETK$ any extreme democratic outcome EDOi or EDOj can win the election; and the strength or size of support of the consistent non-independent rule of law system NIRL each of them has will determine who persists in the election and get power. Hence, if $V_i > V_j$ under full true majority complacency(FTC) then EDOi wins the re-election as indicated by the continuous black arrow from EDOj to EDOi, but EDOi will persist only if $NIRL_i > NIRL_j$. Otherwise, EDOi would fail to persist even after winning the re-election. On the other hand, if $V_i < V_j$ under full true majority complacency(FTC) then EDOj wins the election as indicated by the continuous black arrow from EDOi to EDOj, but EDOj will persist only if $NIRL_i < NIRL_j$. Otherwise, EDOj would fail to persist even after winning the election as legal loyalty is to the movement that has more non-independent rule of law system(NIRL) support.

The road from normal liberal democracy to permanent authoritarianism from within

The road from normal liberal democracy to permanent authoritarianism from within has three steps, the coming to exist step, the consolidation, re-election, and targeted corruption step under temporary authoritarianism, and the permanent authoritarianism step, each of which are described below in detail:

a) Step 1: The coming to exist stage under the independent rule of law system phase

Extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) comes to exist when normal democratic outcomes(NDO) are seeking re-election and compete for power with them under full true majority complacency or effective targeted chaos($FTC = ETK$) governed by the independent rule of law IRL, a situation indicated in Figure 7 below:




Figure 7 The road towards permanent authoritarianism:
First step: Coming to exist

Figure 7 above tells us two important things i) when there is full true majority complacency $FTC = ETK$ in the electoral system the extreme democratic outcome EDO_j wins the democratic contest as $V_i < V_j$, which is indicated by the continuous arrow from NDO_i to EDO_j ; and ii) if NDO_i were to claim electoral fraud, the EDO_j would win as the independent rule of law system IRL will validate the winner no matter who is it so the NDO_i loses anyway as indicated by the broken arrow from EDO_j to NDO_i . This is because the loyalty of the independent rule of law system (IRL) system is to country/democracy regardless of who wins.

b) Step 2: The re-election and corruption of independent rule of law system phase

As soon as extreme democratic outcomes come to exist, they will focus their attention on i) corrupting the independent legal system $K[IRL]$ in which they came to exist and ii) to maintaining an ongoing full true majority complacency (FTC) environment; and if they are re-elected they will have more time to corrupt and spread chaos even more to make sure there is always full true majority complacency FTC in the system, a situation stated in Figure 8 below:





Figure 8 The road towards permanent authoritarianism:
Second step: Winning re-election to get more time
to corrupt the independent legal loyalty system

Figure 8 above shows at the center an independent rule of law system under targeted chaos ($K[IRL]$) as the EDO_j wins re-election as it managed to maintain ongoing full true majority complacency $FTC = ETK$ since existence and as long as there is full true majority complacency (FTC) the EDO_j will win re-election and the NDO_i will lose elections. Hence,

under a corrupting legal system K [IRL] and full true majority complacency, the extreme democratic outcome wins re-elections, yet its legal and political loyalty is to movement, not to country/democracy.

c) Step 3: The permanent authoritarianism phase

Once ongoing targeted chaos to corrupt the independent legal system K[IRL] succeeds in corrupting it fully and transform it into a non-independent rule of law system NIRL and succeeds too in maintaining full true majority complacency through effective targeted chaos $FTC = ETK$, then even if the extreme democratic outcome EDO_j loses an election to the normal democratic outcome NDO_i it can still remain in power due to the backing of the non-independent rule of law system $NIRL_j$, a situation indicated in Figure 9 below:



**Figure 9 The road towards permanent authoritarianism:
Third step: The full corruption of the independent legal loyalty system $K[IRL] = NIRL_j$**

Figure 9 above helps us to see the following aspects: i) the re-election of the extreme democratic outcome EDO_j takes place under the non-independent rule of law system $NIRL_j$ now in place as the independent rule of law system that existed when it came to exist has been fully corrupted $K[IRL] = NIRL_j$; ii) If there is full true majority complacency $FTC = ETK$ the extreme democratic outcome EDO_j wins as then $V_i < V_j$ as indicated by the continuous black arrow from NDO_i to EDO_j ; iii) If there is no full true majority complacency because there is no effective targeted chaos affecting the democratic process $N(FTC) = N[ETK]$, then the normal democratic outcome NDO_i should win the democratic contest because then $V_i > V_j$, but the non-independent rule of law system $NIRL_j$ sides with the extreme democratic outcome EDO_j and keeps it in power as indicated by the broken arrow from EDO_j to NDO_i . Therefore, Figure 9 above reflects the structure of permanent authoritarianism from within as well as the death of the democracy system inside which it came to exist as even when it loses re-elections can still remain in power as even if the normal democratic outcome were to win the election, the independent rule of law system would invalidate as legal loyalty here is to the extreme democratic outcome.

