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Rethinking democracy 104: How can the present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant-based framework be used to show how the democratic landscape has changed since 2016 Brexit and 2016 Trumpism?

By

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Abstract

Before 2016 the liberal democracy landscape was based on competing normal democratic outcomes under normal democratic chaos under an independent rule of law system on how to best implement the best interest of the majority as seen by competing democratic forces. The coming of the 2016 Brexit as confirmed by 2016 Usexit brought a new variable into the equation, effective targeted chaos, which transform the competition between normal democratic outcomes into a competition between normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes, changing the democratic landscape, a fact apparently missed by those following traditional democratic thinking as they apparently have been treating extreme democratic outcomes as normal democratic outcomes because the coming of extreme democratic outcomes falls outside traditional economic thinking. Hence, there is not just a need to formally acknowledge that the democratic landscape changed since 2016, but also a need to know or see in simple terms what has changed, and the implications associated with that change for the survival of liberal democracies. And this raises the questions: how can the present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant-based framework be used to show how the democratic landscape has changed since 2016 Brexit and 2016 Trumpism? What are the implications of this? Among the goals of this paper is to provide answers to those questions.

Key concepts

Brexit, Usexit, Brazilianexit, Brexitism, Trumpism, Brazilianism, Democracy, Liberal democracy, Normal liberal democracy, Extreme liberal democracy, Exism movements, normal

populism, Populism with a mask, Chaos, Effective Targeted Chaos, Independent rule of law, non-independent rule of law

Introduction

a) The present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant-based framework (The P-A-ETK-IRL framework)

The idea that specific social systems are contained within specific walls within the present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law system framework (The P-A-ETK-IRL) has been recently shared (Muñoz 2024) and it is summarized in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1 The present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law system framework: The P-A-ETK-IRL framework

Figure 1 above shows the specific quadrants where political power reside for specific models of action: i) in the quadrant "ie" we find perfect democracy (PD), where since there is no chaos(e), targeted or not, there is no need for a legal system, it is a perfect world; ii) in quadrant "eI" we find liberal democracy (LD), where since there is normal chaos (e), targeted or not, there is a need for an independent rule of law system(I) so no one is above the law, it is not a perfect world; iii) in quadrant "EI" we have temporary authoritarianism (TA), which requires both effective targeted chaos (E) and an independent rule of law system(I) that makes or takes targeted chaos legal chaos and which will rule in favor of temporary authoritarianism (TA) if there is no evidence of electoral fraud; and iv) in quadrant "iE" we have permanent authoritarianism (PA), which requires both the existence of effective targeted chaos (E) and of

non-independent rule of law systems (i) to remain in power, whether there is effective targeted chaos or not.

b) Exism movements within the present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant-based framework.

Notice that exism movements (EXM) that come along within an independent rule of law system(I) under a wave of effective targeted chaos (E) fall within temporary authoritarianism (TA) so that EXM = TA as when targeted chaos stops being effective (e) it loses power; and therefore, it is contained within the walls of quadrant "EI" as shown in Figure 2 below:




Figure 2 Exism movements within the present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant based framework

Figure 2 shows exism movements (EXM) as temporary authoritarianism movements (TA) in quadrant "EI". In 2016 Brexit (BBC 2016) and Usexit (Rawlinson 2016) won the voting competition over normal democratic outcome under effective targeted chaos in the UK and in the USA respectively, leading in both cases widespread social discontent after the wins were announced as what seems to be impossible has happened.

c) The need to understand the democratic landscape before and after 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit

As indicated above, before 2016 the liberal democracy landscape was based on competing normal democratic outcomes under normal democratic chaos under an independent rule of law system on how to best implement the best interest of the majority as seen by

competing democratic forces. For example, in the USA in 2015 competition for power was based on the competition of ideas based on morality versus ideas based on practicality (Muñoz 2015), different ways to advance the best interest of the majority vote. The coming of the 2016 Brexit as confirmed by 2016 Usexit brought a new variable into the equation, effective targeted chaos, which transforms the competition between normal democratic outcomes into a competition between normal democratic outcomes against extreme democratic outcomes, changing the democratic landscape, a fact apparently missed by those following traditional democratic thinking as they apparently have been treating extreme democratic outcomes as normal democratic outcomes because the coming of extreme democratic outcomes falls outside traditional economic thinking. Hence, there is not just a need to formally acknowledge that the democratic landscape changed since 2016, but also a need to know or see in simple terms what has changed, and the implications associated with that change for the survival of liberal democracies. And this raises the questions: how can the present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant-based framework be used to show how the democratic landscape has changed since 2016 Brexit and 2016 Trumpism? What are the implications of this? Among the goals of this paper is to provide answers to those questions.

