



# Rethinking democracy 109: Temporary authoritarianism versus normal liberal democracy competition under perceived capture and fully captured independent legal systems: When we should not expect a peaceful transfer of power and when not to expect a transfer of power at all?

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## Abstract

When temporary authoritarianism competes for power with normal liberal democracy under a fully independent rule of law system two things are expected to happen: a) the true winner has access to power always; and b) the expected transfer of power is peaceful both ways as if there is no evidence of electoral fraud losers are not expected to file illegal claims in fully independent courts without evidence of wrong doing as they know they will lose then. However, if temporary authoritarianism and normal liberal democracy compete for power under a perceived capture of the independency of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism or under a full capture of the independency of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism, then the true loser in the democratic contest may have access to power with the help of the courts and the expectation of having a peaceful transfer of power both ways disappear. The main goal of this paper is to highlight when we should not expect a peaceful transfer of power and when not to expect a transfer of power at

all when temporary authoritarianism competes with normal liberal democracy for power?

## Key concepts

Perfect liberal democracy, normal liberal democracy, temporary authoritarianism, permanent authoritarianism, outwards paradigm shifts, inward paradigm shifts, paradigm dynamics circularity, paradigm shift backs

## I. Introduction

### a) The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape

The general idea that when temporary authoritarianism (TA) competes for power with normal liberal democracy (LD) in the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under a fully independent rule of law system we should expect a peaceful transfer of power both ways as without evidence of electoral fraud filing illegal claims is discouraged by independent courts was very recently shared (Muñoz 2024), which in specific true majority versus true minority competition terms can be summarized as indicated in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape: Under an independent rule of law system(I) winners is determined by whether there is effective targeted chaos(E) or there is no effective targeted chaos(e)

Figure 1 above summarizes the structure of the competition for power between temporary authoritarianism (TA) and normal liberal democracy (LD), where the fully independent court system (I) discourages the filing of complains challenging the loss without proof of electoral fraud that can change the outcome of the democratic contest, and if invalid complains are filed it will dismiss them and ensure that the true winner of the democratic contest has access to power. Hence, under an independent rule of law system the loser is supposed to accept the loss in the best interest of the country making the transfer of power a peaceful exercise both ways as indicated by the green arrow pointing both ways upwards and downwards. For example, Brexit won in 2016 (BBC 2016) and there was a peaceful transfer of power, then Brexit lost in 2024(Sabbagh

2024) and there was a peaceful transfer of power. Inboth cases the respect of the independent rule of law when there is no evidence of electoral fraud to challenge the loss legally encouraged a peaceful transfer of power as the legal system is seen as fully independent.

#### b) The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under effective targeted chaos

In the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when there is effective targeted chaos (E) temporary authoritarianism (TA) wins access to power, and there is peaceful transfer of power as expected as normal liberal democracy (LD) will accept the loss if there is no evidence of electoral fraud, a situation summarized in Figure 2 below:




Figure 2 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when there is effective targeted chaos(E).  
TA wins power as indicated by the green arrow

Figure 2 above shows the structure of the temporary authoritarianism (TA) win when there is effective targeted chaos (E) as indicated by the green arrow pointing upwards. Here a peaceful transfer of power is expected as there is no evidence of electoral fraud so normal liberal democracy accepts the loss and it does not file invalid claims challenging the loss, they know they will lose in fully independent courts. Brexit won in 2016(BBC 2016), peaceful transfer of power; Trumpism/USEXIT won in 2016(Rawlinson 2016), peacefully trump became president; Brazilexit won in 2018(TG 2018), peacefully Bolsonaro became president; Italianexit won in 2022(BBC 2022b), peacefully Maloni became president; Argentinexit

won in 2023(BBC 2023),Milai peacefully assumed power; and Trumpism/USEXIT won again in 2024(TG 2024b), peacefully Trump became president again.

### c) The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under no effective targeted chaos

In the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) normal liberal democracy (LD)wins access to power, and a peaceful transfer of power is expected as temporary authoritarianism (TA) when there is a perception of full independence of the legal system (I)will accept the loss if there is no evidence of electoral fraud, a situation summarized in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when there is no effective targeted chaos(e). LD wins power as indicated by the green arrow.

Figure 3 above shows the structure of the normal liberal democracy (LD) win when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) as indicated by the green arrow pointing downwards. Here a peaceful transfer of power is expected as there is no evidence of electoral fraud so temporary authoritarianism (TA) perceiving the legal system as fully independent will accept the loss and it does not file invalid claims challenging the loss, they know they will lose in fully independent courts. For example, Brexit lost in 2024 (TG 2024a), peaceful transfer of power (Sabbagh 2024). Notice that when Trumpism/USEXIT lost in 2020 to Biden (TG 2020) and when Brazilianexit lost in 2022 (BBC 2022a) in both cases the transfer of power was not peaceful as expected as they had a perception of having captured the independency of the legal system (PCI), but this perception was false (PCIF) and the true winner had access to power, Biden in the USA (TG 2020) as there was no evidence of electoral fraud (Shamsian and Sheth 2021) and no commitment to peaceful transfer of power (BBC 2020) and Lula in Brazil (BBC 2022a) again as it was a legal win, but no commitment to peaceful transfer of power either by Bolsonaro (Brito and Pulice 2022; Hammar Castano 2023).

