

**Sustainability thoughts 134: How can normal and extreme democratic outcome theory be used to point out the structure of the 2016 shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking and its main implications?**

<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15711974>

By

**Lucio Muñoz\***

\* Independent qualitative comparative researcher/consultant, Vancouver, BC, Canada. Email: [munoz@interchange.ubc.ca](mailto:munoz@interchange.ubc.ca)

**Abstract**

It can be said that normal democratic outcomes are those who seek the best interest of the majority, and therefore, they reflect the view of the true majority; and it can be said that extreme democratic outcomes are those who seek the best interest of the minority, and therefore, they reflect the view of the true minority. From this point of view it can be said that i) normal liberal democracies bring different normal democratic outcomes into competition, where the one with majority votes wins the democratic contest; and that ii) extreme liberal democracies bring normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes into competition, where again the one with majority votes wins the democratic contest. When normal democratic outcomes compete with each other under an independent rule of law system there is true democracy as there is democratic consistency that allows power to alternate between different normal democratic outcome if the result of the democracy process says so; and when a normal democratic outcome competes with an extreme democratic outcome under an independent rule of law system we have temporary democratic authoritarianism if the result of the democratic process says so.

When we shifted from liberal democracy thinking to extreme liberal democracy thinking as we did in 2016 with the coming of Brexism and Trumpism we needed to shift our thinking from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking as true democracy thinking no longer holds in an authoritarianism based system if we wanted to understand what to expect from an extreme democratic outcome in terms of behavior or understand what to do either to save the democratic model or to prevent the coming of permanent authoritarianism from within. But apparently traditional democracy thinkers missed this 2016 shift in thinking, which may explain the confusion and knowledge gaps that have led people, academics, and politicians to treat extreme democratic outcomes and their expected behavior as if they were normal democratic outcomes when they are not, missing all together the democracy/authoritarian inconsistency at the heart of this new system. Hence, there is a need to understand the working of true democracy thinking and of temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking in terms of normal and extreme democratic outcome theory in order to

be able to point out the main implication of a shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking or vice versa. And this raises the following question: How can normal and extreme democratic outcome theory be used to point out the structure of the 2016 shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking and its main implications? Among the goals of this paper is to provide an answer to this question both analytically and graphically.

## Key words

Normal democratic outcome, extreme democratic outcome, liberal democracy, normal liberal democracy, extreme liberal democracy, Brexism, Trumpism, no complacency, full true majority complacency, targeted chaos, effective targeted chaos, ineffective targeted chaos, true democracy, authoritarianism, temporary authoritarianism, permanent authoritarianism, populism, normal populism, populism with a mask

## Introduction

### a) The world of normal democratic outcomes(NDO)

It can be said that normal democratic outcomes(NDO) are those who seek the best interest of the majority, and therefore, they reflect the view of the true majority. In other words, when the view of the true majority wins the democratic contest, we have a normal democratic outcome(Muñoz 2017a). The characteristics associated with normal democratic outcomes(NDO) are listed in Figure 1 below:





Figure 1 The characteristics of normal democratic outcomes(NDO)

We can see in Figure 1 above that besides reflecting the true majority view, normal democratic outcomes(NDO) also have the following characteristics: They are driven by normal populism, they seek the common good, they are loyalty to country/constitution, and they see the peaceful transfer of power if they lose elections as a duty.

### **b) The working of normal liberal democracies(NLD)**

It can be said that normal liberal democracies(NLD) bring different normal democratic outcomes into competition, where the one with majority votes(V) wins the democratic contest. A situation summarized in Figure 2 below:



**Figure 2 The working of normal liberal democracies(NLD)**

We can say based on Figure 2 above the following about normal liberal democracies(NLD): i) They bring together different normal democratic outcomes NDOi and NDOj to compete in the democratic contest; ii) The democratic contest operates under the conditions of no complacency(NC) and an independent rule of law system(IRL); iii) Since the number of votes(V) in this election contest for NDOj is greater( $Vi < Vj$ ), then normal democratic outcome NDOj wins the contest as indicated by the blue arrow; and iv) as the competition is between different possible normal democratic outcomes there is democratic consistency as indicated in the figure. We know that under no complacency(NC) and an independent rule of law system we should always expect a normal democratic outcome to come exist(Muñoz 2021)

We can use Figure 2 above to highlight also that when normal democratic outcomes compete with each other under an independent rule of law system there is true democracy as there is democratic consistency that allows power to alternate between different normal democratic outcome if the result of the democracy process says so as for example if  $Vi > Vj$ , then the normal democratic outcome NDOi would win the democratic process.

### **c) The world of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)**

It can be said that extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) are those who seek the best interest of the minority, and therefore, they reflect the view of the true minority. In other words, when the view of the true minority wins the democratic contest, we have an extreme democratic outcome(Muñoz 2017b). The characteristics associated with extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) are indicated in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 The characteristics of extreme democratic outcomes(EDO)

We can see in Figure 3 above that besides reflecting the true minority view, extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) also have the following characteristics: They are driven by populism with a mask, they seek the private good, they are loyal to party/movement, and they see the peaceful transfer of power as an embarrassing duty or acceptance of election loss. Loyalty in extreme democratic outcomes, political and legal loyalty, is to the movement/party/individual behind the extreme democratic outcome(Muñoz 2021).

