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Rethinking democracy 102: What are the 3 fundamental lessons learned from facing exism movements and dictatorship threats 2016-2024?

By

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Abstract

The coming of exisms movements like 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit meant that the liberal democracy landscape had changed from one where different normal democratic outcomes compete for power against other normal democratic outcomes to one where normal democratic outcomes compete against extreme democratic outcomes for access to power, yet what changed in the liberal democracy landscape is not well understood. In 2020 Trumpism fell and in 2024 Brexism fell and there was a shift back from temporary authoritarianism to normal liberal democracies, one shifted back under a non-peaceful transfer of power claiming electoral fraud without evidence, and the other reverse back through a peaceful transfer of power without claiming electoral fraud, yet the reason why transfer of power went that way is not well understood too. And the need to understand what changed and how this change affect incentives for peaceful or not-peaceful transfer of power and why raises this relevant question: What are the 3 fundamental lessons learned from facing exism movements and dictatorship threats 2016-2024? Among the goals of this paper is to provide an answer to this question.

Key concepts

Democracy, perfect democracy, liberal democracy, permanent authoritarianism, temporary authoritarianism, normal liberal democracy, extreme liberal democracy, exism movements, normal democratic outcomes, extreme democratic outcomes, independent rule of law system, effective targeted chaos.

Introduction

a) The liberal democratic landscape after 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit

The coming of exism movements like 2016 Brexit (BBC 2016) in the UK and 2016 Usexit (Rawlinson 2016) in the USA transformed the liberal democracy landscape as now the presence of effective targeted chaos (E) or absent (e) of it determines who has access to power under an independent rule of law system (Muñoz 2024), a situation summarized in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1 The general liberal democracy landscape after 2016 Brexit and Usexit

Figure 1 above tells us that if there is effective targeted chaos (E) under an independent rule of law system (I) as shown by the blue arrow going upwards there will be temporary authoritarianism (TAi) driven by an extreme democratic outcome (EDO_i), but if there is no effective targeted chaos (e) as shown by the blue arrow going downwards there will be a normal liberal democracy (NLD_i) led by a normal democratic outcome (NDO_i). In another words, there will be an extreme liberal democracy ELD_i led by an extreme democratic outcome EDO_i under an independent rule of law system(I) if there is effective targeted chaos (E); and there will be a normal liberal democracy NLD_i driven by a normal democratic outcome NDO_i if there is no effective targeted chaos (e).

b) The need to understand what has changed and the implications of those changes

Hence, the coming of exisms movements like 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit meant that the liberal democracy landscape had changed from one where different normal democratic outcomes

compete for power against other normal democratic outcomes (Muñoz 2015) to one where normal democratic outcomes compete against extreme democratic outcomes for access to power, yet what changed in the liberal democracy landscape is not well understood. In 2020 Trumpism fell (TG 2020) and in 2024 Brexitism fell (TG 2024) and there was a shift back from temporary authoritarianism to normal liberal democracies in both cases, but one shifted back under a non-peaceful transfer of power (BBC 2020) and denial of electoral loss (Collinson 2020) claiming electoral fraud without evidence (Shamsian and Sheth 2021), and the other reverse back through a peaceful transfer of power without claiming electoral fraud (Sabbagh 2024), yet the reason why transfer of power went that way is not well understood too. And the need to understand what changed since 2016 and how this change affect incentives for peaceful or not-peaceful transfer of power and why raises this relevant question: What are the 3 fundamental lessons learned from facing exism movements and dictatorship threats 2016-2024? Among the goals of this paper is to provide an answer to this question.

Goals of this paper

1) To point out how the liberal democracy landscape from before 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit has changed; 2) To highlight that the post 2016 liberal democratic landscape is based on a competition to access power between normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes under an independent rule of law system where the presence or absence of effective targeted chaos as the deciding factor; 3) To point out that the nature of the independent rule of law system at the time of the election or reelection determines whether or not there will be a peaceful transfer of power; and 4) To use the discussion above to highlight the 3 main lessons learnt from being under exism movements and permanent authoritarianism threats since 2016 and used them use them to provides some recommendations needed to be in place to proactively avoid the demise of liberal democracies in front of our eyes.