#### d) The rule of law and true winners and true losers

Consistent with the discussion above, fully independent rule of law (I) ensures the true winners has access to power in the event that the true loser contest the loss without having evidence of systematic electoral fraud such as one that could change the democratic outcome as the case of filing invalid legal claims in the USA in fully independent courts showed (Shamsian and Sheth 2021).

#### e) The rule of law and the peaceful transfer of power

Consistent with the discussion above, fully independent rule of law (I), when respected by both temporary authoritarianism (TA) and the normal liberal democracy (LD), encourages peaceful transfers of power as filing invalid claims to challenge a loss are discouraged, but this only works if both parties have a perception that the rule of law is fully independent (I) and the perception is real as the peaceful transfer of power in the UK showed (Sabbagh 2024). In other words, those who wish to stay in power win or lose will tend and should be expected to tend to find ways to capture the rule of law and destroy their independence of the legal and administrative system so as to use those capture systems to stay in power when they lose reelections in the future (Villeneuve 2024; Lat 2025; Strohm et al 2025).



**f) The need to understand when true losers may have access to power and when the peaceful transfer of power is only one way.**

Consistent with the discussion above, when temporary authoritarianism (TA) competes for power with normal liberal democracy (LD) under a fully independent rule of law system (I) two things are expected to happen: a) the true winner has access to power always; and b) the expected transfer of power is peaceful both ways as if there is no evidence of electoral fraud losers are not expected to file illegal claims as they know they will lose then. However, if temporary authoritarianism and normal liberal democracy compete for power under a perceived capture of the independency of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism or under a full capture of the independency of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism, then the true loser in the democratic contest may have access to power with the help of the courts, and then the expectation of having a peaceful transfer of power both ways disappear. The main goal of this paper is to highlight when we should not expect a peaceful transfer of power and when not to expect a transfer of power at all when temporary authoritarianism competes with normal liberal democracy for power?

**Goals of this paper**

1) To point out the general structure of the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when competition for power is under a perceived capture of the independence of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism and list the implications of this in terms of winners and loser and in terms of the nature of the transfer of power when there is effective targeted chaos and when there is not; 2) To highlight the general structure of the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when competition for power is under a perceived capture of the independence of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism and the perception turns out to be false and list the implications of this in terms of winners and loser and in terms of the nature of the transfer of power

when there is effective targeted chaos and when there is not; 3) To show the general structure of the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when competition for power is under a perceived capture of the independence of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism and the perception turns out to be real and list the implications of this in terms of winners and loser and in terms of the nature of the transfer of power when there is effective targeted chaos and when there is not; and 4) To indicate the general structure of the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when competition for power is under a full capture of the independence of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism and list the implications of this in terms of winners and loser and in terms of the nature of the transfer of power when there is effective targeted chaos and when there is not.

**II. Methodology**

First, the terminology and operational concepts and analytical tools used in this paper are given. Second, the structure of the competition for power under perceived capture of independence of the legal system is pointed out, in general, and when there is effective targeted chaos and when there is no. Third, the structure of the competition for power under perceived capture of independence of the legal system when the perception is false is highlighted, in general, and when there is effective targeted chaos and when there is no. Fourth, the structure of the competition for power under perceived capture of independence of the legal system when the perception is real is pointed out, in general, and when there is effective targeted chaos and when there is no. Fifth, the structure of the competition for power under full capture of independence of the legal system is stressed, in general, and when there is effective targeted chaos and when there is no. And finally, sixth, some food for thoughts and relevant conclusions are listed.

**Terminology**

T = True majority view	M = True minority view
P = Present	A = Absent
ETK = Effective targeted chaos	TK = Targeted chaos
K = Chaos	IRL = Independent rule of law
NIRL = non-independent rule of law	Zij = Known social system “j”
PA = Permanent authoritarianism	TA = Temporary authoritarianism
PD = Perfect liberal democracy	LD = Normal liberal democracy
E = Effective targeted chaos	e = Not effective targeted chaos
I = Independent rule of law system	i = No independent rule of law system





PCI = Perceive captured legal system FCI = Fully captured legal system  
PCIF = Perceived capture is false PCIR = Perceived capture is real  
PFI = Perceived full independent legal system PFIF = Perceived full independence is false  
PFIR = Perceived full independence is real. FI = Fully independent legal system

## Operational concepts and analytical tools and rules

### i) Operational concepts

- 1) *Perfect democracy*, perfect populism or populism with no need of rule of law system as there is no electoral or access to power chaos to sort out.
- 2) *Liberal democracy*, the majority rule-based system under an independent rule of law model needed to sort out electoral or access to power chaos that may exist or that can be made.
- 3) *Normal liberal democracy*, the liberal democracy where there is no effective targeted chaos, the one driven by normal populism.
- 4) *Extreme liberal democracy*, the liberal democracy where there is effective targeted chaos, the one driven by populism with a mask.
- 5) *Normal democratic outcome*, the one where the true majority wins the majority ruled based voting contest,  $T > M$ , where the best interest of the country is put first.
- 6) *Extreme democratic outcome*, the one where the true minority wins the majority ruled based voting contest,  $T < M$ , where the best interest of the movement is put first.
- 7) *Temporary authoritarianism*, the one born within liberal democracies, where the view of the true minority temporarily rules.
- 8) *Permanent authoritarianism*, a non-democratic system where the view of the true minority permanently rules.
- 9) *Effective targeted chaos*, the one that leads to full true majority complacency and produces an extreme democratic outcome.
- 10) *Ineffective targeted chaos*, the one that does not lead to full true majority complacency and produces a normal democratic outcome.
- 11) *Independent rule of law system*, the factual based system that ensures that the laws of the country are respected no matter who is in power or may come to power.
- 12) *Non-independent rule of law system*, the system that overlooks facts if needed to place or maintain or preserve a specific movement or ideology in power.
- 13) *Fully independent legal system*, the one where no one is above the law and put the best interest of the country first;
- 14) *Perceive full independence*, when you think that the legal system is fully independent

15) *Perceived full independence when real*, when you think that the legal system is fully independent and it turns out that it is as independency holds.