#### d) The working of extreme liberal democracies(ELD)

It can be said that extreme liberal democracies(ELD) bring normal democratic outcomes(NDOj) and extreme democratic outcomes(EDOk) into competition, where again the one with majority votes wins the democratic contest. A situation depicted in Figure 4 below:




Figure 4 The working of extreme liberal democracies(ELD)

We can say based on Figure 4 above the following about extreme liberal democracies(NLD): i) They bring together normal democratic outcomes NDOj and extreme democratic outcomes EDOk to compete in the democratic contest; ii) The democratic contest in this case operates under the conditions of full true majority complacency(FTC) and an independent rule of law system(IRL); iii) Since the number of votes(V) in this election contest for EDOk is greater( $V_j < V_k$ ), then extreme democratic outcome EDOk wins the contest as indicated by the blue arrow; and iv) as the competition is between normal and extreme democratic outcomes(NDOj vrs EDOk) there is democracy/autocracy inconsistency as indicated in the figure. We know that under full true majority complacency(FTC) and an independent rule of law system we should always expect an extreme democratic outcome to come exist(Muñoz 2018), an outcome that tends towards amorality and exclusion(Muñoz 2019a).

We can also use Figure 4 above to point out that when a normal democratic outcome such as NDOj competes with an extreme democratic outcome such as EDOk under an independent rule of law system and the extreme democratic outcome EDOk wins the election contest we have then a temporary democratic authoritarianism situation. This is because for as long as the extreme democratic outcomes EDOk operates in a democratic process under full true majority complacency FTC, then temporary democratic authoritarianism will prevail since the outcome EDOk would keep persisting in power for as long as  $V_j < V_k$ . But if the re-election of the extreme democratic outcome EDOk takes place under a situation of no full true majority complacency N[FTC], then authoritarianism would end as then the normal democratic outcome EDOj wins the election and the extreme democratic outcome EDOk loses as then  $V_j > V_k$ .

**e) The nature and implications of the 2016 shift from normal liberal democratic thinking to extreme liberal democratic thinking**

It can be said that the 2016 shift from normal democratic outcomes such as NDOj to extreme democratic outcomes such as EDOk so as the unexpected coming of Brexit in 2016 in the UK(BBC 2016) and the unexpected coming of Trumpism in 2016 in the USA(Rawlinson

2016) led to a shift from normal liberal democracy thinking(NDL) to extreme liberal democracy thinking(ELD), a situation described in Figure 5 below:




Figure 5 The shift from normal liberal democracy thinking(NLD) to extreme liberal democracy thinking(ELD)

We can see in Figure 5 above that the shift from normal democratic outcome  $NDOj$  to extreme democratic outcome  $EDOk$  as indicated by the blue arrow from  $NDOj$  to  $EDOk$  means the following things: i) it means a shift from normal liberal democracy thinking( NLD) to extreme liberal democracy thinking(ELD) as indicated by the red arrow 1 at the top; and ii) it means a shift from democratic consistency to democracy/autocracy inconsistency as indicated by the lower red arrow 2. Notice that the only thing that changed in Figure 5 above and that drove the shift from NLD to ELD was a change in the complacency environment under which the electoral process takes place as it goes from no complacency(NC) in the normal liberal democracy to full true majority complacency(FTC),  $NC \rightarrow FTC$ , in the extreme liberal democracy system as the independent rule of law system IRL stays the same.

In other words, the extreme democratic outcome  $EDOk$  comes to exist within an independent rule of law system, which from the beginning it sees as a barrier or constraining factor to amorality based the minority view agenda besides all other democratic values and independent institutions(Muñoz 2019b ).

**f) The need to understand the nature of the 2016 shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking so as to be able to highlight relevant implications**

When we shifted from liberal democracy thinking to extreme liberal democracy thinking as we did in 2016 with the coming of Brexitism and Trumpism as indicated in the discussion above and highlighted in Figure 5 above we needed to shift too our thinking from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking as true democracy thinking no longer holds in an authoritarianism based system. This change in thinking was needed if we wanted to understand what to expect from an extreme democratic outcome in terms

of behavior or to understand what to do either to save the democratic model from authoritarianism or prevent the coming of permanent authoritarianism from within in a liberal majority rule based democracy.

But, apparently traditional democracy thinkers missed this 2016 shift in democracy thinking, which may explain the confusion and knowledge gaps that have led people, academics, and politicians since 2016 to treat extreme democratic outcomes and their expected behavior as if they were normal democratic outcomes when they are not, missing all together the democracy/authoritarian inconsistency at the heart of this new system. For example, it is not normal democratic behavior to be anti-facts and attack those reporting the facts(Wemple 2020), to be anti-science and promote anti-science behavior(Pazzanese 2020), to be anti-independent rule of law and punish those who respect its independence(Miller 2018; Solender 2020 ), to be anti-election results when losing the democratic contest(Collinson 2020; Shamsian and Sheth 2021), to be anti-validation of election results when your role is to validate them(Yourish et al 2021), to be anti-peaceful transfer of power and make the start of the new government harder(BBC 2020), to be anti-loyalty to country/democracy and punish those loyal to it(Shear and Apuzzo 2017), yet that extreme democratic behavior and support for it as displayed in the capitol riot on January 06, 2021 is seen as patriotic (Wamsley 2021).

Hence, there is a need to understand the working of true democracy thinking as well as the working of temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking in terms of normal and extreme democratic outcome theory as then we could be able to point out the main implication of shifting from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking or vice a versa. And this raises the following question: How can normal and extreme democratic outcome theory be used to point out the structure of the 2016 shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking and its main implications? Among the goals of this paper is to provide an answer to this question both analytically and graphically.

## **Goals of this paper**

a) To point out the structure of true democracy in terms of normal and extreme democratic outcome theory; b) To stress the structure of temporary democratic authoritarianism in terms of normal and extreme democratic outcome theory; c) To highlight the structure of the shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking and its main democratic implications; and d) To share the structure of the shift from temporary democratic authoritarianism to permanent authoritarianism as well as its main implications.