Methodology

First, the terminology and operational concepts and tools used in this paper are introduced. Second, the structure of the normal liberal democracy model landscape before and after 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit is shown. Third, the structure of the extreme liberal democracy model landscape before 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit is shared. Fourth, the structure of extreme liberal democracy after 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit is given. Fifth, the liberal democracy structure that leads to a peaceful transfer of power both ways is stressed. Sixth, the liberal democracy structure that leads to a peaceful transfer of power when permanent authoritarianism flips back to normal liberal democracy is highlighted. Seventh, the liberal democracy structure that leads to a non-peaceful transfer of power when temporary authoritarianism flips back to normal liberal democracy is pointed out. Eight, the liberal

democracy structure that leads to a peaceful transfer of power always is underlined. Ninth, the three fundamental lessons learned 2016-2024 when liberal democracies have been under exism movements and permanent authoritarianism threat are presented. Tenth, key recommendations needed to be implemented to ensure the persistency of democracy even under extreme authoritarianism are listed. And eleventh, some food for thoughts and relevant conclusions are provided.

Terminology

This paper shares the same terminology as Muñoz 2024 as it is in the same line of thinking.

E = Effective targeted chaos e = No-effective targeted chaos
Q = Quadrant Qi = Quadrant type “i”
SS = Social structure SSi = Social structure type “i”
APO = Access to power APOi = Access to power type “i”
I = Independent rule of law system i = Non-independent rule of law system
PD = Perfect democracy LD = Liberal democracy
TA = Temporary authoritarianism PA = Permanent authoritarianism
EXM = Exism movement BREXIT = Exism movement in the UK
USEXIT = Exism movement in the USA T = Trumpism
ELD = Extreme liberal democracy NLD = Normal liberal democracy
IRL = Independent rule of law system inversegram T = True majority
NIRL = Non-independent rule of law system inversegram M = True minority
ETK = Effective targeted chaos inversegram NDO = Normal democratic outcome
NETK = Non-effective targeted chaos inversegram EDO = Extreme democratic outcome

Operational concepts and analytical tools and rules

This paper shares the same concepts and analytical tools and rules as Muñoz 2024 as it is in the same line of thinking.

a) Operational concepts

- 1) Normal populism**, the movement that reflects the best interest of the true majority.
- 3) Populism with a mask**, the movement that reflects the best interest of the true minority.
- 4) Perfect democracy**, perfect populism or populism with no need of rule of law system as there is no electoral or access to power chaos to sort out.
- 5) Liberal democracy**, the majority rule-based system under an independent rule of law model needed to sort out electoral or access to power chaos that may exist or that can be made.
- 6) Normal liberal democracy**, the liberal democracy where there is no effective targeted chaos, the one driven by normal populism.
- 7) Extreme liberal democracy**, the liberal democracy where there is effective targeted chaos, the one driven by populism with a mask.
- 8) Normal democratic outcome**, the one where the true majority wins the majority ruled based voting contest, $T > M$, where the best interest of the country is put first.
- 9) Extreme democratic outcome**, the one where the true minority wins the majority ruled based voting contest, $T < M$, where the best interest of the movement is put first.
- 10) Temporary authoritarianism**, the one born within liberal democracies, where the view of the true minority temporarily rules.
- 11) Permanent authoritarianism**, a non-democratic system where the view of the true minority permanently rules.
- 12) Exism**, the extreme democratic movements born within liberal democracies aiming at destroying majority rule-based institutions, locally and globally.
- 13) Brexism**, the extreme democratic movement in the UK 2016-2024.
- 14) Trumpism**, the extreme democratic movement in the USA 2016-2021.
- 15) Brazilianism**, the extreme democratic movement in Brazil 2019-2023.
- 16) Democratic normalism**, the tendency of normal liberal democracies to move towards more stable or balance democratic conditions through time as they seek responsible true majority rule.

17) Democratic extremism, the tendency of extreme liberal democracies to move towards the more unstable or unequal democratic conditions as they flourish under irresponsible true minority rule.

18) Effective targeted chaos, the one that leads to full true majority complacency and produces an extreme democratic outcome.

19) Ineffective targeted chaos, the one that does not lead to full true majority complacency and produces a normal democratic outcome.

20) Independent rule of law system, the factual based system that ensures that the laws of the country are respected no matter who is in power or may come to power.