16) *Perceived full independence when false*, when you think that the legal system is fully independent, but it turns out it is not as independency does not hold.

17) *Fully capture legal system*, a system loyal to the movement or party, not to the country.

18) *Perceived captured legal system*, the one thought be loyal to the movement or party, not the country.

19) *Perceived capture legal system when real*, the one thought be loyal to the movement or party, not the country, and it turns out to be true and independency does not hold.

20) *Perceived capture legal system when false*, the one thought be loyal to the movement or party, not the country, and it turns out to be false and independency holds.

Notice that these concepts are shared by all articles in the series Rethinking Democracy for consistency to help traditional democracy thinkers follow the ideas in these papers such as in Muñoz 2024.

### ii) Analytical rules

#### a) Merging rules under present-absent conditions

If we have two factors, P and Q, where P = Factor present, p = Factor absent, Q = factor present, and q = factor absent, and then the following holds true:

$$PP = PQQ = Qpp = pqq = q$$

$$Pq = Pq \quad pQ = p \quad PQ.PQ = PQ \quad pq.pq = pq$$

#### b) Merging rules when the presence of a factor P drives an interaction

When the presence of factor "P" drives interactions the following holds true:

$$P(PP) = P \quad P(QQ) = PQ \quad P(pp) = PP(qq) = Pq$$

$$P(Pq) = Pq \quad P(pQ) = PQP(PQ.PQ) = PQP(pq.pq) = Pq$$

#### c) Merging rules when the absence of factor "p" drives an interaction

When the absence of factor "p" drives the interactions, the following holds true:

$$p(PP) = pp(QQ) = pQp(pp) = pp(qq) = pq$$

$$p(Pq) = pq \quad p(pQ) = pQp(PQ.PQ) = pQp(pq.pq) = pq$$

#### d) Paradigm competition structure

If we have two paradigms  $M1 = Pq$  and  $M2 = PQ$ , then the following is true:

$$M1.M2 = (Pq)(PQ) = (PP)(qq) = P(Qq)$$



The expression above tells us that who wins the competition between M1 and M2 depends on if  $Qq \rightarrow Q$  or  $Qq \rightarrow q$  as factor P is a common factor.

#### f) Impact of present-absent factor on the winner of the competition

Which factors are affecting the competition determines the winner of the competition or which model shift to take the form of the competing model, as indicated below:

##### 1) Competition under the influence of the absence of factor “q”

When competition is influenced by the absence of factor “q”, then the following holds true:  
 $q(M1.M2) = q[(Pq)(PQ)] = q[(PP)(Qq)] = q[P(Qq)] = q[Pq] = Pq = M1$  as  $Qq \rightarrow q$   
And this means that under the absence of factor “q” paradigm M1 wins the competition for power. which can also be expressed as:

$$q \\ M2 = PQ \text{-----} > M1 = Pq$$

##### 2) Competition under the influence of the presence of factor “Q”

When competition is influenced by the presence of factor “Q”, then the following holds true:  
 $Q(M1.M2) = Q[(Pq)(PQ)] = Q[(PP)(Qq)] = Q[P(Qq)] = Q[PQ] = PQ = M2$  as  $Qq \rightarrow Q$   
And this means that under the presence of factor “Q” paradigm M2 wins the competition for power, which can also be stated as:

$$Q \\ M1 = Pq \text{-----} > M2 = PQ$$

#### 3) Independency and capture rules

##### i) When a factor is independent such as factor P, the the following is true:

$FI_P = P = \text{Full independence}$

$PFI_P = P$  or  $p = \text{Perceived independence can go either way}$

$PFIR_P = P = \text{Perceived independence is real}$

$PFIF_P = p = \text{Perceived independence is false.}$

##### ii) When a factor is perceived as captured such as capture factor CIP, then the following is true:

$$PCI_P = ?$$

$$M1 = (PCI_P.q) < \text{-----} \rightarrow M2 = (PFI_P.Q) \\ \text{Access to power}$$

Proof:

If  $PCIP = ?$

$$PCI_P(M1.M2) = PCI_P (PCI_P.q.PFI_P.Q) = (PCI_P.PFI_P)(qQ) = (? . PFI_P)(Qq) = ?(qQ) \\ \text{since } ? . PFI_P = ?$$

Hence, we do not know who will have access to power as we do not know if the perception of capture of factor P by model M1 is real ( $PCIR_P$ ) or false ( $PCIF_P$ ), and hence, we do not know if

$FCI_P = p = \text{Full capture of independence}$

$PCI_P = P$  or  $p = \text{Perceived capture of independence can go either way}$

