

Rethinking democracy 107: Placing the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under independent rule of law variability system to indicate when to expect peaceful transfer of powers and when not when parties lose elections

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Abstract

Since 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit, the liberal democracy landscape changed from competition for power between different forms of normal democratic outcomes to an internal cold war between normal liberal democracy and temporary authoritarianism. In other words, the coming of exism movements led to a competition for power between normal liberal democracies and extreme liberal democracies. And here, the peaceful transfer of power is encouraged, and if needed, the win is enforced by an independent rule of law system: Nobody can claim electoral fraud without evidence of electoral fraud, so legal claims without evidence are discouraged and when invalid claims are made, they are dismissed. But what happens if there is a perception that the rule of law benefits someone, especially someone, who does not welcome the limitations that an independent rule of law system places on democratic leaders and one who wants to remain in power when losing elections, but the independent rule of law still rules or it is upheld? And what happens if one party while in power takes action to capture fully the independent rule of law system to remain in power even when losing elections? Those questions highlight the need to understand when we can expect a peaceful transfer of powers and when not to expect them under normal liberal democracy verse liberal democracy competition for power. The main goal of this paper is to place the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under independent rule of law variability to show analytically and graphically when to expect peaceful transfer of powers and when not, using 3 different scenarios: i) the case when parties lose elections and competition takes place under an independent rule of law system; ii) the case when parties lose elections and competition is under a perceived captured independent rule of law system supposedly benefiting the loser; and iii) the case when parties lose elections and competition is under a fully captured independent rule of law system benefiting the loser.

Key concepts

Democracy, perfect democracy, normal liberal democracy, temporary authoritarianism, permanent authoritarianism, paradigm shift, paradigm fall, paradigm flip back, effective targeted

chaos, chaos, targeted chaos, independent rule of law, non-independent rule of law. present conditions, absent conditions

Introduction

1) The structure of the internal liberal democracy cold war post 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit

Since 2016 Brexit (BBC 2016) and 2016 Usexit (Rawlinson 2016), the liberal democracy landscape changed from competition for power between different forms of normal democratic outcomes or views (Muñoz 2015) to an internal cold war between democracy and temporary authoritarianism (Muñoz 2024), and the nature of this internal cold war within majority rule based liberal democracy is summarized in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1 The normal liberal democracy(LD) under internal cold wars

Figure 1 above shows the internal cold war where normal liberal democracy (LD) is fighting against temporary authoritarianism forces (TA) under an independent rule of law system. In other words, since 2016 democracies (LD) have been trying to stop temporary authoritarianism (TA) from taking power as indicated by the green arrow upwards from LD to TA.

Implication 1:

Since 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit the normal liberal democracy model (LD) has been fighting to face off or to win power back from temporary authoritarianism-based models (TA).

The structure of the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape to access power

Hence, since 2016 access to power in majority rule based liberal democracies is alternating between normal democracy (LD) and temporary authoritarianism (TA), a situation reflected in Figure 2 below:




Figure 2 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape, where the presence of effective targeted chaos(E) or absence of effective targeted chaos(e) determines who has access to power.

Figure 2 above shows competition for power between normal democracy thinkers (LD) and temporary authoritarianism thinkers (TA) as the new post 2016 liberal democracy landscape. If there is effective targeted chaos(E) under an independent rule of law system(I) we have temporary authoritarianism rule (TA) and if there is not effective targeted chaos(e) under an independent rule of law system(I) we have normal democracy (LD). This situation can be stated analytically as follows:

$$\text{TA. LD} = [(\text{T.M})(EI)] [(\text{T.M})(\text{eI})] = \text{T.M}(EI)(\text{eI}) = \text{T.M}(\text{Ee})\text{I}$$

The presence or absence of effective targeted chaos (Ee) determines who has access to power under independent legal rule system(I), Temporary authoritarianism (TA) or liberal democracy (LD), making authoritarianism tendencies when the happen temporary.

Implication 2:

Since 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit competition for access to power in liberal democracies is one between normal liberal democracy model (LD) and temporary authoritarianism-based models (TA).

The current internal liberal democracy cold war in terms of normal liberal democracies versus extreme liberal democracies

If we make temporary authoritarianism (TA) be extreme liberal democracy (ELD) so that $TA = ELD$; and we make normal democracy (LD) be normal liberal democracy (NLD) so that $LD = NLD$, then we can restate the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape in terms of normal liberal democracies (NLD) and extreme liberal democracies (ELD) as stated in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape, where the presence of effective targeted chaos(E) or the absence of effective targeted chaos determines who has access to power

Figure 3 above highlights competition for power between a normal liberal democracy thinkers (NLD) and extreme liberal democracy (ELD) as the new post 2016 liberal democracy landscape. If there is effective targeted chaos (E) under an independent rule of law system(I) we have an extreme liberal democracy (ELD) and if there is not effective targeted chaos(e) under an independent rule of law system (I) we have a normal liberal democracy (NLD). Notice that in the Figure 3 above the independent rule of law system(I) is the constant and the present or absence of effective targeted chaos is the variable, as the presence or absence of effective targeted chaos determines who wins access to power. Notice that under normal liberal democracies(NLD) loyalty is to the constitution, not to the party so normal liberal democracies

respect the independent rule of law system, but in extreme liberal democracies (ELD) loyalty is to the temporary authoritarianism movement (TA), which means that there is a conflict of loyalties in the interaction between extreme liberal democracies (ELD) and the independent rule of law system(I) when extreme liberal democracies (ELD) behave in ways inconsistent with the constitution under which they came to exist. This situation can be stated analytically as shown below:

$$\text{ELD. NLD} = [(T.M) (EI)] [(T.M)(eI)] = T.M(EI)(eI) = T.M(Ee)I$$

The presence or absence of effective targeted chaos (Ee) determines who has access to power under independent legal rule system(I), extreme liberal democracy (ELD) or normal liberal democracy (NLD), making authoritarianism tendencies when they happen temporary.

Implication 3:

Since 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit competition for access to power in liberal democracies is one between normal liberal democracy model (NLD) and extreme liberal democracy models (ELD).

Linking the nature of the rule of law system and the nature of the transfer of power

The situation summarized in Figure 3 above indicates that here a peaceful transfer of power between normal liberal democracies (NLD) and extreme liberal democracies (ELD) is encouraged as it is known that invalid legal claims do not work under an independent rule of law system, and if needed, the win is enforced by the independent rule of law system(I): Nobody can claim electoral fraud without evidence of electoral fraud, so legal claims without evidence are discouraged and when invalid claims are made, they are dismissed and the legal winner is certified as the winner. But what happens if there is a perception that the rule of law benefits someone, especially someone, who does not welcome the limitations that an independent rule of law system (I) places on democratic leaders; and one who wants to remain in power when losing elections, but the independent rule of law still rules or it is upheld? And what happens if one party while in power takes actions to capture fully the independent rule of law system to remain in power even when losing elections? Those questions highlight the need to understand when we can expect a peaceful transfer of powers and when not to expect them under normal liberal democracy verse liberal democracy competition for power. The main goal of this paper is to place the post 2016 liberal democracy landscape detailed in Figure 3 above under independent rule of law variability to show analytically and graphically when to expect peaceful transfer of powers and when not, using 3 different scenarios: i) the case when parties lose elections and competition takes place under an independent rule of law system; ii) the case when parties lose elections and competition is under a perceived captured independent rule of law system supposedly benefiting the loser of the election; and iii) the case when parties lose elections and

competition is under a fully captured independent rule of law system benefiting the loser of the election.