21) Non-independent rule of law system, the system that overlooks facts if needed to place or maintain or preserve a specific movement or ideology in power.

b) Operational analytical tools and rules

If we have the majority rule based liberal democratic model of the form $D = Q.P$, where D = liberal democracy, Q = the true majority, and P = the true minority, and therefore, $Q > P$. Then, the following holds true:

i) Liberal democracies under no effective targeted chaos(e)

If no effective targeted chaos (e) is affecting the working of the majority rule based liberal democracy model (D), and therefore, not affecting the competition contest between Q and P, then the voting contest where Q competes with P leads to a normal democratic outcome (NDO) as there is no full true majority complacency as indicated below:

1) $e(D) = e(Q.P) = NDO$ since $Q > P$

Expression 1 above tells us that under no effective targeted chaos(e) the majority rule-based voting contest produces a normal democratic outcome (NDO).

ii) Liberal democracies under effective targeted chaos(E)

If effective targeted chaos (E) is affecting the working of the majority rule based liberal democracy model (D), and therefore, affecting the competition contest between Q and P, then the voting contest where Q competes with P leads to an extreme democratic outcome (EDO) as there is full true majority complacency induced by effective targeted chaos (E) as indicated below:

2) $E(D) = E(Q.P) = EDO$ since $Q < P$

Expression 2 above indicates to us that under effective targeted chaos (E) the majority rule-based voting contest produces an extreme democratic outcome (EDO) as effective targeted chaos (E) leads to the collapse of Q due to induced full true majority complacency.

More concepts and operational tools and rules consistent with the ideas in this paper can be found in (Muñoz 2019) and in (Muñoz 2021).

The structure of the normal liberal democracy model landscape before and after 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit

We can label the structure shared in Figure 1 above into liberal democracy before 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit and the structure after those exism movements came into play in order to be able to share the ideas in this paper in very simple terms, which is done in Figure 3 below:




Figure 2 The liberal democracy landscape before 2016 Brexit-Usexit and after 2016 Brexit-Usexit

Figure 2 above on the left side tells as that before 2016 there was no effective targeted chaos(e) influencing access to power as competition was between different normal democratic outcomes NDO1 and NDO2; and the right side of Figure 2 tells us that since 2016 there was effective targeted chaos influencing access to power as now competition is between extreme democratic outcomes (EDO_i) and normal democratic outcomes (NDO_i). Hence, Figure 2 above shows that effective targeted chaos became the deciding issue since 2016 as the nature of the democratic outcome that has access to power is determined by whether there is effective targeted chaos (E) or not (e).

The structure of the extreme liberal democracy model landscape before 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit

Before 2016 effective targeted chaos (E) was not an issue so democratic competition took place under normal democratic chaos under an independent rule of law system (I) so liberal democracy takes the normal form as indicated in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 The liberal democracy world when there is no effective targeted chaos : Normal democratic outcomes prevail

Figure 3 above tells us that no effective targeted chaos (e) under an independent rule of law system (I) as indicated by the blue arrow pointing downwards means a normal democratic outcome NDOi will come to power.

The structure of extreme liberal democracy after 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit

After 2016 effective targeted chaos (E) became the issue so democratic competition took place under extreme democratic chaos under an independent rule of law system (I) so liberal democracy took the form as shown in Figure 4 below:




Figure 4 The liberal democracy world when there is effective targeted chaos: The extreme democratic outcome prevails

Figure 4 above indicates that the presence of effective targeted chaos (E) under an independent rule of law system (I) as indicated by the blue arrow pointing upwards means an extreme democratic outcome EDOi will come to power.

The structure of the new liberal democracy landscape after 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit

Therefore, the coming of effective targeted chaos (E) transformed the liberal democracy landscape permanently in 2016 as now power changes hands between normal democratic outcomes NDOi and extreme democratic outcomes EDOi depending on whether there is effective targeted chaos (E) or not (e), a situation summarized in Figure 5 below:




Figure 5 The new liberal democracy landscape after 2016: The presence or absence of effective targeted chaos determines the type of democratic outcome that get access to power

Figure 5 shows that currently in liberal democracies if there is no effective targeted chaos (e) power shift from extreme democratic outcomes EDO_i as indicated by the green arrow pointing downwards or power shift from temporary authoritarianism (TA_i) to normal democratic outcomes NDO_i or normal liberal democracies (NLD_i) if there is effective targeted chaos (E) as indicated by the green arrow pointing upwards.