## **The methodology**

a) The terminology used in the papers is introduced; b) The operational concepts, models and rules are shared; c) The structure and characteristics of true democracy is pointed out; d) The structure and characteristics of temporary democratic authoritarianism is highlighted; e) The structure and implications of a shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking is stressed; f) the structure and implications of the shift from temporary democratic authoritarianism to permanent authoritarians that takes place when the independent rule of law systems is fully corrupted is pointed out; and g) Some food for thoughts and relevant conclusions are listed.

## Terminology

---

V = Voting model

$V_i$  = Voter “i”

$G_1$  = Group of voters 1

$G_2$  = Group of voters 2

T = True majority

M = true minority

D = Democracy

TD = True democracy

A = Group A

B = Group B

K = General chaos

O = Outcome

TK = Targeted chaos

DO = Democratic outcome

$TK_A$  = Chaos targeted to group A

$TK_B$  = Chaos targeted to group B

$TK_{PA}$  = Partial group A collapse

$TK_{FA}$  = Full group A collapse

$TK_{PB}$  = Partial group B collapse

$TK_{FB}$  = Full group B collapse

T = Dominant/active component

t = Dominated/passive component

M = Dominant/active component

m = Dominated/passive component

C = Complacency

NC = No complacency

TC = True majority complacency

TNC = True majority no complacency

MC = True minority complacency

MNC = True minority no complacency

FTC = Full true majority complacency

PTC = Partial true majority complacency

FMC = Full true minority complacency

PMC = Partial true minority complacency

NDO = Normal democratic outcome	EDO = Extreme democratic outcome
BREXIT = UK June 2016 outcome	USEXIT = USA November 2016 outcome
ND = No democracy exists	CRE = Complacency rule expectations
KC = General chaos led complacency	KC <sub>M</sub> = Chaos targets true minority complacency
KC <sub>PM</sub> = Chaos led partial complacency	KC <sub>FM</sub> = Chaos led minority full complacency
KC <sub>PT</sub> = Chaos led partial complacency	KC <sub>T</sub> = Chaos targets true majority complacency
KC <sub>FT</sub> = Chaos led full complacency	? = Unknown outcome
I = Influence operator	KC <sub>i</sub> = Chaos based complacency type i
ETK = Effective targeted chaos	ITK = Ineffective targeted chaos
NETK N[ETK] = Not effective targeted chaos	IRL = Independent rule of law system
NIRL = Non-independent rule of law system	NDO <sub>i</sub> = Normal democratic outcome “i”
EDOk = Extreme democratic outcome “k”	
C = Complacency	NC = No complacency
K = Chaos	TK = Targeted chaos

---

## Operational concepts, chaos expectations, operational models and complacency expectations

### A) Operational concepts

- 1) **Democracy**, *system that aims at providing equal opportunity to elect, to be represented, and to share in the benefits to all its members;*
- 2) **True democracy**, *there is equal opportunity in all democratic aspects as the same time;*
- 3) **Partially distorted democracy**, *there is not equal opportunity in at least one democratic aspect;*
- 4) **Fully distorted democracy**, *there is inequality of opportunity in all democratic aspects at the same time;*

**5) Majority rule system,** *the electoral system where the majority rules decides the winner of democratic contexts;*

**6) Voters,** *each individual in the electoral system acting without complacency and who is committed to make sure his vote or her vote is counted in the determination of the democratic outcome with the goal to maintain or improve his current or future benefits and rights;*

**7) True majority,** *the actual number of voters who win the democratic context;*

**8) True minority,** *the actual number of voters who lose the democratic context;*

**9) Complacency,** *the social discontent or protest or frustration affecting opposing groups with the given democratic or electoral system choices that may lead voters from the true majority and/or the true minority to not vote at all or if they vote they go for a protest vote by either voiding their vote or shifting their vote to other choices in the belief that their party will still win or will still lose anyway without their vote or in the belief that their vote is just one vote anyway and it will not matter in the end result; Hence, complacency based voting is linked to pure dissatisfaction as voting behavior takes place without thinking much about the impact that this action may have in the end on the balance of current and future majority and minority democratic rights;*

**10) No complacency,** *the absence of social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral system that leads each voter from each group to vote for their preferred democratic choice to ensure his or her vote is counted, therefore no complacency based voting is linked either to ensuring the preservation and enhancing of current democratic rights in one group or linked to seeking the erosion or change of those rights or to slowing the pace of democratic chance in the other group;*

**11) Partial complacency,** *the partial social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is not widespread; some voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*

**12) Full complacency,** *the general social discontent or protest or frustration with the democratic or electoral choices is widespread; many voters do not vote or cast a protest vote;*

**13) True majority complacency,** *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*

**14) True minority complacency,** *it can be partial or full, voters do not show to vote or spoil the vote or shift votes in a show of social discontent or protest or frustration;*

**15) True majority no complacency,** *everybody in the true majority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*

**16) True minority no complacency**, *everybody in the true minority camp votes for their preferred candidate, no protest votes take place;*

**17) Normal democratic outcome**, *under no complacency or not protest behavior everybody votes and the true majority wins the democratic contest; governments retain or lose power without big surprises. Inclusion, openness, respect for the rule of law, equality, stability, integration, union, harmony, the truth, trust, clarity, scientific facts, and the will of the majority for the common good are the heart of normal democratic outcomes.*

**18) Extreme democratic outcome**, *under full true majority complacency or full true majority protest behavior the true minority wins the democratic context, governments lose or win power under a big surprise as the democratic option that seems impossible to happen wins the day. Exclusion, closeness, lack of respect for the rule of law, inequality, instability, separation, division, chaos, fake truth, fake trust, confusion, fake facts, and the will of the minority for the good of the minority are the heart of extreme democratic outcomes.*