Goals

1) To show how losing elections under an independent rule of law system and majority rule-based competition encourages a fully peaceful transfer of power, but if invalid legal challenges are made as respect for the rule of law prevails then the actual winner will be declared by the independent courts as the winner; 2) To show how losing elections under a perceived captured rule of law system benefiting the loser can lead to a non-peaceful transfer of power as the independency of the rule of law prevails and ratify the actual winner as the winner as it dismisses invalid legal claims; and 3) To show how losing elections under a fully captured rule of law system by the side that fully captured the legal system leads to power take-overs; and hence, it leads to the end of democracy as then temporary authoritarianism becomes permanent authoritarianism so permanent authoritarianism takes hold.

Methodology

1) The terminology and operational concepts and analytical rules are shared; 2) The case of how losing elections under an independent rule of law system and majority rule-based competition encourages a fully peaceful transfer of power as respect for the rule of law prevails is described in detailed, both analytically and graphically; 3) The case of how losing elections under a perceived captured rule of law system benefiting the loser can lead to a non-peaceful transfer of power as the independency of the rule of law prevails is pointed out in detailed, both analytically and graphically; 4) The case of how losing elections under a fully captured rule of law system leads to a non-peaceful transfer of power and the end of democracy as then permanent authoritarianism takes hold is stressed; 5) The structure of the death of liberal democracy in general is summarized; 6) The structure of the death of liberal democracy in the USA is highlighted; and 7) Some food for thoughts and conclusions are listed.

Terminology

T = True majority view

M = True minority view

P = Present

A = Absent

ETK = Effective targeted chaos

TK = Targeted chaos

K = Chaos

IRL = Independent rule of law

NIRL = non-independent rule of law	Z _j = Known social system “j”
PA = Permanent authoritarianism	TA = Temporary authoritarianism
ELD = Extreme liberal democracy	NLD = LD = Normal liberal democracy
NDO = Normal democratic outcome	EDO = Extreme democratic outcome
E = Effective targeted chaos	e = Not effective targeted chaos
I = Independent rule of law system	i = No independent rule of law system
PCI = Perceived captured independence	FCI = Fully captured independence
PCIR = Perceived capture is real	PCIF = Perceived capture is false
FI = Fully independent legal system	PFI = Perceived full independence
PFIR = Perceived full independence is real	PFIF = Perceived full independence if false
PCI-USA = Perceive capture independence in USA	
FCI-USA = Fully captured independence in USA	

Operational concepts and analytical tools and rules

a) Operational concepts

- 1) **Perfect democracy**, perfect populism or populism with no need of rule of law system as there is no electoral or access to power chaos to sort out.
- 2) **Liberal democracy**, the majority rule-based system under an independent rule of law model needed to sort out electoral or access to power chaos that may exist or that can be made.
- 3) **Normal liberal democracy**, the liberal democracy where there is no effective targeted chaos, the one driven by normal populism.
- 4) **Extreme liberal democracy**, the liberal democracy where there is effective targeted chaos, the one driven by populism with a mask.
- 5) **Normal democratic outcome**, the one where the true majority wins the majority ruled based voting contest, $T > M$, where the best interest of the country is put first.
- 6) **Extreme democratic outcome**, the one where the true minority wins the majority ruled based voting contest, $T < M$, where the best interest of the movement is put first.

7) Temporary authoritarianism, the one born within liberal democracies, where the view of the true minority temporarily rules.

8) Permanent authoritarianism, a non-democratic system where the view of the true minority permanently rules.

9) Effective targeted chaos, the one that leads to full true majority complacency and produces an extreme democratic outcome.

10) Ineffective targeted chaos, the one that does not lead to full true majority complacency and produces a normal democratic outcome.

11) Independent rule of law system, the factual based system that ensures that the laws of the country are respected no matter who is in power or may come to power.

12) Non-independent rule of law system, the system that overlooks facts if needed to place or maintain or preserve a specific movement or ideology in power.

13) Perceived captured rule of law system when the capture is not real, the one where the legal system still certifies as the winner of an electoral contest the actual winner regardless of the winner is.

14) Perceived captured rule of law system when the capture is real, the one where the legal system certifies as the winner of an electoral contest the actual loser, it is loyal to the actual loser who captured it.

15) Fully captured rule of law system, a non-independent rule of law system, the one that always certifies as the winner of the electoral contest the actual loser, the one who captured it when it loses elections.

16) Fully independent rule of law system, the one that always certifies as the winner of the electoral contest the actual winner regardless of who the winner is

17) Perceived full independent rule of law system when the perception is true, the one who certifies as the winner the actual winner regardless of who the actual winner is as the rule of law still holds.

18) Perceived full independent rule of law system when the perception is false, the one who certifies as the winner of the electoral contest the actual loser as the independent rule of law does not hold.

19) BREXIT, the exism movement in the UK/2016 known as Brexism

20) USEXIT, the exism movement in the USA/2016 known as Trumpism

b) Operational analytical tools and rules

1) Merging rules

If we have the following present and absent factors, E and e and I and i, where capital letters mean factors that are present and lower-case letters means factors that are absent, then the following holds true:

$$EE = E \quad ee = e \quad Ee = Ee \quad eE = eE$$

$$II = I \quad ii = i \quad Ii = Ii \quad iI = iI$$

2) Merging interactions when E and I are present

$$E(EE) = E \quad E(ee) = Ee \quad E(Ee) = Ee \quad E(eE) = eE$$

$$I(II) = I \quad I(ii) = Ii \quad I(Ii) = Ii \quad I(iI) = iI$$

3) Merging interactions when e and i are absent

$$e(EE) = eE \quad e(ee) = e \quad e(Ee) = Ee \quad e(eE) = eE$$

$$i(II) = iI \quad i(ii) = i \quad i(Ii) = Ii \quad i(iI) = iI$$

4) Shifting gaps expectations when mergers are under the influence of external factors

a) The case when mergers are under the influence of external factors that are present, then the merging expectations are:

$$E(eE) = E \text{ since } eE \rightarrow E \text{ when } E \text{ is present so that } E.E = E$$

$$I(iI) = I \text{ since } iI \rightarrow I \text{ when } I \text{ is present so that } I.I = I$$

$$E[(eE)(iI)] = E(E)(iI) = E(iI) \text{ since } eE \rightarrow E \text{ when } E \text{ is present}$$

$$I[(eE)(iI)] = (eE)(iI)(I) = (eE)(iI) = (eE)I \text{ since } i.I \rightarrow I \text{ when } I \text{ is present}$$

b) The case when mergers are under the influence of external factors that are absent, then the merging expectations are:

$$e(eE) = e \text{ since } eE \rightarrow e \text{ when } E \text{ is absent so that } e.e = e$$

$$i(iI) = i \text{ since } iI \rightarrow i \text{ when } I \text{ is absent so that } i.i = i$$

$$e[(eE)(iI)] = e(e)(iI) = e(iI) \text{ since } eE \rightarrow e \text{ when } E \text{ is absent}$$

$$i[(eE)(iI)] = (eE)(iI)(i) = (eE)(iI) = (eE)i \text{ since } i.I \rightarrow i \text{ when } I \text{ is absent}$$

5) Merging dynamics during competitions/cold wars

If we have two different models expressed under majority rule-minority rule-based structure such as $K = T.M(E, I)$ and $L = T.M(eI)$, where capital letters E and I means effective targeted chaos and an independent rule of law system are present; and lower-case letters e and i means effective targeted chaos and an independent rule of law system are absent, then their interaction can be stated as follows:

$$K.L = [T.M(E.I)] [T.M(eI)] = T.M(EI)(eI) = T.M(Ee)I$$

The expression above tells us the presence of effective targeted chaos or not (Ee) determines who has access to power under an independent rule of law system(I) as the independent system will ratify the actual winner if invalid legal challenges are filed by the loser.