The liberal democracy structure that leads to a peaceful transfer of power both ways

If the independent rule of law system (I) is strong or present because both the extreme democratic outcome EDO_i and the normal democratic outcome NDO while in power respect the independent rule of law system, then the transfer of power from normal democratic outcomes to extreme democratic outcomes and visa versa is peaceful as both outcomes puts the best interest of the country before the best interest of the party or movement, which creates the situation stated in Figure 6 below:




Figure 6 The liberal democracy structure that leads to a peaceful transfer of power both ways: from normal democratic outcomes NDOi to extreme democratic outcomes EDOi if there is targeted chaos(E) and from extreme democratic outcomes EDOi to normal democratic outcomes NDOi if there is no effective targeted chaos(e)

Figure 6 above points out that when under an independent rule of law system (I), whether there is effective targeted chaos (E) or not(e) there will be a peaceful transfer of power from normal liberal democracy NLDi to extreme liberal democracy ELDi and visa versa as no claim of electoral fraud without evidence can be expected to be successful under an independent rule of law system.

The liberal democracy structure that leads to a peaceful transfer of power when permanent authoritarianism flips back to normal liberal democracy

If the exism movements gains power and its extreme democratic outcome EDOi does not touch the independent rule of law system (I) while in power, then if there is no effective targeted chaos (e) when under reelection it will lose the election and a peacefully transfer of power takes place as the leader of the exism movement knows that without evident of electoral fraud the independent rule of law system (I) will ratify the normal democratic outcome NDOi win, which encourages a peaceful transfer of power, a situation stated in Figure 7 below:




Figure 7 The structure of extreme liberal democracies under peaceful transfer of power after losing the voting contest

Figure 7 tells us that if there is no effective targeted chaos as indicated by the broken blue arrow E under an independent rule of law system (I) there will be a peaceful transfer of power from the extreme democratic outcome EDO_i to the normal democratic outcome NDO_i as going to an independent court of law (I) without evidence of electoral fraud is not in the best interest of the country. If the exism movement knows the independency of the court system is in place they will go for a peaceful transfer of power as they know that independent courts will not keep them in power when they fail to keep effective targeted chaos permanently and there is no evidence of electoral fraud. As mentioned in the introduction, the leader of Brexit chose a peaceful transfer of power when losing the reelection in 2024 (Sabbagh 2024) knowing that under an independent rule of law system making claims of electoral fraud without evidence do not work to persist in power.

The liberal democracy structure that leads to a non-peaceful transfer of power when temporary authoritarianism flips back to normal liberal democracy

If the exism movements gains power and its extreme democratic outcome EDO_i does work on taking over the independent rule of law system (I) while in power, then if there is no effective targeted chaos (e) when reelection takes place it will try to stay in power and avoid a peaceful transfer of power if it feels is has capture the independence of the court system just enough if not fully expecting then that even without evidence of electoral fraud the captured court system will keep it in power, an expectation reflected in Figure 8 below:




Figure 8 The structure of extreme liberal democracies under NO peaceful transfer of power after losing the voting contest

Figure 8 helps to point out that tells us that if there is no effective targeted chaos as indicated by the broken blue arrow E under a captured rule of law system ($I = i$) fully or partially as indicated by the broken independent rule of law arrow (I) there will not be a peaceful transfer of power from the extreme democratic outcome EDO_i to the normal democratic outcome NDO_i as going to a captured court of law ($I = i$) without evidence of electoral fraud is the way to go as what matters for the exism movement as the best interest of the exism movement, not the best interest of the country. If the exism movement thinks the independency of the court system is captured they will not go for a peaceful transfer of power hoping that the captured courts will keep them in power when they fail to keep effective targeted chaos permanently. As mentioned in the introduction, the leader of Usexit did not choose a peaceful transfer of power when losing the reelection in 2020 (TG 2020) hoping that independent rule of law system was by then captured enough that making claims of electoral fraud without evidence could work to persist in power, but the independent rule of law held as claims without evidence of fraud were rejected (Shamsian and Sheth 2021). Notice in Figure 8 above that if the exism movement manage to capture the independence of the court system ($I = i$) fully, then liberal democracy ends (LD_i) and permanent authoritarianism (PA) from within begins.