$PCIR_P = p = \text{Perceived capture of independence is real}$

$PCIF_P = P = \text{Perceived capture of independence is false}$

##### iii) Independent to capture factor links

$FI_P = PCIF_P = P = \text{Full independence holds}$

$PFI_P = PCIR_P = p = \text{Perceived independence does not hold}$

$PFI_P = PCI_P = P$  or  $p = \text{Perceived independence can go either way}$

$INV(FI_P) = FCI_P = \text{Full capture is the inverse (INV) of full independency.}$

$INV(P) = p = \text{Full inverse opposite since } FI_P = P \text{ and } FCI_P = p$

#### 4) Competition under the influence of the presence of factor “Q” or absent of factor “q” when factor P is perceived captured by authoritarianism forces in model M1

If we have two paradigms  $M1 = PCI_P.q$  under perceived capture  $PCI_P$  and paradigm  $M2 = PFI_P.Q$  under perceived independence  $PFI_P$ , where M1 can use the capture of factor P to win a competition when it loses legally that competition, then the following is true:

##### i) The structure of the competition

The structure of the competition can be stated as follows:

$$M1.M2 = (PCI_P.q)(PFI_P.Q) = (PCI_P.PFI_P)(q.Q)$$

The expression above tells us that there is a perception gap ( $PCI_P.PFI_P$ ) that affects who actually has access to power after the competition contest ends between M1 and M2 as M1 will use the perceived capture factor  $PCI_P$  if it turned out to be real ( $PCIR_P$ ) to win competition even if it loses, but it will still lose the competition if the perceived capture is false ( $PCIF_P$ ) as independence then holds, but as we do not know if the perceptions are true or false ( $PCI_P = ?$ ), access to power can go either way, which can be stated as indicated below:

paradigm M1 can use it to hold power even when it loses the competition contest legally.

#### 5) Competition under the influence of the presence of factor “Q” or its absent “q” when factor P is perceived captured and the capture is real ( $PCIR_P$ )

If we have two paradigms  $M1 = PCIR_P.q$  under perceived capture  $PCIR_P$  when real and paradigm  $M2 = PFI_P.Q$  under perceived independence  $PFI_P$ ,



when it is false, then M1 can use the capture of factor P to win a competition when it loses legally that competition, then the following is true:

**i) The structure of the competition**

The structure of the competition can be stated as follows:

$$M1.M2 = (PCIR_P.q)(PFIF_P.Q) = (PCIR_P.PFIF_P)(q.Q) = (p.p)(q.Q) = p(q.Q) = p.q$$

$$PCIR_P = p$$

$$M1 = (PCIR_P.q) <----- M2 = (PFIF_P.Q)$$

Access to power

**Proof:**

**If  $PCIR_P = p$**

$$PCIR_P(M1.M2) = PCIR_P(PCIR_P.q.PFIF_P.Q) = (PCIR_P.PFIF_P)(q.Q) = (p.p)(q.Q) = p(q.Q) = p.q$$

As when M1 has a real capture of factor “p”, then  $qQ \rightarrow q$

Hence, we do know who will have access to power as we know that paradigm M1 has factor “p” captured as the perception of capture of factor P is real; and it can use it to illegally maintain access to power with the help of factor “p” when legally losing a competition.

**6) Competition under the influence of the presence of factor “Q” or its absent “q” when factor P is perceived captured and the capture is false ( $PCIF_P$ )**

If we have two paradigms  $M1 = PCIF_P.q$  under perceived capture  $PCIF_P$  when false and paradigm  $M2 = PFIR_P.Q$  under perceived independence  $PFIR_P$  when it is real, then M1 cannot use the perceived

$$PCIF_P = P$$

$$M1 = (PCIF_P.q) <----- M2 = (PFIR_P.Q)$$

Access to power

**Proof:**

**If  $PCIF_P = P$**

$$PCIF_P(M1.M2) = PCIF_P(PCIF_P.q.PFIR_P.Q) = (PCIF_P.PFIR_P)(q.Q) = (P.P)(q.Q) = P(q.Q) = P.Q$$

As when M1 has a false capture of factor “p” and it is actually fully independent ( $PFIR_P = P$ ), then  $qQ \rightarrow Q$ .

Hence, we do know who will have access to power as we know that paradigm M1 has no capture factor “p” as the perception of capture of factor P is false; and it cannot use it to illegally maintain access to power with the help of factor “p” when legally losing a competition so model M2 has this time access to power.

**7) Competition under the influence of the presence of factor “Q” or its absent “q” when factor P is fully captured ( $FCI_P$ )**

as with the help of captured factor “p” absent then  $Qq \rightarrow q$  so M1 gets access to power

The expression above tells us that there is a perception gap ( $PCIR_P.PFIF_P$ ) that affects who actually has access to power after the competition contest ends between M1 and M2 as M1 will use the perceived capture factor  $PCIR_P$  when real when it loses the competition to maintain access to power, a situation stated below in terms of paradigm shift:

capture factor P to win a competition when it loses legally that competition as the perception is false, then the following is true:

**i) The structure of the competition**

The structure of the competition can be stated as follows:

$$M1.M2 = (PCIF_P.q)(PFIR_P.Q) = (PCIF_P.PFIR_P)(q.Q) = (P.P)(q.Q) = P(q.Q) = P.Q$$

as without the help of captured factor “p” absent as now it is present factor “P” then  $Qq \rightarrow Q$  so M1 loses access to power

The expression above indicates that there is a perception gap ( $PCIF_P.PFIR_P$ ) that affects who actually has access to power after the competition contest ends between M1 and M2 as M1 will cannot use the perceived capture factor “p” as the capture is false  $PCIF_P = P$  and when factor P is present it loses the competition to maintain access to power, a situation shown below in terms of paradigm shift:

If we have two paradigms  $M1 = FCI_P.q$  under full capture =  $FCI_P$  and paradigm  $M2 = PFIF_P.Q$  under perceived independence  $PFIF_P$  when it is false, then M1 maintain power even when losing competitions as if it loses legally, it will use the fully captured factor “p” to maintain power, and when it wins legally, it does not need to use the absence of factor “p”.