5) Winners and losers when merging dynamics during competitions/cold wars are affected by present-absent conditions

If the interaction $K.L = T.M(Ee)I$ is placed under electoral test/competition, the following holds true pointing to the winner:

a) The case when there is no effective targeted chaos(e)

If there is no effective targeted chaos affecting the competition(e), then the winner is model L as when there is no chaos $Ee \rightarrow e$ and since $e.e = e$, then the following holds true:

$$e(K.L) = e[T.M(Ee)I] \text{ and since } Ee \rightarrow e, \text{ then}$$

$$e(K.L) = e[T.M(e)I] = T.M(e)(e)I = T.M(ee)I = T.M(eI) = L = \text{winner}$$

When there is no effective targeted chaos model L wins, which means:

$$e(K.L) = e[T.M(Ee)I] \rightarrow L \text{ wins}$$

b) The case when there is effective targeted chaos(E)

If there is effective targeted chaos affecting the competition(E), then the winner is model K as when there is chaos $Ee \rightarrow E$ and since $E.E = E$, then the following holds true:

$$E(K.L) = E[T.M(Ee)I] \text{ and since } Ee \rightarrow E, \text{ then}$$

$$E(K.L) = E[T.M(E)I] = T.M(E)(E)I = T.M(EE)I = T.M(EI) = K = \text{wins}$$

When there is effective targeted chaos model K wins, which means:

$$E(K.L) = T.M(Ee)I \rightarrow K \text{ wins}$$

6) Winners and losers when competition is under different legal system structures

The interaction between K and L as indicated above is: $K.L = T.M(Ee)I$ and therefore, the deciding factor for K or L to win again as indicated above is the presence (E) or absence (e) of effective targeted chaos.

a) Stating paradigm competition under a fully independent legal system (FI) condition

When we have a fully independent legal system (FI), then the actual winner of the electoral contest is certified as a legal winner even if the loser decides file invalid claims of electoral fraud in a fully independent legal court (FI) so the independence of the court always

hods, which means $FI = I$. The structure of the interactions between K and L under a fully independent legal system (FI) can be indicated as done below:

$K.L = T.M(Ee)FI$ and since $FI = I$, then

$K.L = T.M(Ee)I$

If there is effective targeted chaos then K wins as $Ee \rightarrow E$; and if there is no effective targeted chaos, then L wins as $Ee \rightarrow e$.

b) Stating paradigm competition under a perceived captured independent legal system (PCI) condition

When we have perceived captured independent legal system (PCI), then the actual winner of the electoral contest may not be certified as a legal winner even if the winner decides file valid claims of electoral fraud in a perceived captured independent legal court (PCI) so the independence of the court may not always hold as all depends of the nature of the capture, it is real (PCIR) or false (PCIF). The structure of the interactions between K and L under perceived captured of independence of the legal system can be indicated as done below:

$K.L = T.M(Ee)PCI$

Under perceived capture, who will stay in power if K loses the electoral contest is not clear as it depends on the nature of the perceived capture, whether the capture is real (PCIR) or not (PCIF). In other words, under perceived capture (PCI) the winner is not clear because it depends of the nature of the perceived capture by K

1) The case when the perceived capture by K is real (PCIR)

The structure of the interaction when the perception of capture of the independent courts by K is real (PCIR) can be stated as follows:

$K.L = T.M(Ee)PCIR$

Since if the perception of capture is real, then the independence of the court will not hold so that $PCIR = i$, which leads to:

$K.L = T.M.(Ee)i$

That means that K stays in power whether there is effective targeted chaos or not becoming a permanent authoritarianism entity: If there is effective targeted chaos so that $Ee \rightarrow E$ so K = wins without the help of the captured court system; and if there is not effective targeted chaos so that $Ee \rightarrow e$, K still stays in power with the help of the captured court,

2) The case when the perceived captured by K is false (PCIF)

The structure of the interaction when the perception of capture of the independent courts by K is false (PCIF) or not real can be stated as follows:

$$K.L = T.M(Ee)PCIF$$

Since if the perception of capture is false, then the independence of the court will hold so that $PCIF = I$, which leads to:

$$K.L = T.M.(Ee)I$$

That means that K stays in power only when there is effective targeted chaos as when there is no effective targeted chaos, then L wins and gains access to power as the independent courts will certify the actual winner as court independence still holds which is L as the perception of capture was false. This is because, if there is effective targeted chaos so that $Ee \rightarrow E$ so $K = \text{wins}$ and if L challenges the independence of the court will certify the actual winner K, but if there is not effective targeted chaos so that $Ee \rightarrow e$, L wins and the court will certify it as the winner even if K files invalid claims as the perception of capture is false and the court independence still holds.

c) Stating paradigm competition under a fully captured independent legal system (FCI) condition

When we have a fully captured independent legal system (FCI), then the actual winner of the electoral contest may not be certified as a legal winner even if the winner decides file valid claims of electoral fraud in a fully captured independent legal court (FCI) so the independence of the court may no longer hold as the legal system now is loyal to the side who capture it and it will side with the one who captured it when that group or movement or party loses elections as when there is full captured (FCI) the perception of capture are real (PCIR) and hence, the rule of law is no longer independent(i) so that $FCI = PCIR = i$. The structure of the interactions between K and L under a fully captured of independence of the legal system (FCI) as the perceived capture is real (PCIR) and the rule of law is non-independent now(i) can be indicated as done below:

$$K.L = T.M (Ee) FCI = T.M.(Ee) PCIR = T.M.(Ee)i$$

Under full capture by K, who will stay in power always is K as if K loses the electoral contest because there is no effective targeted chaos(e), the full capture court (FCI) will keep it in power, ending democracy that way, signaling a shift to permanent authoritarianism under K.

1) The case when there is full capture (FCI = i) by K and K wins the democratic contest as there is effective targeted chaos

The structure of the interaction when there is full capture of the independent courts (FCI) by K and hence the perception of capture is real ($PCIR = i$) and there is effective targeted chaos affecting the electoral competition can be stated as follows as shown above:

$$E[K.L] = E[T.M(Ee)i] \text{ and since } Ee \rightarrow E \text{ as there is effective targeted chaos}(E), \text{ then}$$

$$E[K.L] = E[T.M(E)i] = T.M(E)(i) = T.M(Ei) = K \text{ wins}$$

The above means that K wins without the help of the fully capture court (FCI = i) as L respect the rule of law and it will not file invalid claims challenging a legal loss.

1) The case when there is full capture (FCI = i) by K and K loses the democratic contest as there is NO effective targeted chaos

The structure of the interaction when there is full capture of the independent courts (FCI) by K and hence the perception of capture is real (PCIR = i) and there is NO effective targeted chaos affecting the electoral competition can be stated as follows as shown above:

$e[K.L] = e[T.M(Ee)i]$ and since $Ee \rightarrow e$ as there is NO effective targeted chaos(e), then

$e[K.L] = e[T.M(e)i] = T.M(e)(i) = T.M(ei) = L$ legally wins, but K keeps power

However, K stays in power with the help of the fully capture court (FCI) even though it loses the electoral contest as it will file invalid claims to the fully capture court (FCI) if needed which will accept them to keep K in power and if L files legal claims seeking to be certified as the actual winner, the legal filing will be ignored or dismissed by the fully captured court (FCI). In other words, under full capture of the courts by K, still K stays in power even if legally losing an election as a favor of the fully captured independent court system (FCI).