**19) Internal complacency**, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by internal group divisions(e.g. divisive choice/leader selection);*

**20) External complacency**, *social discontent or protest or frustration generated by external group divisions(e.g. equally disliked competing choices/leaders);*

**21) Full democracy**, *a full inclusion model, a true democracy;*

**22) Partial democracy**, *a partial inclusion model, a distorted democracy;*

**23) Democratic stability**, *the tendency towards harmony associated with specific democratic outcomes;*

**24) Full democratic stability**, *the tendency towards full harmony associated with normal democratic outcomes;*

**25) Full democratic instability**, *the tendency towards zero harmony associated with extreme democratic outcomes.*

**26) BREXIT**, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the UK withdrawing from the European Union.*

**27) BREXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of economic or territorial or state based unions.*

**28) USEXIT**, *the extreme democratic outcome supporting the USA withdrawing from the international and local order.*

**29) USEXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements supporting the breakup of the international and local order.*

**30) EXISM**, *the extreme democratic movements aiming at destroying majority rule based institutions, locally and globally.*

**31) Democratic normalism**, *the tendency of normal democratic outcomes to move towards more stable or balance democratic conditions through time as they seek responsible majority rule.*

**32) Democratic extremism**, *the tendency of extreme democratic outcomes to move towards the more unstable or unequal democratic conditions as they flourish under irresponsible minority rule.*

**33) Effective targeted chaos**, *the chaos that leads to full true majority complacency or achieves specific targets.*

**34) Ineffective targeted chaos**, *the chaos that does not lead to full true majority complacency or does not achieve specific targets*

**35) Normal liberal democracy**, *the one where the majority view wins the democratic contest.*

**36) Extreme liberal democracy**, *the one where the minority view wins the democratic contest.*

**37) Effective targeted chaos**, *the one that leads to full true majority complacency.*

**38) Ineffective targeted chaos**, *the one that does not lead to full true majority complacency.*

**39) Normal populism**, *when the majority view wins the democratic contest, the common good is the target.*

**40) Populism with a mask**, *when the minority view wins the democratic contest, the private good is the target.*

**41) True democracy**, *when competition for the right to rule under an independent legal system is between normal democratic outcomes.*

**42) Temporary authoritarianism**, *when competition for the right to rule under an independent legal system is between a normal democratic outcome and an extreme democratic outcome.*

**43) Permanent authoritarianism**, *when competition for the right to rule under a non-independent rule of law system leads to an extreme democratic outcome, even when it loses re-elections.*

## **B) Chaos expectations**

If we have a population of voters(V) that can be divided into two groups, groups A and group B under the assumption of one person, one vote; and the assumption that everybody votes so that the total number of voters equals the total number of votes, then the voting model can be expressed as follows:

### **1) $V = AB$**

Formula 1 simply says that the voting system(V) brings together two groups of voters, group A and group B.

If we assume we do not know the size of group A and the size of group B, then the expectation of who will win the voting contest is not clear. In other words, when you do not know the size of the groups involved in the voting contest the expected winner outcome(O) is not clear(?), a situation that can be expressed as follows:

### **2) $V = AB \rightarrow O = \text{winner A or B} = ?$**

In formula 2) above, we can see that the expected outcome(O) of who is the winner is not clear(?) as we do not know the size of each group.

Now we can use formula 2) to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the voting model(V) comes from factor I, which systematically affects the voting system; and it therefore may affect the nature of the outcome(O) as indicated below:

### **3) $I[V] = I[AB] \rightarrow I[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?]$**

Formula 3 shows that the working and the outcome of the voting process(V) is being affected systematically by the operator I.

#### **a) General chaos expectations when we do not know the size of the groups involved**

If we make the influence operator(I) be general chaos(K), then we have  $I = K$  and if we substitute this in formula 3 we can state the expected influence of general chaos(K) on the winner expectation when we do not know the size of group A and of group B.

---

#### **Expectation 1**

When the voting system(V) is under the influence of general chaos(K), we cannot link chaos and winners, as we do not know the size of the groups involved and there is no clear targeting, which can be stated as:

### **4) $K[V] = K[AB] \rightarrow K[O = \text{winner A or B} = ?] = ?$**

---

Notice that if there is no chaos,  $K = I = 1$ , still we would not be able to have a clear expectation of the winner, an expectation consistent with that of formula 2 above.

### **b) Targeted chaos expectations under majority rule**

If we assume now the size of group A is greater than that of group B in the voting model(V) so that  $A > B$ , where A is the majority group and B is the minority group, then the majority rule expectation leads to an outcome(O) that is normal democratic outcome(NDO) where the majority group A wins the voting contest, as indicated below:

$$5) V = AB \longrightarrow O = \text{winner A}$$

In formula 5 we can see that the expected outcome(O) is clear, group A is the winner as we do know that  $A > B$ .

Now we can use formula 5 to create a general influence operation where the influence on the working of the majority rule voting model(V) comes from factor I, which systematically affects the voting system and it therefore may affect the nature of the majority rule based outcome(O) as indicated below:

$$6) I[V] = I[AB] \longrightarrow I[O = \text{winner A}]$$

Formula 6 tells us that the working and the outcome of the majority rule voting process(V) is being affected by the operator I.

If we make the influence operator I be targeted chaos  $TK_i$ , so that  $I = TK_i$ , then the targeted chaos influence operation can be stated as follows:

$$7) TK_i[V] = TK_i[AB] \longrightarrow TK_i[O = \text{winner A}]$$

Notice from expression 7 above that depending of the type of targeted chaos( $TK_i$ ), the nature of the majority rule winner may change, and it raises the possibility that under a specific type of successful targeting the outcome can be flipped and be won by group B, a situation consistent with the ideas shared in the introduction that a specific type of targeted chaos may lead to flipping the majority rule based democratic outcome.