**i) The structure of the competition**

The structure of the competition can be stated as follows:

$$M1.M2 = (FCI_P.q)(PFIF_P.Q) = (FCI_P.PFIF_P)(q.Q) = (p.p)(q.Q) = p(q.Q)$$

Notice that if model M1 wins legally, then  $qQ \rightarrow q$  so that  $p(q) = pq$ , M1 has access to power without the need to use the absent factor “p”, but if model M1 legally uses the competition, the  $qQ \rightarrow Q$  so M1 will use the absent factor “p” to maintain





power so that  $p(qQ \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow p.q$  blocking the true winner M2 to access power and having the true loser retaining access to power.

The expression above then highlights that full capture of factor “p” ( $FCI_p.PFIF_p$ ) ensures that M1 will retain access to power, whether it legally

$FCI_p = p$   
 $M1 = (PCIF_p.q) < \dots \dots \dots M2 = (PFIF_p.Q)$   
Access to power win or lose

**Proof:**

If  $FCI_p = p$   
 $FCI_p(M1.M2) = FCI_p(FCI_p.q.PFIF_p.Q) = (FCI_p.PFIF_p)(qQ) = (p.p)(qQ) = p(qQ)$   
A legal win means  $p(qQ) \rightarrow p.q$  as then  $qQ \rightarrow q$  so it wins access to power; a legal loss means  $p(qQ) \rightarrow p.q$  as then the absent factor “p” forces  $qQ \rightarrow q$  blocking the true winner M2 accessing power and maintaining the true loser M1 in power.

Hence, we do know that model M1 will permanently stay in power whether it wins or loses a competition when having factor “p” fully captured, and this is the structure of permanent authoritarianism (PA).

**The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under a perceived capture of the independency of the rule of law by temporary authoritarianism**

When temporary authoritarianism (TA) while in power take steps to change the legal landscape to its

wins or legally loses the competition as when it wins it does not need to use the absent factor “p” to access power, but if it loses it needs the help of the absent factor “p” to help it maintain power, a situation summarized below in terms of paradigm shift:

advantage to the point that it perceives it has captured the independence of the legal system (PCI) when facing reelection, then it behaves when losing elections as if it has the courts on its side as it perceives the court as loyal courts to the movement/political party, not to the country, as detailed below.

**a) the structure of the competition for power under perceived capture of independency of the legal system**

Under perceived capture of the legal system (PCI), you do not know if the actual winner will be the one who actually has access to power as if the loser contests the result of the elections is no clear who the courts will back up as we do not know if the perception of capture of the independency of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism is real or false, a situation indicated in Figure 4 below:




Figure 4 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when under perceived capture of independency(PCI) by temporary authoritarianism(TA) and perceived full independent courts(PFI) by normal liberal democracy(LD).



The Figure 4 above shows the structure of one-way peaceful transfer of power as only when normal liberal democracy (LD) loses the democratic contest we can expect a peaceful transfer of power, a structure where it is not clear who will have access to power as it is not clear if the perceived capture of the courts is real (PCIR) or it is false (PCIF).

**i) The case when there is effective targeted chaos (E) under perceived capture (PCI)**

When there is effective targeted chaos (E) under perceived capture (PCI) temporary authoritarianism (TA) wins and has access to power, and the normal liberal democracy (LD) loses, accepts the loss and we have a peaceful transfer of power, a situation summarized in Figure 5 below:




Figure 5 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when under perceived capture of independency(PCI) by temporary authoritarianism(TA) and perceived full independent courts(PFI) by normal liberal democracy(LD) when there is effective targeted chaos(E).

Figure 5 above shows that under effective targeted chaos (E), temporary authoritarianism (TA) wins power as indicated by the green arrow pointing upwards; and there is a peaceful transfer of power as normal liberal democracy (LD) perceives the legal system as fully independent (PFI) and it will not disrespect the courts by filing invalid claims challenging the loss,

**ii) The case when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) under perceived capture (PCI)**

When there is no effective targeted chaos (e) under perceived capture of the independence of the court system (PCI) by temporary authoritarianism(TA) we do not know who may have access to power as we do not know if the perception of capture is false (PCIF) or real (PCIR), leading to a situation where whether temporary authoritarianism (TA) has access to power or not there will be a non-peaceful transfer of power, a condition described in Figure 6 below:




Figure 6 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when under perceived capture of independency (PCI) by temporary authoritarianism (TA) and perceived full independent courts (PFI) by normal liberal democracy (LD) when there is no effective targeted chaos (e).

Figure 6 above tells us that under a perceived capture of the independence of the court system (PCI) by temporary authoritarianism (TA) we do not know who will have access to power after the election as we do not know if the perception of capture of the courts is real or not, but we know there will not be a peaceful transfer of power both ways.