The post 2016 liberal democracy model under full independent rule of law system(I)

When competition for access to power is between extreme liberal democracies (ELD) and normal liberal democracies (NLD) under a binding fully independent rule of law system, then whoever wins power gets power as if invalid legal claims are made by the loser of the election to an independent court(I), the independent court (I) will dismiss it and the actual winner certified, a situation summarized in Figure 4 below:




Figure 4 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A FULLY INDEPENDENT LEGAL SYSTEM(I).

If the parties respect the independent court system (I), there will be a peaceful transfer of power to and from normal liberal democracies to extreme liberal democracies as the loser knows that without evidence of electoral fraud legal claims made will be dismissed. However, if the loser of the election files invalid legal claims just to maintain the chaos that feeds its movement they will be dismissed and the actual winner certified. Hence, the fully independent rule of law system (I) as indicated by the wide black arrow going from left to right in Figure 4 above acts as 1) a peaceful transfer of power inducer as filling invalid cases can be seen as a waste of time, and 2) in the worse-case scenario, it acts as a legal winner ratifier when losers file invalid legal claims to challenge losing the electoral context. For example, when Brexit won in the UK in 2016 (BBC 2016) there was a peaceful transfer of power and when it lost the election in 2024(TG 2024a) there was a peaceful transfer of power too (Sabbagh 2024) under an independent rule of law system. In Brazil in 2018(TG 2018) when Jair Bolsonaro won election there as a peaceful transfer of power and in the USA in 2016 (Rawlinson 2016) when Trump won the election there was a peaceful transfer of power too as normal liberal democracies respect the rule of law and democratic traditions even when the lose access to power.

The competition of extreme liberal democracy (ELD) and normal liberal democracy (ELD) for power under the influence of an independent rule of law system (I) as indicated in Figure 4 above can be stated analytically as follows:

$$I\{ELD, NLD\} = I\{[(T.M)(EI)] [(T.M)(eI)]\} = I\{T.M(EI)(eI)\} = T.M(Ee)I \text{ since } I.I.I = I$$

Under the influence of an independent rule of law system(I), access to power depends on whether there is effective targeted chaos or not (Ee).

Implication 4:

Under a fully independent rule of law system (I) as indicated by the continuous thick black arrow going from left to right in Figure 4 above the actual winner of the majority rule-based contest, normal liberal democracy (NLD) or extreme liberal democracy (ELD), wins access to power. Peaceful transfer of power or not, under a fully independent rule of law system (I) the winner is the winner.

a) The post 2016 liberal democracy model under full independent rule of law system when extreme liberal democracy (ELD) wins

When extreme liberal democracies (ELD) win the democratic contest there will be a peaceful transfer of power as normal liberal democracies (NLD) put the country/ constitution first by conceding loss and by not challenging loses without evidence of electoral fraud as a sign of respect for the independence of the legal system as by doing so they are not wasting the independent court time and resources and this act means normal liberal democracies (NLD) are putting the country/constitution first, not party or movement, a situation indicated in Figure 5 below:




Figure 5 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A FULLY INDEPENDENT LEGAL SYSTEM(I) when the extreme liberal democracy side(ELD) wins power.

Figure 8 indicates that if there is effective targeted chaos (E) under a perceived capture independent rule of law (PCI) as indicated by the continuous blue arrow pointing upwards to “E” there will be a peaceful transfer of power from normal liberal democracy (NLD) to extreme liberal democracy (ELD) without any legal challenge as if an invalid challenge were made by the normal liberal democracy without evidence of electoral fraud it would be dismissed by the perceived capture independent court (PIC) is the capture is not real and the win by the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) would be legally ratified. The competition of extreme liberal democracy (ELD) and normal liberal democracy (NLD) for power under the influence of an independent rule of law system(I) and there is effective targeted chaos(E) as indicated in Figure 5 above can be stated analytically as follows:

$$E\{I\{ELD, NLD\}\} = E\{I\{[(T.M)(EI)] [(T.M)(eI)]\} = E\{I\{T.M(EI)(eI)\} = T.M(Ee)I = T.M(E)(I) = TM(EI) = ELD \text{ wins since } Ee \rightarrow E \text{ as } E \text{ is present}$$

Under the influence of an independent rule of law system(I) and effective targeted chaos(E), extreme liberal democracy (ELD) wins access to power as shown in Figure 5 above.

Implication 5:

Under a fully independent rule of law system (I) as indicated by the continuous thick black arrow going from left to right in Figure 5 above when there is effective targeted chaos (E) the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) wins the democratic contest, a win that would be certified as a win would the loser, the normal liberal democracy (NLD), was to file invalid claims challenging the loss to a fully independent court system(I). Peaceful transfer of power or not, under a fully independent legal system (I), the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) is the winner when it wins the majority rule-based contest.

b) The post 2016 liberal democracy model under full independent rule of law system when normal liberal democracy (NLD) wins

When normal liberal democracies (NLD) win the democratic contest there may be a peaceful transfer of power if extreme liberal democracies (ELD) knowing that filing invalid legal claims to challenge election loses in independent courts (I) will not help them, and actually doing so may affect the movement or the leader negatively next time around as putting the leader or movement first and the best interest of the country/constitution last may not be the way to go; and hence they will accept the electoral loss without legally challenging it, a situation pointed out in Figure 6 below:




Figure 6 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A FULLY INDEPENDENT LEGAL SYSTEM(I) when the normal liberal democracy side(NLD) wins the electoral contest.

Figure 6 tells us that if there is no effective targeted chaos (e) as indicated by the continuous blue arrow pointing downwards to “e” and the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) does not legally challenge the election loss there will be a peaceful transfer of power from extreme liberal democracy (ELD) to normal liberal democracy (ELD). However, if the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) just for the sake to induce or maintain chaos to keep its based engaged challenges the loss without evidence of electoral fraud it would be dismissed by the independent court(I) and the win by the normal liberal democracy (NLD) would be legally ratified.

The competition of extreme liberal democracy (ELD) and normal liberal democracy (ELD) for power under the influence of an independent rule of law system(I) and there is NO effective targeted chaos(e) as indicated in Figure 6 above can be stated analytically as follows:

$$e\{I\{ELD, NLD\}\} = e\{I\{[(T.M)(EI)][(T.M)(eI)]\} = e\{I\{T.M(EI)(eI)\} = T.M(Ee)I = T.M(e)(I) = TM(eI) = NLD \text{ wins since } Ee \rightarrow e \text{ as } E \text{ is absent}$$

Under the influence of an independent rule of law system(I) and NO effective targeted chaos(E), normal liberal democracy (NLD) wins access to power as shown in Figure 6 above.

Implication 6:

Under a fully independent rule of law system (I) as indicated by the continuous thick black arrow going from left to right in Figure 6 above when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) the normal liberal democracy (NLD) wins the democratic contest, a win that would be certified as a win would the loser; the extreme liberal democracy (ELD), was to file invalid

claims challenging the loss to a fully independent court system (I). Peaceful transfer of power or not, under a fully independent legal system (I), the normal liberal democracy (NLD) is the winner when it wins the majority rule-based contest.