#### **i) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the minority group vote( $TK_B$ )**

---

### **Expectation 2**

When majority rule voting system(V) is under minority group targeted chaos( $TK_B$ ); therefore,  $I = TK_i = TK_B$ , then the majority group A still wins the voting contest, and with a bigger majority as this chaos leads to minority vote collapse, partial or full, which flips minority votes toward the majority view camp:

**8)  $TK_B[V] = TK_B[AB] \rightarrow TK_B[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still the winner}$**

Notice that chaos targeted to the minority group  $TK_B$  does not affect group A.

---

### **Expectation 3**

When minority group targeted chaos leads to partial minority collapse( $TK_{PB}$ ) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{PB}$ , then the majority group A still wins, with a slightly bigger majority,

**9)  $TK_{PB}[V] = TK_{PB}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{PB}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still wins, bigger margin}$**

---

### **Expectation 4**

When minority group targeted chaos leads to full minority collapse( $TK_{FB}$ ) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{FB}$ , the majority group A still wins, with the biggest majority,

**10)  $TK_{FB}[V] = TK_{FB}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{FB}[O = \text{winner A}] = \text{A still wins, biggest margin}$**

---

Notice that expectations 2, 3 and 4 above tell us that when the majority rule voting system(V) is under any type of minority group targeted chaos, the majority group is still expected to win the voting contest.

### **ii) The case of chaos targeted to induce the collapse of the majority group vote( $TK_A$ )**

---

### **Expectation 5**

When the majority rule voting system(V) is under majority group targeted chaos( $TK_A$ ), so that  $I = TK_i = TK_A$  we cannot have a clear expectation(?) of the voting outcome(O) or of who the winner is expected to be without knowing the type of true majority targeting and therefore, the type of majority group collapse it generates, partially majority group collapse( $TK_{PA}$ ) or full majority group collapse( $TK_{FA}$ ), as indicated below:

**11)  $TK_A[V] = TK_A[AB] \rightarrow TK_A[O = \text{winner A or B}] = \text{winner A or B} = ?$**

Notice that chaos targeted to the majority group  $TK_A$  does not affect group B.

---

### **Expectation 6**

When majority group targeted chaos( $TK_A$ ) leads to partial majority collapse( $TK_{PA}$ ) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{PA}$ , then the majority group A still wins the voting contest as still  $A > B$ , with a smaller majority, as stated below:

12)  $TK_{PA}[V] = TK_{PA}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{PA}[O = \text{winner A}] = A \text{ wins, smaller majority}$

---

### Expectation 7

When majority group targeted chaos( $TK_A$ ) leads to full majority collapse( $TK_{FA}$ ) so that  $I = TK_i = TK_{FA}$ , the minority group B wins the voting contest as now  $B > A$ , since the majority group A votes has fully collapsed as shown below:

13)  $TK_{FA}[V] = TK_{FA}[AB] \rightarrow TK_{FA}[O = \text{winner A}] = B \text{ wins}$

This is the only instance when an expected normal democratic outcome A can be flipped to an extreme democratic outcome B

---

## *C) Operational models*

### a) The general voting model

If we have a one person, one vote system, then we can express the population of voters( $V_p$ ) as follows:

14)  $V_p = V_1 + V_2 + V_3 + \dots + V_{100} + V_{101} + \dots + V_n$

Model  $V_p$  in expression 14) above gathers all voters from voter  $V_1$  to voter  $V_n$ , which can also be stated as indicated below:

$n$

15)  $V_p = \sum_{i=1}^n V_i$

$i = 1$

Therefore, formula 15) above indicates the summation of all voters.

### b) The general voting model by groupings

We can also express the population of voters in formula 14) and 15) in two main groups or views, group  $G_1$  and group  $G_2$  as shown below:

$r$

$s$

$$16) \mathbf{G_1 = V_1 + V_2 + \dots + V_{100} = \sum V_j \text{ and } G_2 = V_{101} + \dots + V_n = \sum V_k, \text{ where } r + s = n}$$

$$j=1 \qquad \qquad \qquad k=1$$

Therefore, the voting model by groups can now be indicated as follows:

$$17) \mathbf{V_p = G_1 + G_2}$$

In the model  $V_p$  in expression 17) above we can see that the views of both groups  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

### c) The general voting model in terms of true minority and true majority

If we assume that group  $G_2 > G_1$ , then  $G_2$  is the true majority (T) and  $G_1$  is the true minority (M) so that  $G_1 = M$  and  $G_2 = T$ ; and therefore, the following is true:

$$18) \mathbf{V_p = M + T}$$

In the model  $V_p$  in expression 18) above we can see that the views of both groups M and T matter to determine the democratic outcome of the voting system. If the views of one group were not present, the voting system would be bias.

### d) The fully inclusive general voting model

The voting model(V) that brings together the competing views of groups of participants is the ideal voting model as it is fully inclusive as indicated below:

$$19) \mathbf{V = G_2.G_1 = T.M}$$

Model V in expression 19) above tells us that the views of  $G_2$  and  $G_1$  and the views of the true majority T and the true minority M are present in the model at the same time; and therefore it is fully inclusive.

### e) Effective and ineffective targeted chaos

$$20) \mathbf{ETK = TK_{FTC}}$$

Expression 20 simply tells us that chaos that leads to full true majority complacency  $TK_{FTC}$  is effective chaos ETK, which leads to an extreme democratic outcome win or to a normal democratic outcome loss.

$$21) \mathbf{ITK = N[TK_{FTC}]}$$

Expression 21 says that chaos that does not lead to full true majority complacency  $N[TK_{FTC}]$  is ineffective chaos ITK, which leads to an extreme democratic outcome loss or to a normal democratic outcome win.