**The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under a perceived capture of the independency of the rule of law by temporary authoritarianism when the perception is false**

When temporary authoritarianism (TA) while in power take steps to change the legal landscape to its

advantage to the point that it perceives it has captured the independence of the legal system (PCI) and the perception is false (PCIF), then it behaves as explained below:

**a) the structure of the competition for power under perceived capture of independence of the legal system when the perception is false (PCIF)**

When the perceived capture of the independence of the legal system is false (PCIF) and the independence of the rule of law holds when filing illegal claims challenging a loss, then the true winner of the election has access to power, but only when normal liberal democracy (LD) loses there is a peaceful transfer of power, as indicated in Figure 7 below:




Figure 7 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when the perceive capture of independence of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism(TA) is false(PCIF)

Figure 7 above shows that under perceived capture of the rule of law when it is false (PCIF) and hence, the independency of the courts still holds, then the true winner has access to power and if illegal challenges are filed in courts where full independence holds the will be dismissed and the true winner of the election is ratified by the courts.

**i) The case when there is effective targeted chaos (E) and the perception of capture is false (PCIF)**

When tempoaray authoritarianism (TA) competes for power with normal liberal democracy

(LD) when the perception of capture is false(PCIF) and there is effective targeted chaos(E), then temporary authoritarianism has access to power as the independence of the legal system holds and if normal liberal democracy were to file illegal claims challenging the loss the claim would be dismissed and the true winner, temporary authoritarianism (TA) has access to power. However, normal liberal democracies (LD) respect the rule of law, and accept the loss, and ensure a peaceful transfer of power, a situation detailed below:




Figure 8 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when the perceive capture of independence of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism(TA) is false(PCIF) when there is effective targeted chaos(E).

Figure 8 above highlights that a) when there is effective targeted chaos (E) temporary authoritarianism (TA) wins access to power without the need to seek help from the perceived capture court (PCIF); b) When there is effective targeted chaos (E) normal liberal democracy (LD) loses and accepts the loss and there is a peaceful transfer of power as it perceives the courts as fully independent(FI) where you cannot file claims without evidence of wrong doing. The true winner has access to power here, in this case temporary authoritarianism (TA).

**ii) The case when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) when the perception of capture is false (PCIF)**

When tempoaray authoritarianism (TA) competes for power with normal liberal democracy (LD) when

the perception of capture is false (PCIF) and there is no effective targeted chaos(e), then temporary authoritarianism has losses to power as the independence of the legal system holds and if temporary authoritarianism (TA) were to file illegal claims challenging the loss without evidence of electoral fraud the claim would be dismissed and the true winner, normal liberal democracy (LD) has access to power. Hence, we should expect temporary authoritarianism (TA) to challenge a loss in independent courts it perceives as having captured, and those invalid claims being dismissed for lacking evidence of electoral fraud and the true winner, normal liberal democracy (LD) is legally ratified and get access to power under a non-peaceful transfer of power, a situation indicated below:






Figure 9 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when the perceive capture of independence of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism(TA) is false(PCIF) when there is no effective targeted chaos(e).

Figure 9 above highlights that a) when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) normal liberal democracy (LD) wins access to power with or without the help from the perceived fully independent court (PFI); b) When there is no effective targeted chaos (e) temporary authoritarianism (TA) loses power and challenge the loss in the perceived captured courts(PCI), but the challenge is dismissed for lacking evidence of fraud by the courts as the perceived capture is false (PCIF) and the independency of the courts holds and reaffirms normal liberal democracy as the legal true winner. Hence the true winners have access to power here when the perception of capture of independent court system is false (PCIF), in this case normal liberal democracy (LD).

**The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under a perceived capture of the independency of the**

**rule of law by temporary authoritarianism when the perception is real.**

When temporary authoritarianism (TA) while in power take steps to change the legal landscape to its advantage to the point that it perceives it has captured the independence of the legal system and the perception is real, then it behaves when losing elections as shown below.

**a) the structure of the competition for power under perceived capture of independence of the legal system when the perception is real (PCIR)**

When the perceived capture of the independence of the legal system is real(PCIR) and the independence of the rule of law no longer holds when filing illegal claims challenging a loss, then the true winner of the election may not be the one who has access to power after all, but only when normal liberal democracy (LD) loses there is a peaceful transfer of power, as indicated in Figure 10 below:




Figure 10 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when the perceived capture of the independence of the court system by temporary authoritarianism(TA) is real(PCIR)

Figure 7 above shows that under perceived capture of the rule of law when it is real (PCIR) and hence, the independency of the courts no longer holds in favor of temporary authoritarianism (TA), then temporary authoritarianism (TA) stays in power weather it rightly wins or rightly loses, and when it loses, it can retain power with the help of the perceived captured courts as the perceived capture is real (PCIR). When temporary authoritarianism (TA) rightly wins, there is a peaceful transfer of power as normal liberal democracy (LD) will accept the loss as it perceives the courts as fully independent (PFI), but when temporary authoritarianism (TA) loses the election it will filed illegal claims in the perceived captured courts to retain power and even without evidence of fraud it will get access to power as the

perceived capture is real while valid claims to have normal liberal democracy (LD) as the true winner based on valid electoral evidence supporting the win will be dismissed.