The post 2016 liberal democracy model under perceived captured of the independent rule of law system (PCI)

When competition for access to power is between extreme liberal democracies (ELD) and normal liberal democracies (NLD) under a perceived captured of the independent rule of law system (PCI) by one competitor, then still whoever wins power gets power if the perceived capture of the independency of the legal system is not real ; and this is because as if invalid legal claims are made by the loser of the election who think it has captured the independency of the courts in that perceived capture court (PCI), this court will dismiss it and the actual winner certified as the capture is not real, and therefore, the court independency holds allowing it to continue to put country/constitution first, a situation summarized in Figure 7 below




Figure 7 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A PERCEIVED CAPTURED INDEPENDENT LEGAL SYSTEM(PCI)

If the no all parties respect the independent court system (I) as one party perceives it has captured it by actions taken towards capturing it and it is now operating under a perceived captured independent legal system (PCI), there may not be a peaceful transfer of power to and from normal liberal democracies (NLD) to extreme liberal democracies (ELD) as if the loser of the election thinking that without evidence of electoral fraud legal claims made to the perceived

captured court (PCI) will be successful they will file invalid claims as they think they can stay in power that way. However, if the loser of the election files invalid legal claims in a perceived captured court (PCI) when the capture is not real the invalid claims will be dismissed and the actual winner certified. Hence, the perceived captured independent rule of law system (PCI) as represented by the wide red arrow going from left to right in Figure 7 above acts a) as a not peaceful transfer of power inducer as it leads one party to believe that filing invalid claims are not waste of time and see them as a way to stay in power when losing elections, and b) when illegal claims are file, the perceived capture court (PCI) acts as a legal winner ratifier dismissing the losers' invalid legal claims filed to challenge the losing the electoral context which they legally lost. For example, in Brazil in 2022(Hammar Castano 2023) and in the USA in 2020(BBC 2020) there was not a peaceful transfer of power as the extreme liberal democracy movement perceived to have captured while in power the independency of the court and that perception, which turned out to be not real, encouraged them to file invalid legal claims as done in the USA(Shamsian and Sheth 2021) challenging Biden's victory(TG 2020) and in Brazil in 2022 challenging Lula's victory(BBC 2022) and/or encouraged them to take illegal political actions as done in Brazil in 2022(Brito and Pulice 2022) and in the USA in 2020(Barrett et al 2021) when they legally lost elections.

The competition of extreme liberal democracy (ELD) and normal liberal democracy (ELD) for power under the influence of an independent rule of law system (I) as indicated in Figure 4 above can be stated analytically as follows:

$$I\{ELD, NLD\} = I\{[(T.M)(EI)] [(T.M) (eI)]\} = I\{T.M(EI)(eI)\} = T.M(Ee)I \text{ since } I.I.I = I$$

Under the influence of an independent rule of law system(I), access to power depends on whether there is effective targeted chaos or not (Ee).

Implication 7

Under a perceived captured independent rule of law system (PCI) as indicated by the continuous thick red arrow going from left to right in Figure 7 above the actual winner of the majority rule-based contest, normal liberal democracy (NLD) or extreme liberal democracy (ELD), wins access to power. Peaceful transfer of power or not, under a perceived captured independent rule of law system (PCI) when capture is not real the independent rule of law system still holds so the actual winner is the winner.

a) The post 2016 liberal democracy model under perceived capture of the independent rule of law system (PCI) when extreme liberal democracy (ELD) wins

When extreme liberal democracies (ELD) win the democratic contest under a perceived capture independent rule of law system (PCI) and a system perceived loyal to it there will be a peaceful transfer of power as normal liberal democracies (NLD) put the country/ constitution first by conceding loss and by not challenging loses without evidence of electoral fraud as a sign of respect for the independence of the legal system as they do not perceive it captured as by

doing so they are not wasting the time and resources of the perceived captured independent court (PCI) by the extreme liberal democracy and in doing so normal liberal democracy puts the country/constitution first, a situation indicated in Figure 8 below:




Figure 8 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A PERCEIVED CAPTURED INDEPENDENT LEGAL SYSTEM(PCI) when the extreme liberal democracy side(ELD) wins the electoral contest

Figure 8 above shows tells us that if there is effective targeted chaos (E) under a perceived captured independent legal system (PCI) as indicated by the continuous blue arrow pointing upwards to “E” there will be a peaceful transfer of power from normal liberal democracy (NLD) to extreme liberal democracy (ELD) without any legal challenge as if an invalid challenge were made by the normal liberal democracy without evidence of electoral fraud it would be dismissed by the perceived captured independent court (PCI) as the capture is not real and the win by the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) would be legally ratified.

Implication 8:

Under a perceived captured independent rule of law system (PCI) as indicated by the continuous thick red arrow going from left to right in Figure 8 above when there is effective targeted chaos (E) the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) wins the democratic contest, a win that would be certified as a win would the loser, the normal liberal democracy (NLD), was to file invalid claims challenging the loss to a perceived captured independent court system (PCI) when the capture is not real as then the independent rule of law still holds. Peaceful transfer of power

or not, under a perceived capture independent legal system (PCI) when the capture is not real, the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) is the winner when it wins the majority rule-based contest.

b) The post 2016 liberal democracy model under perceived capture of the independent rule of law system (PCI) when normal liberal democracy (NLD) wins

When normal liberal democracies (NLD) win the democratic contest under a perceived captured independent legal system (PCI) by the extreme liberal democracy there will not be a peaceful transfer of power as extreme liberal democracies (ELD) believing that filing invalid legal claims challenging election loses in perceived captured independent courts (PCI) loyal to it will file invalid claims seeking to stay in power when legally losing elections in these perceived captured independent courts (PCI), and when doing so extreme liberal democracies places the best interest of the leader and movement over the best interest of the country/constitution. However, as the capture of the independent court is not real. Then the perceived capture courts will dismiss invalid claims and ratify the normal liberal democracy (NLD) as the winner. In other words, under perceived capture of independent rule of law (PCI) by the extreme democratic outcome, there will never be a peaceful transfer of power from extreme to normal liberal democracy when extreme liberal democracy loses elections as they will try to stay in power by filing invalid legal challenges into perceived captured courts with the goal of staying in power still when losing elections, a situation shown in Figure 9 below:




Figure 9 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A PERCEIVED CAPTURED INDEPENDENT LEGAL SYSTEM(PCI) when the normal liberal democracy side(NLD) wins the electoral contest

Figure 9 above describes that if there is no effective targeted chaos (e) under a perceived captured independent legal system (PCI) by the extreme liberal democracy as indicated by the continuous blue arrow pointing downwards to “e”, then there will be a shift from extreme liberal democracy to normal liberal democracy, even if the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) challenges the election loss into perceived captured independent rule of law system, but the transfer of power will not be peaceful. Perceived captured courts (PCI) when the capture is not real will dismissed invalid claims of electoral fraud file by the loser of the election and it will ratify the normal liberal democracy as the legal winner of the election under a non-peaceful transfer of power, a situation found in Figure 9 above.

Implication 9:

Under a perceived captured independent rule of law system (PCI) as indicated by the continuous thick red arrow going from left to right in Figure 9 above when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) the normal liberal democracy (NLD) wins the democratic contest, a win that would be certified as a win would the loser, the extreme liberal democracy (ELD), was to file invalid claims challenging the loss to a perceived captured independent court system (PCI) when the capture is not real. Peaceful transfer of power or not, under a perceived captured independent legal system (PCI) when the capture is not real, the normal liberal democracy (NLD) is the winner when it wins the majority rule-based contest.