## f) Complacency expectations and expected democratic outcomes

If NC = no complacency

FTC = Full true majority complacency

FMC = Full true minority complacency PTC = Partial true majority complacency

PMC = Partial true minority complacency D = V = T.M = democratic contest

*Then the following expectations hold true:*

**22)  $NC[D] = NC[V] = NC[T.M] \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$**

Expression 22 says that under no complacency(NC) we should expect the voting system(V) to produce a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

**23)  $FTC[D] = FTC[V] = FTC[T.M] \rightarrow M \text{ wins at } T < M = EDO$**

Expression 23 says that under full true majority complacency(FTC) we should expect the voting system(V) to produce an extreme democratic outcome(EDO).

**24)  $FMC[D] = FMC[V] = T.FMC[M] \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$**

Expression 24 says that under full true minority complacency(FMC) we should expect the voting system(V) to produce a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

**25)  $PTC[D] = PTC[V] = PTC[T.M] \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$**

Expression 25 says that under partial true majority complacency(PTC) we should expect the voting system(V) to produce a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

**26)  $PTM[D] = PTM[V] = T.PTM[M] \rightarrow T \text{ wins as } T > M = NDO$**

Expression 26 says that under partial true minority complacency(PTM) we should expect the voting system(V) to produce a normal democratic outcome(NDO).

## The structure and characteristics of true democracy

In a true democracy, the competition for power is between different normal democratic outcomes, such as NDOi and NDOj, who may alternate power as they win and lose elections, a situation detailed in Figure 6 below:




Figure 6 The structure of true democracy

As indicated in Figure 6 above, true democracy brings normal democratic outcome NDOi into competition with normal democratic outcome NDOj under an independent rule of law system(IRL) and no complacency(NC) as everybody votes, one person one vote, full inclusion or full participation. The normal democratic outcome NDOi wins when it has more votes so that  $Vi > Vj$  and the normal democratic outcome NDOj wins also when it has more votes so that  $Vi < Vj$  as indicated by the blue arrows between them.

We can also see in Figure 6 above that as true democracy works and power alternates between normal democratic outcomes it tends towards morality and towards inclusion with the support of science as it is science based. As true democracy is about normal democratic outcomes dynamics, it is about majority views winning the democratic contest, it is about normal populism, it is about championing the common good, it is about loyalty to the country/constitution/democracy, and it is about a peaceful transfer of power. And the above is true as in true democracy there is democratic consistency at play.

### The structure and characteristics of temporary democratic authoritarianism

In temporary democratic authoritarianism, the competition for power is between a normal democratic outcomes and an extreme democratic outcome, such as NDOJ and EDOk, who may alternate power as they win and lose elections, but it remains in place as long as the extreme democratic outcome EDOk is in power, a situation indicated in Figure 7 below:




Figure 7 The structure of temporary democratic authoritarianism

As shown in Figure 7 above, temporary democratic authoritarianism brings normal democratic outcome NDOj into competition with an extreme democratic outcome NDOk under an independent rule of law system(IRL) and it comes to exist when the extreme democratic outcome EDOk wins the election, but notice that the complacency conditions under which they win the democratic contest are different. As it can be seen in Figure 7 above, when there is full true majority complacency FTC the extreme democratic outcome EDOk wins the democratic contest as then  $Vj < Vk$  as indicated by the blue arrow from NDOj to EDOk; and when there is no full true majority complacency N[FTC], then the normal democratic outcome NDOj wins the contest as then  $Vj > Vk$  as indicated by the broken blue arrow from EDOk to NDOj. The blue arrow is broken because the normal democratic outcome NDOj in this case lost the election, which has given to the rise of temporary democratic authoritarianism as EDOk has won.

And since the moment the extreme democratic outcome EDOk wins the election and for as long as it is re-elected, there is temporary democratic authoritarianism we should expect it to tend towards amorality and towards exclusion without science support as it is non-science based. As temporary democratic authoritarianism is about extreme democratic outcomes dynamics, it is about minority views winning the democratic contests, it is about populism with a mask, it is about championing the private good, it is about loyalty to the party/movement/individual, and it is about non-peaceful transfer of power. And the above is true as in temporary democratic authoritarianism there is democracy/autocracy inconsistency at play as amorality is place over morality, exclusion over inclusion, and non-science based thinking over science based thinking.

### The structure and implications of the 2016 shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking

The structure and implications of the 2016 shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking when we shift from normal democratic outcomes like NDOj to extreme democratic outcomes like EDOk can be appreciated by contrasting those two ways of thinking as done in Figure 8 below:




Figure 8 The shift from true democracy thinking to temporary authoritarianism thinking

The following aspects can be highlighted based in Figure 8 above: i) Power in a true democracy alternates between normal democratic outcomes like NDOi and NDOj indicating democratic consistency while power in a temporary democratic authoritarianism system alternates between normal democratic outcomes like NDOj and extreme democratic outcomes like EDOk, but when power is in the hands of the extreme democratic outcome EDOk the authoritarian system is active and when power goes to the normal democratic outcome, the authoritarian system ends; ii) the shift from normal democratic outcomes like NDOj to extreme democratic outcome like EDOk as indicated by the blue arrow from NDOj to EDOk means a shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking as indicated by the red arrow 1; iii) the shift from normal democratic outcomes like NDOj to extreme democratic outcome like EDOk also means a shift from democratic consistency to democracy/autocracy inconsistency, and therefore, a shift from morality, inclusion and science to amorality, exclusion and non-science, respectively as indicated by the red arrow 2; and iv) When the extreme democratic outcome loses re-election, the period of temporary authoritarianism ends and true democracy thinking rules again as the normal democratic outcome NDOj would be now in power.