**i) The case when there is effective targeted chaos (E) when the perception of capture is real (PCIR)**  
When tempoaray authoritarianism (TA) competes for power with normal liberal democracy (LD) when the perception of capture is real(PCIR) and there is effective targeted chaos(E), then temporary authoritarianism has access to power as normal liberal democracy (LD) perceives the courts as fully independent (PFI) and accepts the loss, and ensure a peaceful transfer of power, a situation stressed below:




Figure 11 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when the perceived capture of the independence of the court system by temporary authoritarianism(TA) is real(PCIR) when there is effective targeted chaos(E).

Figure 11 above highlights that a) when there is effective targeted chaos (E) temporary authoritarianism (TA) wins access to power without the need to seek help from the perceived capture court (PCIR); b) When there is effective targeted chaos (E) normal liberal democracy (LD) loses and accepts the loss and there is a peaceful transfer of power as it perceives the courts as fully independent(PFI) where you cannot file claims without evidence of wrong doing. The true winner has access to power here, in this case temporary authoritarianism (TA).

**ii) The case when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) when the perception of capture is real (PCIR)**

When temporary authoritarianism (TA) competes for power with normal liberal democracy (LD) when the perception of capture is real (PCIR) and there is no effective targeted chaos(e), then temporary authoritarianism loses access to power legally, but it retains power illegally with the help of the perceived capture courts and the capture of independence is real(PCIR) leading to a situation where the true loser, temporary authoritarianism (TA), remains in power, ending normal liberal democracy (LD) in the process as then it becomes permanent authoritarianism, a situation summarized in Figure 12 below:




Figure 12 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when the perceived capture of the independence of the court system by temporary authoritarianism(TA) is real(PCIR) when there is no effective targeted chaos(e).

Figure 12 above indicates that a) when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) normal liberal democracy (LD) despite being the legal true winner does not have access to power as the perceived capture courts (PCI), regardless of the evidence, will keep temporary authoritarianism (TA) in power; b) When there is no effective targeted chaos (e) temporary authoritarianism (TA) has access to power as challenging the legal loss in perceived captured courts(PCI), when the capture is real(PCIR), will end with a ruling on its favor of temporary authoritarianism (TA) as the capture court will accept and ratify invalid claims of electoral fraud and dismissed legal ones filed by normal liberal democracy; c) This means the end of normal liberal democracy (LD) and the beginning of permanent authoritarianism (PA); and d) And this stresses that under a perceived capture court system, when the capture is real(PCIR) and there is no effective targeted chaos(e), temporary authoritarianism (TA) will not transfer power at all with the backing of the captured courts, ending democracy in the process. Hence, the true winner does not have access to power here when the perception of capture of independent court system is real (PCIR), in this case normal liberal democracy

(LD), and this means democracy ends, and permanent authoritarianism begins when the perceived capture turns out to be real (PCIR).

#### **The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under a full capture of the independency of the rule of law by temporary authoritarianism**

When temporary authoritarianism (TA) while in power take steps to change the legal landscape to its advantage to the point that it fully captures the independency of the legal system (FCI), then it behaves as shown below:

##### **a) the structure of the competition for power under full capture of independency of the legal system (FCI)**

When the independency of the legal system is fully captured (FCI) by temporary authoritarianism while in power, then if it legally loses elections, it can file illegal claims challenging a loss in the fully captured legal system which will accept them to keep the true loser in power, starting the period of permanent authoritarianism (PA) and the end of normal liberal democracy as win or lose, temporary authoritarianism stays in power, a situation described as indicated in Figure 13 below:




Figure 13 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when under fully captured independent court systems(FCI) by temporary authoritarianism(TA) while in power becomes a permanent authoritarianism system

Figure 13 above indicates that under a fully captured legal system the independency of the courts no longer holds as it is in favor of temporary authoritarianism, then temporary authoritarianism stays in power weather it rightly wins or it rightly loses, and when it loses, it can retain power with the help of the fully captured legal system as even if normal liberal democracy (LD) file a valid claim in these fully captured courts they will be dismissed as the fully capture courts is loyal to temporary authoritarianism. When temporary authoritarianism (TA) rightly wins, there is a peaceful transfer of power as normal liberal democracy (LD) will accept the loss as it perceives the courts as fully independent (PFI), but when temporary authoritarianism (TA) loses the election it will file illegal claims in the court it has fully captured to retain power and even without evidence of fraud it

will get access to power as the fully captured courts will ratify the legal loser as the legal winner without evidence of electoral fraud and if normal liberal democracy (LD) files legal challenges, the fully capture courts will dismiss them.

**i) The case when there is effective targeted chaos (E) under a fully captured legal system (FCI)**

When tempoaray authoritarianism (TA) competes for power with normal liberal democracy (LD) when the legal system is fully captured (FCI) by temporary authoritarianism (TA) and there is effective targeted chaos(E), then temporary authoritarianism has access to power as normal liberal democracy (LD) perceives the courts as fully independent (PFI) and accepts the loss, and ensure a peaceful transfer of power, a situation stressed below:






Figure 14 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when under fully captured independent court systems(FCI) b temporary authoritarianism(TA) while in power when there is effective targeted chaos(E).