The post 2016 liberal democracy model under fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI)

When competition for access to power is between extreme liberal democracies (ELD) and normal liberal democracies (NLD) under a fully captured of the independent rule of law system (FCI) by one competitor, then no longer whoever wins power gets power as now the captured independent legal system (FCI) will side with the loser who has captured the court when losing elections as evidence or not, the captured legal court (FCI) will keep the party to which it has loyalty to in power when that party loses elections. In other words, in the world described in Figure 10 above when there is a fully captured legal system (FCL) when the full capture is real one group stays in power always whether it wins or loses elections as if it loses elections the captured legal system (FCI) will keep it in power and any claims made by normal liberal democracy (NLD) to the fully captured legal court (FCL) will be dismissed or not heard, a situation detailed in Figure 10 below:




Figure 10 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A FULLY CAPTURED LEGAL SYSTEM

If the no all parties respect the independent court system (I) as one party has fully captured it by actions taken towards fully capturing it and it is now operating under a fully captured independent legal system (FCI), there may not be a peaceful transfer of power to and from normal liberal democracies (NLD) to extreme liberal democracies (ELD) as the extreme liberal democracy will keep power when losing elections with the help of the fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) so even if the normal liberal democracy (NLD) wins the electoral contest the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) with the help of the fully captured legal system (FCI) will still stay in power, ending that way the world of normal liberal democracies and moving to take the form of permanent authoritarianism-based systems, a situation found in Figure 10 above. In other words, the fully capturing of the independent rule of law system (FCI) by one party or movement as shown in Figure 10 above means the end of democracy as now the party or movement is supreme, and the best interest of the country/constitution falls with the fall of democracy and the rise of permanent authoritarianism. Hence, the fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) as indicated by the wide brown arrow going from left to right in Figure 10 above acts as antidemocratic policy enabler and as a one-party rule enforcer when the party in power that has captured it loses elections legally. In other words, we should expect the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) to take action while in power to fully capture the independency of the court system (FCI) so that in case it cannot maintained effective targeted chaos to legally win the following electoral contest, they can still stay in power with the help of the fully captured court.

The competition of extreme liberal democracy (ELD) and normal liberal democracy (ELD) for power under the influence of a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) as indicated in Figure 10 above can be stated analytically as follows:

$$\text{FCI} \{ \text{ELD, NLD} \} = \text{FCI} \{ [(T.M) (EI)] [(T.M)(eI)] \} = \text{FCI} \{ T.M(EI)(eI) \} = T.M(Ee)I.FCI$$

And since $\text{FCI} = i$, then

$$i \{ \text{ELD, NLD} \} = i \{ [(T.M) (EI)] [(T.M)(eI)] \} = i \{ T.M(EI)(eI) \} = T.M(Ee)I.i$$

Under the influence of a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI), access to power belongs only to extreme liberal democracy (ELD), which has captured the independency of the rule of law system so it wins without the help of the fully capture court (FCI) when there is effective targeted chaos (E) since $Ee \rightarrow E$ and $Ii \rightarrow i$ as then we get the winning structure $\text{ELD} = T.M(Ei)$; and it stays in power with the help of the fully captured courts (FCI) if there is no effective targeted chaos (e) and loses the electoral contest as then $Ee \rightarrow e$ and $Ii \rightarrow i$ leading to the losing structure $\text{ELD} = T.M(ei) = T.M(eGFI)$, but still the fully capture courts (FCI) keeps the extreme liberal democracies in power as now the independent legal system no longer exist ($\text{FCI} = i$).

Implication 10:

Under a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) as indicated by the continuous thick brown arrow going from left to right in Figure 10 above the actual winner of the majority rule-based contest may not be the one that get access to power even when the winner is legally the winner as the fully captured legal system (FCI) will keep the loser that has captured it in power. Peaceful transfer of power or not, under a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) the side that has fully captured the courts stays in power, ending this way the liberal democracy models as the one who control the courts will never give power back peacefully and the fully captured legal system (FCI) will support this action.

a) The post 2016 liberal democracy model under fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) when extreme liberal democracy (ELD) wins

When extreme liberal democracies (ELD) win the democratic contest under a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) and a legal system loyal to it there will be a peaceful transfer of power as normal liberal democracies (NLD) put the country/ constitution first by conceding loss and by not challenging loses without evidence of electoral fraud as a sign of respect for the independence of the legal system as they do not perceive it captured as by doing so they are not wasting the time and resources of the perceived captured independent court (PCI) by the extreme liberal democracy and in doing so normal liberal democracy puts the country/constitution first, a situation indicated in Figure 11 below:




Figure 11 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A FULLY CAPTURED LEGAL SYSTEM when the extreme liberal democracy side(ELD) wins the electoral contest

Figure 11 above states that if there is effective targeted chaos (E) under a fully captured independent legal system (FCI) as indicated by the continuous blue arrow pointing upwards to “E” there will be a peaceful transfer of power from normal liberal democracy (NLD) to extreme liberal democracy (ELD) without any legal challenge as if an invalid challenge were made by the normal liberal democracy without evidence of electoral fraud it would be dismissed by the fully captured independent court (FCI) and the win by the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) would be legally ratified.

The competition of extreme liberal democracy (ELD) and normal liberal democracy (ELD) for power under the influence of a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) when there is effective targeted chaos(E) as indicated in Figure 11 above can be stated analytically as follows:

$$\mathbf{E.FCI \{ELD, NLD\} = E.FCI \{[(T.M)(EI)] [(T.M)(eI)]\} = E.FCI \{T.M(EI)(eI)\} = T.M\{E(Ee)I.FCI\}}$$

And since $FCI = i$, then

$$\mathbf{Ei \{ELD, NLD\} = Ei \{[(T.M)(EI)] [(T.M)(eI)]\} = Ei \{T.M(EI)(eI)\} = T.M(Ee)i}$$

Under the influence of a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) and the presence of effective targeted chaos(E), extreme liberal democracy (ELD) legally win power as under effective targeted chaos $E_e \rightarrow E$ leading to the following legally winning structure:

$$E_i \{ELD, NLD\} = T.M(E_i)$$

Hence competition when there is effective targeted chaos(E) and a fully capture independent rule of law system(i) leads always to an extreme liberal democracy (ELD) win.

Implication 11:

Under a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) as indicated by the continuous thick brown arrow going from left to right in Figure 11 above when there is effective targeted chaos (E) the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) wins the democratic contest, a win that would be certified as a win would the loser, the normal liberal democracy (NLD), was to file invalid claims challenging the loss to a fully captured independent court system (FCI) as then the fully captured court will dismiss legal claims as they are invalid. Peaceful transfer of power or not, under a fully captured independent legal system (FCI)), the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) is the winner when it wins the majority rule-based contest.

b) The post 2016 liberal democracy model under fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) when normal liberal democracy (NLD) wins

When normal liberal democracies (NLD) win the democratic contest under a fully captured independent legal system (FCI) by the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) there will not be transfer of power at all as the extreme liberal democracies (ELD) knowing that filing invalid legal claims challenging election loses in fully captured independent courts (FCI) loyal to it will file invalid claims seeking to stay in power when legally losing elections in these fully captured independent courts (FCI) will keep it in power, and when doing so extreme liberal democracies place the best interest of the leader and movement over the best interest of the country/constitution leaving the constitution behind. If the normal liberal democracy (NLD) files valid claims that it won the election legally into fully captured independent courts (FCI) these courts will dismiss valid legal claims to keep its master movement or leader in power ending the world of normal liberal democracies in the process, a situation highlighted in Figure 12 below:




Figure 12 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A FULLY CAPTURED LEGAL SYSTEM when the normal liberal democracy side(NLD) wins the electoral contest

Figure 12 above notes that if there is no effective targeted chaos(e) under a fully captured independent legal system (FCI) by the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) as indicated by the continuous blue arrow pointing downwards to “e”, then there will not be transfer of power from extreme liberal democracies (ELD) to normal liberal democracies (NLD) as with the help of the fully captured independent courts (FCI) will stay in power regardless of losing the election, and flipping the liberal democracy system in the process towards permanent authoritarianism (PA).