The liberal democracy structure that leads to a peaceful transfer of power always

When normal democratic outcomes NDOi lose power and there is no evidence of electoral fraud under an independent rule of law system they will peacefully transfer power to the extreme democratic outcome EDOi as it respects the independent rule of law system (I) and it places the best interest of the country first, a context summarized in Figure 9 below:




Figure 9 The structure of liberal democracy when there is always a peaceful transfer of power

Figure 9 above points out that normal liberal democracies NLDi will peacefully transfer power when losing elections under an independent rule of law system(I) as they respect the independent rule of law and they put the best of the country before the best interest of party. Notice in Figure 9 above that under an independent rule of law court system(I) there will never be permanent authoritarianism (PA) taking over liberal democracies LDi from within,

The three fundamental lessons learned 2016-2024 when liberal democracies have been under a permanent authoritarianism threat

From the discussion above we can extract the following lessons learnt: 1) The coming of effective targeted chaos changed the liberal democratic landscape in 2016. Now post 2016 the competition for access to power is between extreme democratic outcomes and normal democratic outcomes; 2) As extreme democratic outcomes cannot maintain effective targeted chaos forever, they should be expected to work on capturing the independency of the court of law system while in power to help them stay in power when they lose reelections; and 3) Hence, the values of the extreme liberal democracies are inconsistent with the values of the liberal democracy in which

they were born. To permanently stay in power, the exism movement needs to destroy democracy fully by capturing the independence of the rule of law system and operate under a non-independent rule of law system, which means the death of democracy.

Recommendations to ensure the reelection persistency of democracy even under extreme authoritarianism

To ensure democracy lives even under extreme democratic outcomes the following key aspects are a must: 1) We need to ensure the protection of the independence of the rule of law system to avoid permanent authoritarianism from within so no one is above the law while setting clear ethical, moral and loyalty requirements on the independent judiciary to ensure that those making, reviewing, and implemented the laws at all levels of jurisdiction do not undermine the trust of the independent rule of law system: The independent rule of law need to be protected front outside and inside influences the independent judiciary by a clear legal code, code of ethics, and loyalty code to the country only; and 2) We need to determine which parts of different types of targeted chaos are legal and which parts are illegal in the political world in a non-partisan manner as doing this would minimize the risk that effective targeted chaos poses to the continuity of democratic values. Similar legal rules that apply to the private sector would deter most forms of targeted chaos in the political sector if they are in place. Targeted chaos needs to be regulated to protect the persistence of democracy regardless of who has access to power.

Food for thoughts

a) Can permanent authoritarianism exist without effective targeted chaos? I think No, what do you think? ; b) Can perfect democracy exist under effective targeted chaos? I think No, what do you think? ; and c) Can a normal democratic outcome stay in power after losing elections under an independent rule of law system? I think No, what do you think?

Conclusions

First, it was indicated that the structure of liberal democracy before 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit and after changed as effective targeted chaos became the driving force of access to power after 2016. Second, it was pointed out that after 2016 competition for access to power was no longer between different normal democratic outcomes but between normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes. Third, it was stressed that extreme democratic outcomes can no persist in power if they lose elections under an independent rule of law system so they should be expected to act while in power to capture the independency of the law system and transform it into a non-independent court system that can come handy when they fail to maintain effective

targeted chaos in play and lose elections. Fourth, it was highlighted that the 3 fundamental lessons learnt from being under exism movements and permanent authoritarianism threats 2016-2024 are a) that from 2016 effective targeted chaos became the force deciding who has access to power, normal democratic outcomes or extreme democratic outcomes; b) That extreme democratic outcome will tend to destroy the independent rule of law system as only when doing that they can capture it so they can remain in power even when they lose elections; and c) if the independence of the court system is intact there will be a peaceful transfer of power, even when exism movements lose power, but if the independence of the court is captured or perceived to be captured, there will not be a peaceful transfer of power. Finally, Fifth, it was said that if ensuring the survival of democracy is the goal then proactively, we have to ensure that the independent rule of law system is in place, protected legally and ethically, from external threats from outside the court system and from inside the court system to ensure no one, no person, no institution, neither the independent judiciary at all levels is above the law.

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