Goals of this paper

1) To link the exism movement in present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant base framework to Brexitism and Trumpism; 2) To point out the nature of the liberal democracy landscape before 2016 Brexit and Usexit, both in general, and in terms of the competition between normal democratic outcomes; 3) To stress the nature of the liberal democracy landscape after 2016 Brexit and Usexit, both in general, and in terms of the competition between normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes; and 4) To highlight the current general structure of the liberal democratic landscape in terms of competing normal and extreme democratic outcomes at play and the implications of this.

Methodology

First, the terminology and operation concepts and tools consistent with this article are shared. Second, the exism movement in present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant base framework is linked to Brexitism and Trumpism. Third, the nature of the liberal democracy landscape before 2016 Brexit and Usexit, both in general and in terms of the competition between normal democratic outcomes is pointed out. Fourth, the nature of the liberal democracy landscape after 2016 Brexit and Usexit, both in general and in terms of the competition between normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes is highlighted. Fifth, the current general structure of the liberal democratic landscape in terms of competing normal and extreme democratic outcomes in place today and the implications of this are highlighted. And finally, sixth, some relevant food for thoughts and conclusions are listed.

Terminology

PA = Permanent authoritarianism TA = Temporary authoritarianism
PD = Perfect democracy LD = Liberal democracy
NLD = Normal liberal democracy ELD = Extreme liberal democracy
NDO = Normal democratic outcome EDO = Extreme democratic outcome
EXM = Exism movements E = Effective targeted chaos
e = Not effective targeted chaos I = Independent rule of law system
i = Non-independent rule of law system ETK = Effective targeted chaos
NETK = Not effective targeted chaos IRL = Independent rule of law
NIRL = Non-independent rule of law T = True majority
M = True minority MR = Majority rule

Operational concepts and analytical rules

a) Operational concepts

- 1) **Independent rule of law system**, the one where no one, person or institution, is above the law.
- 2) **Non-independent rule of law system**, the one where one, person or institution, is above the law.
- 3) **Effective targeted chaos**, the one that induces full true majority voting complacency.
- 4) **Non-effective targeted chaos**, the one that does not induce full true majority voting complacency.
- 5) **Majority rule contest**, the one where the majority of votes wins the voting contest.
- 6) **Normal democratic outcome**, the one where the true majority view wins the voting contest.
- 7) **Extreme democratic outcome**, the one where the minority view wins the voting contest.

8) Normal populism, the one that aims to advance the best interest of the true majority.

9) Populism with a mask, the one that aims to advance the best interest of the true minority.

b) Analytical tools and rules

i) Majority rule-based thinking

If there is a true majority view (T) and a true minority view (M), and they compete for power in a democratic system of the form $D = T.M$, then the following is true:

1) $D = T.M \rightarrow T$ wins since $T > M$

Expression 1 above tells us that when the true majority view (T) competes with the true minority view (M) for power in the democratic system, the true majority (T) wins. Hence, under democratic thinking, perfect democracy or liberal democracy, the true majority (T) wins the voting contest under majority rule.

b) Majority rule-based thinking under no effective targeted chaos (e)

2) $e(D) = e(T.M) \rightarrow T$ wins as $T > M$

Expression 2 above tells us that when the true majority view (T) competes with the true minority view (M) for power in the democratic system when there is no effective targeted chaos(e), the true majority (T) wins. Hence, under democratic thinking, perfect democracy or liberal democracy, the true majority (T) wins the voting contest under majority rule under no effective targeted chaos(e). In other words, chaos does not affect the democratic process under democratic thinking, as chaos does not exist in perfect democracy (PD) or normal democratic chaos exists in liberal democracy (LD), but it is sorted out by an independent rule of law system, where normal chaos without evidence of electoral fraud is cast aside and the true majority win is certified, the true majority wins under majority rule under no effective targeted chaos where the true majority has done no wrong.

c) Majority rule-based thinking under effective targeted chaos (E)

3) $E(D) = E(T.M) \rightarrow M$ wins as $T < M$

Expression 3 above tells us that effective targeted chaos (D) affects the democratic process as it leads to full true majority voting complacency where $T < M$ and the true minority view (M) wins the voting contest. In other words, expression 3 indicates that Effective targeted chaos(E) flips the liberal democracy system (LD) from a normal liberal democracy model (NLD) where the true majority view wins (T) the voting contest to an extreme liberal democracy model (ELD) where the true minority view wins (M) the voting contest as effective targeted chaos (E) induces full true majority complacency, which leads to $T < M$.