Also notice the following in Figure 8 above: i) under an independent rule of law system IRL extreme democratic outcomes like EDOk win the election or re-election only when there is full true majority complacency FTC as only then  $Vj < Vk$  as indicated by the blue arrow from NDOj to EDOk; and ii) under an independent rule of law system IRL normal democratic outcomes like NDOj win the democratic contest always when there is no full true majority

complacency N[FTC] as indicated by the blue arrow from EDOk to NDOj. And finally it is important to point out that because of the democratic/autocratic inconsistency in the temporary democratic authoritarianism system since the moment the extreme democratic outcome EDOk comes to exist in Figure 8 above and for as long as it is in power it will operate within this morality/amorality, inclusion/exclusion, and science/non-science inconsistency, where what is rational for the extreme democratic outcome EDOk seems irrational to the normal democratic outcome NDOj and vice a verse.

### The structure of permanent authoritarianism from within

As soon as the extreme democratic outcome EDOk comes to exist it sees independent institutions like the independent rule of law system and all democratic values as barriers to persist in power at all costs as they know that under an independent rule of law system IRL they cannot remain in power if they lose re-election so targeted chaos is aimed at corrupting the independent rule of law system{K[IRL]} and transform it into a non-independent rule of law system(NIRL) with loyalty to the EDOk/party/leader/movement, not to country/democracy/constitution.

And when the independent rule of law system IRL is fully corrupted and transformed in a non-independent system NIRL, then temporary democratic authoritarianism is transformed into permanent authoritarianism as the extreme democratic outcome EDOk will win democratic contests even if it loses re-election, situation summarized in Figure 9 below:




Figure 9 The corruption of the independent legal system K[IRL] transforms temporary authoritarianism into permanent authoritarianism, where EDOk persists in power even when losing re-elections

We can appreciate in Figure 9 above with respect to the nature of extreme democratic outcome EDOk that under temporary democratic authoritarianism in the left side of the figure, when the votes are  $Vj > Vk$  the extreme democratic outcome EDOk loses the re-election and the

normal democratic outcome NDOj wins the election, and if the extreme democratic outcome EDOk complaints about for example election fraud in an independent rule of law system IRL it will lose the case without evidence and proof of fraud; and the court will validate the NDOj win as the loyalty of the independent rule of law system IRL is to democracy. On the other hand, under permanent authoritarianism in the right hand of the figure even when the votes are  $V_j > V_k$  and therefore even when the normal democratic outcome NDOj wins the election the extreme democratic outcome EDOk persist in power as for example even if the normal democratic outcome NDOj brings an election fraud claim to a non-independent rule of law system NIRL it will lose the case as the non-independent court system NIRL will ignore evidence and proof of fraud and the NIRL court will invalidate the NDOj win as the loyalty of the non-independent rule of law system NIRL is the extreme democratic outcome's movement.

We can also appreciate in Figure 9 above the following about the consequences of corrupting the independent rule of law system  $K[IRL]$  to transform it into a non-independent rule of law system  $NIRL$ : i) Corrupting the independent rule of law system  $K[IRL] = NIRL$  leads to a shift from temporary democratic authoritarianism to permanent authoritarianism and to the death of true democracy as they the extreme democratic outcome EDOk remains in power whether it wins or loses re-elections; ii) Corrupting the independent rule of law system  $K[IRL] = NIRL$  leads to a shift from democracy/autocracy inconsistency to autocratic consistency, where political and legal loyalty now is to movement/party/extreme democratic outcome; and 3) Corrupting the independent rule of law system  $K[IRL] = NIRL$  leads to a shift from amorality, exclusion and non-science to full amorality, full exclusion, and full non-science as all true democracy values are vanished.

Finally we can highlight based on Figure 9 above about extreme democratic outcomes like EDOk that i) They come to exist only when there is full true majority complacency(FTC), but they cannot persist in power for ever because under an independent rule of law system they cannot remain in power if they lose re-election as shown in the left side of the figure/Temporary democratic authoritarianism; ii) They come to persist in power at all cost only when there is a non-independent rule of law system  $NIRL$  system or corrupted independent law system  $K[IRL]$  as then if there is full true majority complacency(FTC) they win; and if there is no full true majority complacency  $N[FTC]$ , they still stay in power with the backing of the non-independent rule of law system  $NIRL$  as shown in the right side of the figure/permanent authoritarianism; and iii) Hence, extreme democratic outcomes like EDOk can only lose power and normal democratic outcomes like NDOj can win power only under temporary democratic authoritarianism while under permanent authoritarianism only extreme democratic outcomes like EDOk can never lose power even when they lose re-elections.

### **Summary:**

When competition is between normal democratic outcomes, true democracy thinking is the tool; and when competition is between normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic

outcomes, then temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking is the proper tool as the tool that work in one system does not work in the other system. Hence, as systems shift the thinking supporting them must also shift too. Under an independent rule of law system a shift from normal democratic outcomes to extreme democratic outcomes will always lead to temporary democratic authoritarianism.

If while in power, the extreme democratic outcome corrupts the independent legal system and transform it into a non-independent rule of law system, then under a non-independent rule of law system extreme democratic outcomes will persist in power even when they lose re-elections as we are now under permanent authoritarianism from within. Extreme democratic outcomes come to exist when there is full true majority complacency, which leads to temporary democratic authoritarianism. Extreme democratic outcomes come to persist in power at all costs under a non-independent rule of law system, which leads to permanent authoritarianism as then it will stay in power even if it loses re-elections. The shift from true democracy to temporary democratic authoritarianism means democracy is in danger from within; and a shift from temporary democratic authoritarianism to permanent authoritarianism means the death of true democracy from within.