The fall of extreme democratic outcomes

Hence, the fall of extreme democratic outcomes EDOj can only come during the period when the independent rule of law system IRL in which they come to exist is still strong when re-elections come along as then if extreme democratic outcomes EDOj seek re-election and they lose the re-election, no matter what they do, they cannot persist as the independent rule of law system will validate the winner, a situation pointed out in Figure 10 below:




Figure 10 The fall of extreme democratic outcomes: Under the independent rule of law if extreme democratic outcomes like EDOj lose they an election they can not persist

We can appreciate the following based on Figure 10 above: i) the extreme democratic outcome EDOj goes into re-election under an independent rule of law system IRL; ii) As there is no full true majority complacency, there is no effective targeted chaos $N(FTC) = N(ETK)$, then $V_i > V_j$ so the normal democratic outcome NDOi wins the election as indicated by the continuous black arrow from EDOj to NDOi; and iii) even if the extreme democratic outcome EDOj bring claims of electoral fraud to an independent rule of law system IRL without facts and proof to prove the claim, it will lose the case and the winner is validated and hence, the extreme democratic outcome EDOj does not persist in power as indicated by the broke black arrow from NDOi to EDOj. Notice that if there was full true majority complacency $FTC = ETK$, then the EDOj would win re-election. Hence, Figure 10 above reflects the structure of temporary authoritarianism as authoritarianism will rule until the extreme democratic outcome loses re-election; and it starts again, if ever the extreme democratic outcome comes into existence again. In addition, notice, that if the extreme democratic outcome loses the re-election, we should not expect a peaceful transfer of power as legal and political loyalty in the case of the extreme democratic outcome is to movement, not to country/democracy.

The structure of the 2016 rise of Trumpism

As indicated in the introduction, it is known now that the 2016 election when Hillary Clinton was competing with Donald Trump took place under an independent rule of law system IRL and under effective targeted chaos ETK focused on the states in the USA that would bring the majority of the electoral college votes to Trump and ensure that way his win, a situation summarized in Figure 11 below:




Figure 11 THE RISE OF TRUMPISM
 Under effective targeted chaos(ETK) and
 the independent rule of law system(IRL)
 Trump won over Clinton in 2016

Figure 11 tells us that under the independent rule of law IRL and under full true majority complacency led targeted chaos $FTC = ETK$, Clinton will lose the election against Trump as indicated by the broken black arrow from Trump to Clinton as Trump will have the majority of the electoral college votes as indicated by the continuous black arrow from Clinton to Trump. Notice that Figure 11 above summarizes the structure of the raise of Trumpism in 2016 and the beginning of temporary authoritarianism; and here you can expect a peaceful transfer of power as the legal loyalty of the normal liberal democracy and its outcome is to country/democracy, it is to respect the will of the people.

The structure of the 2020 fall of Trumpism

We know that the 2020 election when Joe Biden was competing with Donald Trump took place under an independent rule of law system IRL and under non-effective targeted chaos N(ETK) focused on the states in the USA that would bring the majority of the electoral college votes to Trump and ensure his win, an effort that this time failed to work, a situation displayed in Figure 12 below:




Figure 12 THE FALL OF TRUMPISM
 If trumpism loses a re-election under the independent rule of law system(IRL) and under no effective targeted chaos[N(ETK)] it can not persists

Figure 12 above tells us that under an independent rule of law system IRL, when an election takes place under no full true majority complacency $N(FTC) = N(ETK)$, then $V_i > V_j$ and Biden will win the election and Trump will lose the election. Trump cannot persist here as fake fraud claims brought to independent rule of law courts will not work and they will validate the winner so it persists over Trump. Notice that Figure 12 above summarizes the structure of the fall of Trumpism in 2020 and the end of temporary authoritarianism; and we should not expect here a peaceful transfer of power as legal and political loyalty in an extreme liberal democracy and its extreme democratic outcome is to movement, not to country/democracy.

Food for thoughts

i) Can normal democratic outcomes fail to persist after re-election wins under the independent rule of law system? I think no, what do you think?; ii) Can extreme democratic outcomes persist after re-election loss under the independent rule of law system? I think no, what do you think?; iii) Can permanent authoritarianism come to exist from within under the independent rule of law system? I think no, what do you think?; and iv) Does the fall of Trumpism means the authoritarian threat to democracy from within is over? I think no, what do you think?

Conclusions

A general democratic re-election model based on complacency conditions and legal loyalty systems was introduced. It was shown that this model can be used to frame the conditions under which normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes persist and fail to persist when winning or losing re-elections. The knowledge gained from the working of the general democratic re-election model was used to point out the three steps needed to take place in the road from normal liberal democracy to temporary authoritarianism to permanent authoritarianism from within. The majority rule based structures related to when extreme democratic outcome come to exist and when they fail to persist was used to frame the majority

rule based democratic re-election structure under which Trumpism came to exist in 2016; and under which Trumpism failed to persist after re-election lost in 2020. It was stressed in general, that when normal liberal democratic outcomes lose re-election against an extreme democratic outcome under an independent rule of law system we should expect a peaceful transition of power as then legal and political loyalty from the normal liberal democracy point of view is to country/democracy; and that when extreme democratic outcomes lose re-elections against a normal democratic outcome and under the independent rule of law system you should not expect a peaceful transfer of power as then legal and political loyalty is to the exism movement like trumpism, not to country/democracy.

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