The competition of extreme liberal democracy (ELD) and normal liberal democracy (ELD) for power under the influence of a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) when there is NO effective targeted chaos(e) as indicated in Figure 12 above can be stated analytically as follows:

$$e.FCI \{ELD, NLD\} = e.FCI \{[(T.M)(EI)] [(T.M)(eI)]\} = e.FCI \{T.M(EI)(eI)\} = T.M\{e(Ee)I.FCI\} \quad \text{And since } FCI = i, \text{ then}$$

$$ei \{ELD, NLD\} = ei \{[(T.M)(EI)] [(T.M)(eI)]\} = ei \{T.M(EI)(eI)\} = T.M\{e(Ee)i.i\}$$

And since $Ee \rightarrow e$ when there is no effective targeted chaos and $i.i = i$, the following is true:

$$ei \{ELD, NLD\} = T.M(e)(i) = T.M(ei),$$

The expression above is one where normal liberal democracy (NLD) is the legal winner as there is no effective targeted chaos(e), but the fully capture rule of law (FCI = i) keeps the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) still in power, hence competition when there is NO effective targeted chaos(e) and a fully capture independent rule of law system (FCI = i) leads always to an extreme liberal democracy (ELD) accessing power even though it is not the legal winner, but it has the backing of the fully captured courts (FCI). Hence, the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) stays in power winning or losing elections when there is a fully captured independent court (FCI) loyal to it and hence, there is no liberal democracy (NLD) anymore, but permanent authoritarianism (PA)

Implication 12:

Under a fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) as indicated by the continuous thick brown arrow going from left to right in Figure 12 above when there is no effective targeted chaos (e) the normal liberal democracy (NLD) wins the democratic contest legally, but the fully captured independent rule of law system (FCI) will not certified the normal liberal democracy (NLD) win and keep the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) in power fully knowing that the one who has fully captured them has lost the majority rule based electoral contest. As the independence of the rule of law no longer holds here as now, we have a fully captured legal system where $FCI = i$, this means the end of the liberal democracy model a la majority rule and full respect for the independent rule of law system(I). Here peaceful transfer of power from extreme liberal democracies (ELD) to normal liberal democracies (NLD) when they lose the majority rule-based contest as there is no longer effective targeted chaos(e) is no longer possible as now we are in a world under permanent authoritarianism (PA). In other words, under a fully captured legal system (FCI) the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) stays in power whether it wins or loses the majority rule-based contest ending this way the world of liberal democracies and moving from temporary authoritarianism (TA) to permanent authoritarianism (PA) which allows them permanent access to power.

The structure of the death of liberal democracy

When we have fully captured legal systems ($FCI = i$), we have permanent authoritarianism (PA) so when the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) takes steps to fully capture the independent rule of law system (I) into which it was born to become a fully captured legal system (FCI) at the service of a specific movement or leader we shift the normal liberal democracy model (NLD) permanently to permanent authoritarianism (PA), a model where effective targeted chaos (E) or not(e) the party that captures the legal system or the extreme liberal democracy party (ELD) stays in power for ever, ending democracy that way, a situation summarized in Figure 13 below:




Figure 10 The post 2016 liberal democracy landscape under A FULLY CAPTURED LEGAL SYSTEM

Figure 13 above simply says that under a fully capture independent court system (FCI = i) there is a permanent authoritarianism-based system (PA) as effective targeted chaos or not or winning or losing elections, the extreme liberal democracy stays in power. If it wins the election, it does not need the fully captured courts as normal democratic outcomes will not make legal claims without evidence, but if it loses the election, it needs the fully captured courts to accept invalid claims made by the extreme liberal democracy and keep it in power and to dismiss valid legal claims filed by the legal winner of the election when they lose elections. In all cases, the extreme liberal democracy stays in power, ending the world of normal liberal democracy in the process.

The structure of the death of liberal democracy under a fully captured legal law system (FCI) by the extreme liberal democracy movement (ELD) as indicated in Figure 13 above can be stated analytically as done below:

$$(FCI)(ELD.NLD) = (FCI)\{T.M(EI).T.M(eI)\} = T.M(Ee) (I.I) FCI = T.M(Ee)I.FCI$$

And since $FCI = i$, then

$$(i)(ELD.NLD) = T.M(Ee)Ii$$

And since under fully captured court thinking (FCI) we have that $Ii \rightarrow i$, then we have

$$(i)(ELD.NLD) = T.M(Ee)i = \text{THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY}$$

This structure above summarizes the analytical nature of the death of liberal democracy and the coming of permanent authoritarianism as it tells us that under fully capture independent courts (FCI) the extreme liberal democracy wins even if it loses elections: it has access to power type 1 and it wins legally when there is effective targeted chaos(E); and it uses access to power type 2 when it loses elections so it can stay in power illegally with the help of the fully captured independent court (FCI) as detailed below:

a) If there is effective targeted chaos(E), the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) legally wins

$$E(i)(ELD.NLD) = E\{T.M(Ee)i\}$$

Since when there is effective targeted chaos(E), then $Ee \rightarrow E$, so the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) legally wins access to power as indicated by the structure below:

$$E(i)(ELD.NLD) = E\{T.M(Ee)i\} = E\{T.M(E)i\} = T.M(EE)i = T.M(Ei) = ELD \text{ type 1}$$

Where extreme liberal democracy (ELD) wins access to power legally and it does it without the help of the fully capture independent rule of law (FCI = i) as there is effective targeted chaos(E) and hence it uses access to power type 1.

b) If there is NO effective targeted chaos(e), the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) illegally stays in power with the help of the fully captured independent court (FCI)

$$e(i)(ELD.NLD) = e\{T.M(Ee)i\}$$

Since when there is no effective targeted chaos(e) then $Ee \rightarrow e$, then normal liberal democracy legally wins, but the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) stays in power with the help of the fully captured court (FCI) as indicated by the structure below:

$$e(i)(ELD.NLD) = e\{T.M(Ee)i\} = T.M(E.e.e)i = T.M(Ee)i$$

And since there is no effective targeted chaos(e), then $Ee \rightarrow e$ so that:

$$e(i)(ELD.NLD) = T.M(ei) = T.M(e.FCI) = ELD \text{ access to power type 2}$$

Hence, as shown in the expression above, the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) stays in illegally as the normal liberal democracy (NLD) legally wins access to power, but with the help of the fully capture independent rule of law (FCI = i) the extreme liberal democracy (ELD) stays in power as there is no effective targeted chaos(e), yet it still stays in power using access to power type 2.

Implication 13:

If a party or group or movement while in power fully captures the independency of the legal system (FCI), in this case extreme liberal democracy (ELD), then effective targeted chaos or not or winning electoral contest or not, they stay permanently in power as if they lose elections the fully captured court (FCI) will keep them in power, marking the end of liberal democracies (LD)

and the shift from extreme liberal democracies (ELD) and temporary authoritarianism (TA) to permanent authoritarianism (PA), promoting the rise of authoritarianism movements in other democracies all over the world.