The position of Brexit and Usexit within the present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant-based framework

Since Brexit, Usexit, and Brazilexit are all exism movements (EXMi) they can be placed in quadrant "EI" of Figure 2 above to create the situation shown in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 Brexit, Usexit, Brazilianexit within the present-absent effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law quadrant based framewok

Figure 3 above indicates that all exism movements (EXMi), including Brexism, Trumpism and Brazilianism, are forms of temporary authoritarianism (TA), and hence, the fall under quadrant "EI".

The liberal democratic landscape before 2016 Brexit and Usexit

a) General liberal democracy landscape

Before 2016, the democratic landscape had normal democratic outcomes competing for power under an independent rule of law system as there was no targeted chaos at play as summarized in Figure 4 below:




Figure 4 The liberal democracy landscape before 2016 Brexit and Usexit

Figure 4 above shows that liberal democracy before 2016 exists within quadrant "eI", where there is no effective targeted chaos (NETK = e) under an independent rule of law system (IRL = I).

b) The normal liberal democratic landscape before 2016 Brexit and Usexit in terms of competition within normal democratic outcomes

Notice that the liberal democracy landscape (LD) before 2016 was a competition between true majority view (T) and the true minority view(M) within quadrant "eI", where $T > M$. Notice too that the normal liberal democracies (NLD) are based on a voting competition between normal democratic outcomes (NDO) such as NDO1 versus NDO2, where the true majority view (T) wins under no chaos(e) and independent rule of law system(I). Therefore, we can express the liberal democracy model (LD) in terms of a normal liberal democratic model (NLD) by making $NDO1 = T = \text{True majority view}$, and we making $NDO2 = M = \text{True minority view}$. When this is done in quadrant "eI" we have the following:

$$\mathbf{LD = T.M = NLD = (NDO1.NDO2) = NDO1 \text{ as } T = NDO1 > M = NDO2}$$

The expression above indicates that the competition between different types of normal democratic outcomes (NDO) leads to a normal democratic outcome so that $LD = NLD = NDO1.NDO2 \rightarrow NDO$, as shown in quadrant "eI" in Figure 5 below:




Figure 5 The liberal democracy landscape before 2016 Brexit and Usexit as a competition between normal democratic outcomes NDO1.NDO2

Figure 5 above highlights that before 2016 the democratic landscape was based on a competition between different normal democratic outcomes (NDO1 and NDO2) and leading to a normal democratic outcome (NDO) gaining power.

The democratic landscape since 2016 Brexit and Usexit

a) The general democratic landscape

From 2016 the liberal democratic landscape (LD) changed as now exism movements (TA = EXM) are competing with normal democratic outcomes (NDOi) for access to power or maintaining power, a situation summarized in Figure 6 below:




Figure 6 The liberal democracy landscape after 2016 Brexit and Usexit

Figure 6 above shows that now the liberal democratic landscape can have either a normal democratic outcome (NDO) or an exism movement outcome (EXM) depending on the nature of targeted chaos at work under an independent rule of law system (I), if targeted chaos is not effective(e) we have a normal democratic outcome (NDO), but if targeted chaos is effective (E) we have an exism movement outcome (EXM). In other words, Figure 6 above tells us that the liberal democratic landscape has changed and if there is effective targeted chaos (E) as indicated by the continues blue arrow going up there will be exism movements like Brexism, Trumpism, and Brazilianism.

b) The normal versus extreme liberal democratic landscape after 2016 Brexit and Usexit in terms of competition between normal democratic outcomes and extreme democratic outcomes

Since exism movements like Brexit, Usexit, and Brazilexit flip normal liberal democracies (NDL) and normal democratic outcomes (NDO) to extreme liberal democracies (ELD) and extreme democratic outcomes (EDO), then we can express exism movements (EXM) in terms of extreme models that produced extreme democratic outcomes by making Brexit = ELD1, Usexit = ELD2, and Brazilexit = ELD3, which produce extreme democratic outcomes EDO1, EDO2 and EDO3 respectively as indicated in quadrant "EI" in Figure 7 below:




Figure 7 The liberal democracy landscape after 2016 Brexit and Usexit in terms of the competition between extreme democratic outcomes(EDO) and normal democratic outcomes(NDO)

Figure 7 above allows us to see the liberal democratic landscape from 2016 Brexit in different ways: i) as a competition between normal liberal democracy (NLD) and extreme liberal democracy (ELD); ii) as a competition between temporary authoritarianism (TA) or exism movements (EXM) and normal liberal democracy; iii) as a competition between normal democratic outcomes (NDO) and extreme democratic outcomes (EDO); and iv) as a competition between normal populism and populism with a mask.

The current general liberal democracy landscape in place since 2016 Brexit

If we generalize the structure of normal liberal democratic competition in Figure 7 above, we can state the general structure of the current liberal democratic landscape in place since 2016 Brexit and Usexit as shown in Figure 8 below:




Figure 8 The general liberal democracy landscape after 2016 Brexit and Usexit

Figure 8 tells us that under normal liberal democracies if there is no effective targeted chaos there will be a normal democratic outcome ($LD_i = NLD_i \rightarrow NDO_i$), but if there is effective targeted chaos (E) there will be an extreme democratic outcome ($TA_i = EXM_i = ELD_i \rightarrow EDO_i$). Therefore, Figure 8 above reflects the current general structure of liberal democracies since Brexit 2016, that allows for either an extreme democratic outcome (EDO_i) or a normal democratic outcome (NDO_i) to access power depending on where there is effective targeted chaos (E) or there is no effective targeted chaos (e). The following can be pointed out based on Figure 8 above: i) if there is no effective targeted chaos (e), there will be a normal democratic outcome (NDO_i) and normal democratic thinking rules; ii) if there is effective targeted chaos (E) there will be an extreme democratic outcome (i) and extreme democratic thinking will rule; iii) as long as there is effective targeted chaos (E) there will be temporary authoritarianism (TA); and iv) when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) and exism movements are in power, then power reverse back to normal liberal democracy (NLD). You can notice based in Figure 8 above that if extreme democratic outcomes/exism movements want to stay in power, effective targeted chaos or not, they need to destroy the independent rule of law system and capture it to ensure they remain in power, regardless of the outcome of voting contests.

Food for thoughts

1) Can permanent authoritarianism exist under an independent rule of law system and majority rule based democratic system? I think No, what do you think?; 2) Can normal liberal democracy exist under permanent effective targeted chaos and an independent rule of law system under majority rule? I think No, what do you think?; and 3) Does the end of an independent rule

of law system while extreme democratic outcomes are in power means the end of liberal democracy? I think Yes, what do you think?

Conclusions

First, it was shown that the present-absence effective targeted chaos and independent rule of law framework captures the structure of perfect democracy, liberal democracy, temporary authoritarianism and permanent authoritarianism. Second, it was indicated that the framework can be used to state the liberal democracy landscape before 2016 Brexit and Usexit, both in general and as a competition for power between different normal liberal democratic outcomes within normal democracy thinking under majority rule, where the best interest of the country is paramount. Third, it was pointed out that before 2016, the outcome of the voting contest was always a normal democratic outcome as there was no effective targeted chaos. Fourth, it was stressed that the framework can be used to state the liberal democracy landscape on and after 2016 Brexit and Usexit, both in general and as a competition for power between different normal democratic outcomes and different extreme democratic outcomes within liberal democracy thinking under majority rule, where the best interest of the country is first for normal democratic outcomes but the best interest of the exism movement is first for extreme democratic outcomes. Fifth, it was highlighted that after 2016 Brexit and Usexit the outcome of the voting contest can be either a normal democratic outcome or an extreme democratic outcome, depending on whether or not there is effective targeted chaos as the independent rule of law system will validate the winning result no matter its nature. Finally, sixth, it was indicated that the framework can be generalized as one where extreme liberal democracy compete with normal liberal democracies for access to power under an independent rule of law system, which makes authoritarianism when it comes to power temporary as they sooner or later will revert back to normal liberal democracy as when there is no effective targeted chaos, they lose power, whether they like it or not.

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