Figure 14 above points out that a) when there is effective targeted chaos (E) temporary authoritarianism (TA) wins access to power without the need to seek help from the fully captured court system (FCI); b) When there is effective targeted chaos (E) normal liberal democracy (LD) loses and accepts the loss and there is a peaceful transfer of power as it perceives the courts as fully independent(PFI) where you cannot file claims without evidence of wrong doing. The true winner has access to power here, in this case temporary authoritarianism (TA).

**ii) The case when there is no effective targeted (e) chaos under a fully captured legal system (FCI)**

When tempoaray authoritarianism (TA) competes for power with normal liberal democracy (LD) under a full captured court system (FCI) and there is no effective targeted chaos(e), then the true legal winner is normal liberal democracy (LD), but then temporary authoritarianism after losing access to power legallyretains power illegally with the help of the fully captured courts (FCI) forcing the situation where the true loser, temporary authoritarianism (TA), remains in power, ending normal liberal democracy (LD) in the process as then it becomes permanent authoritarianism (PA), a situation summarized in Figure 15 below:




Figure 15 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape when under fully captured independent court systems(FCI) by temporary authoritarianism(TA) while in power when there is no effective targeted chaos(e).

Figure 15 above tells us that a) when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) normal liberal democracy (LD) despite being the legal true winner does not have access to power as the fully captured courts (FCI), regardless of the evidence, will keep temporary authoritarianism (TA) in power; b) When there is no effective targeted chaos (e) temporary authoritarianism (TA) has access to power as challenging the legal loss in fully captured courts (FCI) will end with a ruling on its favor of temporary authoritarianism (TA) as the fully captured courts (FCI) will accept and ratify invalid claims of electoral fraud and reject valid claims filed by normal liberal democracy (LD); c) This means the end of normal liberal democracy (LD) and the beginning of permanent authoritarianism (PA); and d) And this highlights that under a fully captured court system (FCI) when there is no effective targeted chaos(e), temporary authoritarianism (TA) will not transfer power at all with the backing of the captured courts, ending democracy in the process. Hence, the true winner does not have access to power here when there are fully captured courts (FCI), in this case normal liberal democracy (LD), and which means, normal liberal democracy ends, and permanent authoritarianism begins under fully capture courts (FCI) as win or lose, temporary authoritarianism stays in power.

### Food for thoughts

1) Can temporary authoritarianism be seen as the internal door within the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape that leads to permanent authoritarianism? I think Yes, what do you think? 2) Can a true loser win access to power under an independent rule of law system? I think No, what do you think? 3) Can liberal democracy go to permanent authoritarianism under a fully independent rule of law system? I think No, what do you think? And 4) If targeted chaos is codified as legal and illegal under an independent rule of law system based on whether targeted chaos has a positive or negative impact on the quality and size of the voting contest, would that make the coming of temporary authoritarianism less likely? I think Yes, what do you think?

### III. Conclusions

In particular, two specific conclusions can be pointed out a) that when temporary authoritarianism competes for access to power with normal liberal democracy under a perceived capture of the independent rule of law by temporary authoritarianism while in power, we should not expect a peaceful transfer of power and the possibility exist of a true loser having access to with the help of the perceived capture legal system when the perception is real; and b) that when temporary



authoritarianism competes for access to power with normal liberal democracy under a full capture of the independent rule of law system by temporary authoritarianism while in power, we should not expect a transfer of power at all if temporary authoritarianism loses the democratic contest as it will use the captured courts to remain in power transforming temporary authoritarianism into permanent authoritarianism and ending the world of liberal democracy.

In general, first, it was shown that looking at the competition for power within the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under the assumption of a perceived capture legal system and a fully captured legal system by temporary authoritarianism while in power we can see who is expected to access power and when we should expect a peaceful transfer of power or not and when not to expect a transfer of power at all. Second, it was indicated that when competition is under perceived capture, but we do not know if the perceived capture is false or real, we do not know who will have access to power if temporary authoritarianism loses the democratic contest. Third, it was stressed that when the perception of capture turns out to be false, the true winner has access to power without peaceful transfer of power as the independence of the court holds and invalid claims filed by temporary authoritarianism are dismissed. Fourth, it was indicated that when the perception of capture is real, then the true loser, temporary authoritarianism, has access to power with the help of the captured court, ending that way normal liberal democracy and bring in permanent authoritarianism. And fifth, it was highlighted that when competition takes place under a fully captured court system by temporary authoritarianism, then we are in a world of permanent authoritarianism, where the movement in power remains in power whether it loses or wins the competition as when it loses the fully captured courts will keep it in power and when it wins, it does not need to use the fully captured courts.

Hence, the behavior of temporary authoritarianism movements is different whether they compete under a fully independent legal system, a perceived captured legal system and a fully captured legal system, and this has direct implications a) on who has access to power; b) on the nature of the transfer of power, peaceful or not; and c) on whether there is transfer of power or not when temporary authoritarianism loses the democratic contest. Under an independent rule of law system and full respect from all parties and movements for that independence, you expect to see the true winner accessing power under a peaceful transfer of power.

Under perceived capture, real or false, you should expect a peaceful transfer of power only when normal liberal democracy loses the voting contest as they will not file invalid challenges in courts that they perceive as fully independent; and you should expect a non-peaceful transfer of power or even not a transfer of power at all if temporary authoritarianism loses the democratic contest. Under full capture of the legal system by temporary authoritarianism, you should not expect a transfer of power at all if temporary authoritarianism legally loses the election as now the system is under permanent authoritarianism and normal liberal democracy then no longer exists.

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