### **Food for thoughts**

1) Is the structure of trumpism consistent with the structure of the temporary democratic authoritarianism system? I think yes, what do you think?; 2) Is the minority view inconsistent with normal populism? I think yes, what do you think?; 3) Is the majority view inconsistent with populism with a mask? I think yes, what do you think?; and 4) Should we expect exism movements to show loyalty to country/democracy when losing elections or re-elections? I think no, what do you think?

### **Conclusions**

a) It was highlighted that the working of true democracies requires democratic consistency so they bring different possible normal democratic outcome into competition for the right to implement their majority view on how the common good should be advanced; b) It was stressed that the working of temporary democratic authoritarianism requires democracy/ autocracy inconsistency as they bring normal and extreme democratic outcomes into competition for the right to implement the majority view or the minority view respectively on how the common good should be managed; c) It was indicated that if the minority view wins the democratic contest government action and policy moves away from morality, inclusion, and science as they are barriers to the implementation of minority view agendas; d) It was said that if the majority view wins the democratic contest government action and policy moves towards

morality, inclusion, and science as they are essential to the implementation of majority view agendas; e) It was pointed out that the coming of extreme democratic outcomes means the shift from true democracy thinking to temporary democratic authoritarianism thinking; f) It was mentioned that the corruption of the independent rule of law systems while the extreme democratic outcome is in power leads to a shift from temporary democratic authoritarianism to permanent authoritarianism; and therefore, it leads to the death of democracy from within; g) It was stated that extreme democratic outcome can lose elections, but only under an independent rule of law system while normal democratic outcomes can never win power under permanent authoritarianism as they go into re-election under a non-independent rule of law system; and h) Finally, it was indicated that extreme democratic outcome only come to exist when there is full true majority complacency; and that temporary democratic authoritarianism systems come to an end when a normal democratic outcome wins the democratic contest under an independent rule of law system.

## References

British Broadcasting Corporation(BBC), 2016. [Brexit: Europe stunned by UK Leave vote,](#) EU Referendum News, June 24, London, UK.

British Broadcasting Corporation(BBC), 2020. [Trump won't commit to peaceful transfer of power,](#) News US & Canada, September 24, London, UK.

Collinson, Stephen, 2020. [Trump in denial over election defeat as Biden gears up to fight Covid,](#) November 9, Politics, CNN, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.

Miller, Ryan W., 2018. [Jeff Sessions is out as attorney general: Here's what we know, Politics, USA Today,](#) McLean, Virginia, USA.

Muñoz, Lucio, 2017a. [Majority Rule Based True Democracy Under Complacency Theory: Pointing Out The Structure of Normal and of Extreme Democratic Outcomes Analytically and Graphically, Boletin CEBEM-REDESMA,](#) Año 10, No. 8, October, La Paz, Bolivia.

Muñoz, Lucio, 2017b. [Upside Down Democratic Outcomes: Stating the Complacency Conditions Under Which Extreme Democratic Outcomes Such as BREXIT and USEXIT Should Be Expected to Take Place Using Qualitative Comparative Means, Boletin CEBEM-REDESMA,](#) Año 10, No. 9, November, La Paz, Bolivia.

Muñoz, Lucio, 2018. [True Democracy and Complacency: Linking Voting Outcome Expectations to Complacency Variability Using Qualitative Comparative Means, Boletin CEBEM-REDESMA,](#) Año 11 No. 1, January, La Paz, Bolivia.

Muñoz, Lucio, 2019a. [Moral and Amoral Liberal Democracies: How Targeted Chaos Can Affect the Democratic Process?](#), In: *International Journal of Management Studies and Social Science Research(IJMSSR)*, Volume 1, Issue 2, March-April, Ed. Dr.Vishal Muvel, India

Muñoz, Lucio, 2019b. [The 2016 shift from normal liberal democracy to extreme liberal democracy in the USA: Pointing out the structure of Trumpconomics, its meaning, and its expected local and global implications, both analytically and graphically](#), In: *International Journal of Latest Research in Humanities and Social Science(IJLRHSS)*, August 20, Volume 2, Issue 8, Pp 01-11, India.

Muñoz, Lucio, 2021. [Sustainability thoughts 132: How can a general majority rule based liberal democracy model can be stated step by step and how can it be linked to normal democratic outcome and extreme democratic outcome existing and persisting dynamics?](#), In: *International Journal of Management studies and Social Science Research(IJMSSR)*, Vol. 3, Issue 2, March-April, Pp 189-204, ISSN: 2582-0265, India.

Pazzanese, Christina, 2020. [Why isn't the right more afraid of COVID-19?](#), The Harvard Gazette, National & World Affairs, October 30, Cambridge, MA, USA.

Rawlinson, Kevin, 2016. [The world's newspapers react to Trump's election victory](#), Thursday, June 10, London, UK.

Shamsian, Jacob and Sonam Sheth, 2021. [Trump and Republican officials have won zero out of at least 42 lawsuits they've filed since Election Day](#), Business Insider, Politics, January 5, New York, NY, USA.

Shear, Michael D. and Matt Apuzzo, 2017. [F.B.I. Director James Comey Is Fired by Trump](#), Politics, May 9, The New York Times, NY, New York, USA.

Solender, Andrew, 2020. [Trump Calls To Vote Out Republican Governors Who Refused To Overturn Election](#), Election 2020, December 12, Forbes, New York, NY, USA.

Wemple, Erik, 2020. [Trump called the media 'the enemy of the people.' He means it.](#), Opinions, March 20, The Washington Post, Washington, DC, USA.

Yourish, Karen, Larry Buchanan and Denise Lu, 2021. [The 147 Republicans Who Voted to Overturn Election Results](#), The New York Times, Elections, January 07, New York, NY, USA.