The structure of the death of liberal democracy in the USA

Just imagine that from 2024 to 2028 Trumpism manages to fully capture the independent rule of law system (I) in the USA and makes is a fully captured system (FCI-USA = i) loyal to Trumpism only, then it would have the structure of permanent authoritarianism (PA) so the liberal democracy cold war in the USA if we make extreme liberal democracy (ELD) equal Trumpism so that Trumpism = ELD can be stated as done in Figure 14 below, which also shows the structure of the death of liberal democracy in the USA as win or lose, Trumpism will stay in power in 2028 with the help of fully captured independent rule of law courts in the USA (FCI-USA = i) in the case of losing as appreciated below:




Figure 14 The structure of the death of normal liberal democracy in the USA

When we have fully captured legal systems(FCI = i) in the USA as indicated in Figure 14 above, we have Trumpism as a permanent authoritarianism (PA) model so when Trumpism

takes steps to fully capture the independent rule of law system (I) into which it was born to become a fully captured legal system(FCI-USA = i) at the service of Trumpism or its leader we shift the normal liberal democracy model in the USA(NLD-USA) permanently to permanent authoritarianism(PA) so that TRUMPISM = TA---> PA, a model where effective targeted chaos(E) or not(e) Trumpism stays in power for ever, ending normal liberal democracy in the USA that way, a situation summarized in Figure 14 above. For example, Trumpism should be expected to work very hard towards to 2028 elections to capture independence of the courts fully in the USA so that next time the capture is real (Kapur and Hurley 2024) so if it loses the election legally it can stay in power with the help of the fully captured court. Capturing the courts in the USA fully is needed if Trumpism wants to stay in power in the case that maintaining effective targeted chaos through controversial road maps (Wendling 2024), controversial cabinet members (Tausche and Holmes 2024) and controversial policies (Gollom 2024) all the way from 2024 to 2028 fails. When Trump won power in 2024(Boynton and Aziz 2024) transition of power went peacefully as his win was not challenged and Biden even plans to attend the inauguration (TG 2024b).

The structure of the death of liberal democracy under Trumpism if it manages to fully capture legal law system (FCI) as indicated in Figure 14 above can be indicated analytically as done below:

$$\begin{aligned} (\text{FCI-USA}) (\text{Trumpism. NLD-USA}) &= (\text{FCI-USA}) \{T.M(EI).T.M(eI)\} \\ &= T.M(Ee) (I.I) \text{FCI-USA} = T.M(Ee)I.\text{FCI-USA} \end{aligned}$$

And since FCI-USA = i, then

$$(i)(\text{Trumpism.NLD-USA}) = T.M(Ee)Ii$$

And since under fully captured court (FCI-USA = i) thinking we have that Ii---->i, then we arrive at:

$$(i)(\text{Trumpism.NLD-USA}) = T.M(Ee)i = \text{THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY UNDER TRUMPISM}$$

This structure above summarizes the analytical nature of the death of liberal democracy under Trumpism and the coming of permanent authoritarianism as it tells us that under fully capture independent courts (FCI) Trumpism wins even if it loses elections: it has access to power type 1 and it wins legally when there is effective targeted chaos(E); and it uses access to power type 2 when it loses elections so it can stay in power illegally with the help of the fully captured independent court (FCI-USA) as detailed below:

a) If there is effective targeted chaos(E), Trumpism wins

$$E(i)(\text{Trumpism.NLD-USA}) = E\{T.M(Ee)i\}$$

Since when there is effective targeted chaos(E), then $Ee \rightarrow E$, so that Trumpism legally wins access to power as indicated by the structure below:

$E(i)(\text{Trumpism.NLD-USA}) = E\{T.M(Ee)i\} = E\{T.M(E)i\} = T.M(Ee)i = T.M(Ei) = \text{Trumpism access to power type 1}$

When Trumpism wins access to power legally and it does it without the help of the fully capture independent rule of law (FCI-USA = i) as there is effective targeted chaos(E) and hence it uses access to power type 1.

b) If there is NO effective targeted chaos (e), Trumpism illegally stays in power with the help of the fully captured independent court (FCI-USA)

$e(i)(\text{Trumpism.NLD-USA}) = e\{T.M(Ee)i\}$

Since when there is no effective targeted chaos(e) then $Ee \rightarrow e$, then the normal liberal democracy (NLD-USA) legally wins access to power, but Trumpism stays in power with the help of the fully captured USA courts (FCI-USA) as indicated by the structure below:

$e(i)(\text{Trumpism.NLD-USA}) = e\{T.M(Ee)i\} = T.M(E.e.e)i = T.M(Ee)i$

And since there is no effective targeted chaos(e), then $Ee \rightarrow e$ so that:

$e(i)(\text{Trumpism.NLD-USA}) = T.M(ei) = T.M(e.FCI-USA) = \text{Trumpism access to power type 2}$

Hence, as shown in the expression above, Trumpism stays in power illegally as the normal liberal democracy (NLD-USA) legally wins access to power as there is no effective targeted chaos(e), but with the help of the fully capture independent rule of law (FCI-USA = i) Trumpism stays in power using access to power type 2.

Implication 14:

If a party or group or movement while in power fully captures the independency of the legal system (FCI) so that $FCI-USA = i$, in this US case Trumpism, then effective targeted chaos or not or winning electoral contest or not, Trumpism stays permanently in power as if it loses elections the fully captured court US court system ($FCI-USA = i$) will keep it in power, marking the end of liberal democracies in the US(NLD-USA) and the shift from Trumpism and temporary authoritarianism (TA) to permanent authoritarianism (PA), promoting the rise of authoritarianism movements in other democracies around the world.

Food for thoughts

1) If the independence of the legal system is fully captured by one party or group or movement is that a democracy? I think No, what do you think? 2) If targeted chaos lead to full true majority complacency, do we have temporary authoritarianism getting access to power? I

think Yes, what do you think? and 3) Under a fully independent rule of law system can permanent authoritarianism take hold of power? I think No, what do you think?

Conclusions

It was pointed out that liberal democracy landscape post 2016 Brexit and 2016 Usexit can be viewed from the point of view of a fully independent legal system, to a perceived captured legal system, and to a fully captured legal system using qualitative comparative thinking and rules, which can be linked to expected nature of transfer of power. It was expressed that under a fully independent legal system, any party can win access to power, whether the transition of power is peaceful or not, but court independency in general encourages peaceful transfer of power. It was highlighted that when one party or movement believes it has captured the independence of the legal system, then if it loses the election, we should not expect a peaceful transfer of power as it will try to file illegal claims to the perceived captured court and if the perceived capture is not real, then the perceived capture courts will certify as the winner the actual winner. However, if the perceived capture were to turn out to be real, then the captured court would deny access to power to the actual winner and grant power to the actual loser who has captured it. It was indicated that when one party or movement captures fully the independence of the court system, then there is no longer a democracy, but a permanent authoritarianism-based model as the party or movement that has fully captured the independent rule of law system will stay in power whether it wins or loses elections. It was stated that fully captured legal system means the end of democracy and the shift from temporary authoritarianism under extreme liberal democracy thinking to permanent authoritarianism. And it was mentioned that a fully capture legal system in the USA means the end of democracy in the USA and the shift in the USA from temporary authoritarianism under Trumpism to permanent authoritarianism in the USA.

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